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PART I. FURTHER DISLOCATIONS.¹

BOOK I.

12. 3. *καί* should precede *πρότερον*, not *ἀποδασμος*.

28. 5. The order should be *ἐτοῖμοι δὲ εἶναι καὶ σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι ὥστε ἀμφοτέρους μένειν κ.τ.λ.* So 8. 20. 2 *ἐσπείσατο Τηίοις ὥστε δέχεσθαι καὶ σφᾶς*.

77. 3. *ἦν τι παρὰ τὸ μὴ οἶεσθαι χρῆναι ἢ γνώμη ἢ δυνάμει . . . καὶ ὅπως οὖν ἐλασσωθῶσιν*.

It is difficult to be satisfied with *παρὰ . . . χρῆναι*, contrary to their not thinking it right. First the grammar and sense are peculiar. Is there any other instance of *παρὰ* with this meaning taking *τό* and infinitive? Nor would the conduct be contrary to their act of thinking it wrong, but to their thought that it was wrong. For both these reasons we should expect something like *παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν*, or *παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν δίκαιον εἶναι*, and not what we find. Again, even if we waived these objections, what a needlessly awkward phrase it is!

Perhaps then we may translate *παρὰ* by *reason of* (I. 141. 7 *παρὰ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν*), and look for some place in which the words may stand. I do not however find any altogether satisfactory. Possibly they might go after *μετρίοις οὖσι*, or better with *μὴ στερισκόμενοι* (the subject of *οἶεσθαι* being *we*). The really best place is some twelve or thirteen lines above with *τοῦ μὴ πλέον ἔχειν ἀπετράπετο*, but it is a long way to move them.

78. 4. *οὐτ' αὐτοὶ δυντες* Cobet.

120. 1. *ἐν ἄλλοις* has been found hard to explain. Put it in the next line after *ἤδη*.

126. 6. Is not *πανδημεὶ* only an anticipation of the *πανδημεὶ* in 7? Remove it and *πολλοί* becomes unobjectionable. The proposed *πολλά* is very weak. Cf. however 3. 3 *πανδημεὶ ἐορτάζουσιν*.

128. 5. The *καί* before *βασιλέως* should be moved into the next line to

¹ See *Classical Quarterly*, vol. vi., pp. 137 sqq., 217 sqq.

precede *ἐάλωσαν*. *βασιλέως κ.τ.λ.* is in apposition to *Μῆδοι*, the chief persons being named.

136. 4. *ἐς τὸ σῶμα σφῆσθαι*. *ἐς τὸ σφῆσθαι τὸ σῶμα*? When the order was inverted, one *τό* was dropped.

BOOK II.

65. 10. *αὐτοί* is hard to explain. Whether we say with Stahl 'apart from their position' or with Krueger and Steup that *αὐτοί* *πρὸς ἀλλήλους* = *πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς* or *σφᾶς αὐτῶν*, or, as I should prefer, *themselves* as contrasted with Pericles, the explanation is not convincing. We might read in the next line *ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ αὐτοὶ πρῶτος ἕκαστος* (οἱ τοῦ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ἕκαστος) *γίγνεσθαι*. Herwerden suggested this *αὐτός*, independently of *αὐτοί*; and, though not indispensable (4. 80. 3), it is common.

76. 4. The unusual *ἀπό* before *τῆς τομῆς* looks like a duplicate of the other. Cf. on 8. 44. 1 below.

77. 4. *ἀπ' αὐτοῦ* should go a little above with *ἐγένετο φλόξ τοσαύτη*.

89. 2. *καὶ τὸ πλήθος τῶν νεῶν οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου παρεσκευάσατο*?

90. 6. The *ἤδη* after *εἶλον*, which is hard to explain, may be a duplicate of the *ἤδη* shortly following. 8. 82. 3 is a very clear case of *ἤδη* repeated.

96. 3. *καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα ἔθνη* may be right, but perhaps *ὅσα ἄλλα* as in 6. 105. 2.

100. 2. Possibly the *τε* should follow *ἵπποις*.

102. 4. *τὸ* (with two MSS., not *τῷ*) *μὴ σκεδάννυσθαι* after *γίγνονται*, giving the result? Cf. on 7. 53. 4. So 6. 1. 2, unless we should there read *τοῦ*. (At. H. An. 6. 3. 562 a 25 MSS. vary between *τοῦ μή* and *τὸ μή* after *διείργει*).

BOOK III.

11. 6. I before suggested *καθ' ἐν γενομένους* with *σῆμαι*. I should now prefer *καθ' ἐν γενομένων* after *παράσχη*.

12. 1. *ὃ τε τοῖς ἄλλοις μάλιστα εὖνοια πίστιν βεβαιοῖ, ἡμῖν τοῦτο ὁ φόβος ἐχυρὸν παρῆχε*.

Read *ὃ . . . εὖνοια βεβαιοῖ, πίστιν, ἡμῖν τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.* Steup in discussing the passage maintains that fear could hardly be said to promote *πίστις*, i.e. mutual trust. That is to give *πίστις* too narrow a meaning. It is trust or confidence of any kind, as in 2. 39. 1 *πιστεύοντες . . . παρασκευαῖς καὶ ἀπάταις*, 5. 106 *πιστεύοντες τῷ ξυμφέροντι αὐτῶν*. With *πίστιν* added to explain *ὃ* cf. 59. 3 *τῷ αἰσχύιστῳ ὀλέθρῳ, λιμῷ* and *ibid.* *ὅπερ κ.τ.λ., λόγου τελευτᾶν*: 4. 13. 4: 7. 36. 4 and 5.

39. 8. The conjecture *ἔπειτα τῆς προσόδου* is very plausible.

45. 4. *τῶν ἀνθρώπων* might very well follow *ξυντυχίαι*. But *τὸν ἀνθρώπων* is attractive.

51. 4. Did not Thucydides write something like *τεῖχος τειχίσας καὶ φρουρὰν ἐγκαταλιπών*?

80. 1. *δμως* after *οἱ δὲ Π.*?

81. 2. Hude corrects λαβόντες to λαθόντες. If λαθόντες is right, as seems possible enough, it would really go better in the preceding sentence, e.g. with ἀποκομίζονται. ὅπως μὴ . . . ὀφθῶσιν strongly suggests it.

82. 7. If Reiske's ἐκατέρων for ἐκατέρω is right, it might with advantage be put with οὐκ ἐχ. ἄλλ. δύν. For ἐκατέροι with a negative cf. 4. 96. 2. The dative ἐκατέρω is almost, if not quite, superfluous and, if it = ὑπὸ ἐκατέρου, very awkward with διδόμενοι.

92. 5. τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς θεόν (the regular phrase) Cobet. Cf. 1. 134. 4.

104. 6. καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα can hardly mean 'and most of the celebration.' καί seems wrongly repeated from the line before.

So in 108. 2 the καί before οἱ κατὰ seems to come from the line following.

III. 2. οὕτως ἀθροῖ better perhaps with ὥρμησαν than, as I proposed before, with ἀπεχώρουν. Cf. 4. 34. 1 ἀθροῖ ὥρμησαν.

BOOK IV.

4. 1. τοὺς στρατιώτας appears to be another form of the τοῖς στρατιώταις just below. So in 54. 1 the second ἐπὶ θαλάσῃ, and in 44. 4 the second ὥς.

17. 1. As the sentence now stands, the Lacedaemonians speak of some course to be adopted, which will be advantageous to the Athenians and as honourable to the Lacedaemonians as circumstances allow. The latter part of this is rather surprising. It is not honour (κόσμος) that they want, but to recover the captives, which would be a very positive gain. Moreover in § 4 it is to the Athenians that honour and glory (τιμὴ καὶ δόξα) are to accrue. The same thing is said in 20. 2, and that the Lacedaemonians are to come well out of their disaster. The sentence then is dislocated in its parts, and requires rather more than usual rearrangement: ὅτι ἂν ἡμῖν τε ἐς τὴν ξυμφορὰν ὥς ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ὠφέλιμον ὃν τὸ αὐτὸ πείθωμεν καὶ ὑμῖν κόσμον μάλιστα μέλλη οἶσιν.

18. 4. It is not easy to believe that ἔθεντο and νομίσωσι can stand side by side in one construction, though 2. 44. 1 λάχωσιν and ξυνεμετρήθη may be cited as a parallel. 4. 92. 1 certainly is not such. The only other apparent instances known to me of such a combination are Hesiod *Theog.* 607-8 and the two documentary phrases in Dem. 24. 39 and 63. But in the present passage may we not adopt the remedy of reading μὴ νομίσωσι for νομίσωσι μὴ?

22. 2. λέγων γιγνώσκειν μὲν καὶ πρότερον . . . , σαφὲς δ' εἶναι καὶ νῦν.

The second clause is ludicrous after the first. Read νῦν δὲ καὶ σαφὲς εἶναι, unless καὶ is to be put into another clause (before πολὺς?) or omitted as a repetition of the καὶ before πρότερον.

41. 4. The slight pause after the genitive absolute φοιτῶντων gives αὐτοὺς an emphasis which it cannot support. The case is perhaps only due to μειζόνων. Read either ἀπράκτους αὐτοὺς or just possibly φοιτῶντας αὐτοὺς ἀπράκτους.

44. 5. ἐγγὺς ἀστυγειτόνων is disagreeably pleonastic, 'near neighbour'

not being a Greek expression. ἐγγύς should perhaps go before ἐπιόντας, though it might also stand above before γεγενημένον or below before ἐπικειμένους νήσους. Cf. 4. 8. 6 νήσος . . . ἐγγύς ἐπικειμένη.

56. 1. The dative τοῖς 'A. is not easily justified, and one would like to govern it by γίγνοιτο: cf. 5. 66. 2: 7. 70. 7: etc. Also καὶ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ seems to come awkwardly at the end. Put then τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἡσύχασαν after τοιούτῳ, 'thinking themselves inferior in numbers, and in the situation (or state of feeling) above described, they kept quiet.' It may be enough to put it after ἀπόβασις.

72. 4. Partly adopting changes already proposed, I suggest something like οὐ μέντοι . . . οὐδέτεροι ἐνίκησαν, ἀλλὰ τελευτώντες ἀπεκρίθησαν οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ. Cf. Herod. 1. 76 (end) τέλος οὐδέτεροι νικήσαντες διέστησαν. τελευτήσαντες cannot have been used in the sense of *effect*, *achieve*. To *finish* is something different.

73. 2. καὶ αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἀκοντι τὴν νίκην δικαίως ἂν τίθεσθαι. Is ὥσπερ in place here? The supposition is that no fighting at all would take place, and in that case ἀκοντι would be literally true and the qualifying ὥσπερ unsuitable. Three lines below we have ὥσπερ ἡσσηθέντων, and I suspect our ὥσπερ comes from there. Possibly we should read there ὥσπερ ἀκοντι ἡσσηθέντων, but ἀκοντι seems to have more real point where it now stands.

85. 4. The first τε might follow παρά or ἐνυμμάχους and the second διά.

87. 4. Steup is right in demurring to the common explanation of οὐ γὰρ δὴ . . . πράσσοιμεν, *for otherwise we should not be acting reasonably*. No one would say 'I should be right in preventing you from hindering the liberation of Greece, *for otherwise I should be wrong*.' He would say 'I should be right, *for otherwise it could not be effected*,' or give some other distinct reason to show *why* he would be right. In other words such an οὐ γὰρ adduces an argument in support of what precedes it, and 'otherwise we should be in the wrong' is no argument at all.

But I would not with Steup read ἀπεικότως. I prefer to put μή . . . αἰτία into the former clause of the two, say before εἰκότως, and then to carry on its force with οὐδ' ὀφείλομεν.

ib. 5. τοὺς after ὑμᾶς repeated from the line before, unless it stands for something else, e.g. τοῦτοις.

90. 1. τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦ 'A. is often bracketed as an adscript, and it certainly may be one. But, if put a line or two earlier after Δήλιον, there would seem no objection to it. Cf. 8. 67. 2. Even if an adscript, it would naturally have been attached to the first Δήλιον, not the second.

92. 3. 'A. δὲ προσέτι καὶ ὁμόρους? καὶ ὁμόρους προσέτι? Cf. 7. 29. 4.

93. 2. αὐτῷ after Ἰπποκράτει: not, as I first suggested, with ἐπέρχονται.

105. 1. καὶ δεδιώς for δεδιώς καί? But the present order seems defensible in Thucydides. Cf. e.g. 116. 1, and on 6. 24. 1: 62. 1 below.

108. 6. Possibly the hopeless ἐφίμενος should stand as ἐφίμενοι after καταλῦσαι below, parallel in spite of τε καὶ το βουλόμενοι. Cf. 6. 6. 1 ἐφίμενοι

μέν
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φύλα
scrib
tion
ἐμβο
more
τῶν
ἐπὶ
ἐλευθ
words
in ἐπ
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Attic
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μέν . . . ἄρξαι, βοηθεῖν δέ . . . βουλόμενοι. After Λακεδαίμονα something like ἐπεμπε seems lost. It cannot be understood from διέπεμπον, and, if it were, φυλακάς would be understood also.

112. 1. No defence is possible for ἐμβοήσαντας and παρασχόντας, describing what occurred after the time of ἀναστήσας. Such cases as are mentioned below in a note on 4. 81. 1 are very different. We have to read καὶ ἐμβοήσαντές τε ἂ. καὶ ἐκπλήξιν παρασχόντες οἱ μὲν κ.τ.λ.

118. 3. Is the second and wholly superfluous τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρώμενοι more than a repetition? Cf. on 126. 2.

119. 1. καὶ ὤμοσαν after ξυνέθεντο?

119. 3 - 120. 1. ἡ μὲν δὲ ἐκχειρία αὕτη ἐγένετο καὶ ξυνῆσαν ἐν αὐτῇ περὶ τῶν μεζόνων σπονδῶν διὰ παντὸς ἐς λόγους. περὶ δὲ τὰς ἡμέρας ταύτας αἷς ἐπύρχοντο Σκιῶν . . . ἀπέστη.

121. 1. τὸν Βρασίδαν . . . δημοσίᾳ μὲν χρυσῷ στεφάνῳ ἀνέδθησαν ὡς ἐλευθεροῦντα τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἑταινίου τε καὶ προσήρχοντο ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ.

Though it is only in one of these passages that I think a transposition of words is wanted, they are best taken together because of the common difficulty in ἐπύρχοντο and προσήρχοντο. The older editors took these as imperfects of ἐπύρχομαι and προσέρχομαι. It is now well understood that in ἔρχομαι and its compounds ordinary Attic speech (we may almost, though not quite, say serious Attic poetry too) limits itself to the present indicative and makes no use of other parts of the verb. The imperfect rests on the evidence of these two passages and of Ar. *Thesm.* 504, where for the imperfect περιήρχετ' we should no doubt read with Herwerden the graphic present περιέρχεται, there being several other such presents in the same story. Thucydides has the ordinary imperfect ξυνῆσαν at the end of 119. 3 itself (above quoted), and he uses that form dozens of times. Moreover ἐπύρχομαι is unknown in the sense which it would have to bear here. It is rather puzzling that in Pollux 3. 152 we read in the list of words used in connexion with athletic victories ἀναδῆσαι, στεφανώσαι, ταινιώσαι. Ξενοφῶν γὰρ εἶρηκεν 'ἑταινίου τε καὶ προσήσαν ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ.' Probably, I think, he (or his authority) was quoting our passage, but put down the wrong author, and unconsciously substituted the Attic form προσήσαν or προσῆσαν for προσήρχοντο. This would no doubt go to show that he thought the word came from προσέρχομαι.

Driven from ἔρχομαι, editors have fallen back upon ἄρχομαι. ἐπύρχοντο is supposed (Stahl, Steup) to be a ceremonial word, referring to religious rites at the conclusion of the armistice, and προσήρχοντο to mean 'brought offerings,' such as wreaths and flowers. ἐπάρχομαι is however a word unknown in Attic Greek, hardly known indeed at all except in the Homeric ἑπαρξάμενοι δεπάεσσιν. It is also surely ludicrous to think that Thucydides would have referred here to any religious rites. Had he wanted to add anything to τὰς ἡμέρας ταύτας—and such addition is not usual with him, the words explaining themselves—he would have said ἐν αἷς ταῦτα, or ἡ ἐκχειρία, ἐγένετο (ἐν on the other hand being required by Thucydidean and general usage). προσάρχομαι is also

otherwise unknown in Attic Greek, except for Plato *Theaet.* 168c ταῦτα . . . προσηρξάμην, σμικρὰ ἀπὸ σμικρῶν, where the conjecture προσήρκεσα μὲν (cf. Soph. *O.C.* 72 προσαρκῶν σμικρά) is almost certainly right.

In our text προσήρχοντο is, I think, a mistake for προσήγχοντο, they offered vows and prayers for him, as for an athlete. Cf. Ar. *Eth.* 3. 2. 1111b 24. This is strongly supported by a passage in Xen. *Hell.* 5. 1. 3 about another Spartan general, where the words are curiously similar: ὁ μὲν ἐστεφάνωσεν, ὁ δὲ ἐταινίωσεν, οἱ δὲ . . . ἤγχοντο αὐτῷ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ, to which perhaps *ib.* 3. 2. 22 προσεύχεσθαι νίκην πολέμου may be added.

Coming now to ἐπήρχοντο in 120. I we observe that the line preceding refers to the μείζονες σπονδαί, which both sides had in view. In 117 this is directly affirmed of them both (ξυμβῆναι τὰ πλείω, σπονδὰς ποιήσασθαι καὶ ἐς τὸν πλείω χρόνον). I conjecture then that ἐπήρχοντο should be ἐπήρνοντο, that is that in the line preceding we should read περὶ τῶν μείζονων σπονδῶν αὖς ἐπήρνοντο, to which they looked forward, in hope of which they were acting. ἐπαίρομαι is distinctly so used of something still in the future in 1. 42. 2, τὸ μέλλον τοῦ πολέμου and then ἐπαρθέντας αὐτῷ. The common phrases ἐπαίρεσθαι κέρδει, χρήμασιν, etc., have also really very often a future reference. 121. I here has ἐπήρθησαν in a less noticeable use.

120. 3. φάσκων, as critics have seen, cannot well be right here. It seems to belong to a place five lines below, where read φάσκων σημείον τ' εἶναι.

122. 2. Great disorder prevails in this passage. First is it likely that Brasidas sent his troops back to Torone (why should he?) before he had received formal notice of the truce and had satisfied himself that all was correct? Yet we read that he sent them back and that then the communication was made to him. Put καὶ ἡ μὲν . . . Τορώνην after the clause beginning καὶ εἰδέξαντο.

But this clause itself and the words following, εἰδέξαντο πάντες τὰ πεπραγμένα · Ἀριστάνυμος δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κατήνει, Σκιωναίους δὲ κ.τ.λ., need another change. A dative with καταινῶ of that which is assented to, approved, is unknown. Steup's τοῦτο understood is very harsh and otherwise poor. The truth is that τὰ πεπραγμένα should either precede or follow κατήνει and govern τοῖς ἄλλοις (masculine). The object of εἰδέξαντο is τὴν ξυνθήκην.

126. 2. μηδέ, which perplexes the sense and has led to some very forced interpretations, seems only a repetition of μηδέ(ν) in the line before. Cf. on 118. 3.

128. 5. Περδικκας . . . ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν Πελοποννησίων τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ δι' Ἀθηναίους οὐ ξύνθηες μίσος εἶχε, τῶν δὲ ἀναγκαίων ξυμφόρων διαναστὰς ἐπρασεν ὅτῳ τρόπῳ τάχιστα τοῖς μὲν ξυμβήσεται, τῶν δὲ διαλλάσσεται.

There are three, if not four, difficulties in this. δι' Ἀ. is quite unintelligible where it stands. The actual reason has just been given, and the Athenians had nothing to do with it. Steup therefore proposes to put δι' Ἀ. after ξυμφόρων, what on account of the A. were his necessary interests. It is no doubt true that the interests of Perdiccas and the A. were at variance. The phrase

is however an unusual one, and as a matter of fact Thucydides never notices elsewhere this clashing of interests and does not here explain his own expression. What we read elsewhere is that the A. had supported Philip and Derdas against Perdiccas (I. 57. 3), and in apparent reference to this he has been described in 4. 79. 2 as φοβούμενος τὰ παλαιὰ διάφορα τῶν 'Α. Farther διαναστάς is a very strange word here. It seems not to occur elsewhere except in late Greek. There it always has some sense, as we should expect, of *rising up*, whereas here some such sense as *departing from*, *renouncing*, is needed. The scholiast in explaining the passage uses ἀποστάς, and that is the word we might expect. The scholiast's lemma is τῶν ἁ. ξυμφόρων, but his explanation by ἐνεκα and διὰ with accusative points to his having had τῶ ἁ. ξυμφόρῳ before him. Madvig thought this right: Stahl and Hude follow him. Stahl also prints διαστάς (Madvig) for διαναστάς, rendering it *abalienatus*, and so too Hude. He cites no parallel and would not easily have found one for this use with regard to a single person. διεστάναι, διαστήναι are almost always used of two distinct things or persons, or else of one divided into parts. Once or twice we find such a phrase as πλούτου ἀρετὴ διέστηκε (Plato *Rep.* 550 E), ἡ ἀριστοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας (Ar. *Pol.* 3. 2, 1289b 3), expressive of difference and distinction; but is there any real parallel to its supposed use here? A slight further difficulty as to the antithesis of τῇ μὲν γνώμῃ is pointed out by Steup, and μὲν is probably out of place.

Taking account of all these points, remembering that Thucydides likes to repeat an expression from another place, and founding myself on 79. 2, I suggest Πελοποννησίων μὲν τῇ γνώμῃ οὐ ξύνηθες μῖσος εἶχε, τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν ἐς 'Αθηναίους διαφόρων (or διαφόρων ἐς 'Α.) ἀποστάς. The *dia* of διαφόρων may have something to do with δι' 'Α. or δι-αναστάς.

Possibly the corruption to ἀναγκαίων may be paralleled. On Soph. *O.C.* 390 the scholiast speaks of a reading as found ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτέροις τῶν ἀντιγράφων. This apparently unique phrase is taken to mean the most *indispensable*, *valuable* copies. Was the real word παλαιότεροις?

BOOK V.

5. I. ἐποίκοις and ἔποικοι look like duplicates. Probably the former should be omitted (Cobet). So just below τοῖς (sometimes bracketed) before κομιζόμενοις may come from τοῖς Λοκροῖς. Cf. however 8. 69. 3 τῶν ἐποίκων, οὓς 'Α. ἐπεμφαν οἰκήσοντας.

10. 7. ἐξαπίνης καὶ would be better than καὶ ἐξαπίνης, though not very good. Perhaps ἐξαπίνης should precede ἐπεφέρετο and καὶ emphasize ἀμφοτέρωθεν.

41. 2. ἔχει δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ Θυρέαν καὶ 'Ανθήνην πόλιν.

It is curious that πόλιν should be attached to 'Α. only. Perhaps Θ. πόλιν καὶ 'Α.; perhaps Θ. καὶ 'Α. πόλεις.

44. I. πόλιν σφίσι τε φιλίαν? φιλίαν τε σφίσι πόλιν?

BOOK VI.

24. 1. ἡ ἀποτρέψει before τοὺς 'A. would be natural, but cf. on 4. 105. 1. 8. 46. 1 has also been altered.

25. 2. No real parallel is adduced for ἄκων μὲν εἶπεν ὅτι κ.τ.λ. with nothing answering to μὲν. εἶπε δέ is conjectured. We might also think of ἄκων εἶπε μὲν ὅτι, in which case μέντοι would answer μὲν. Regularly ἔφη or another such word should have been added to μέντοι, but cf. e.g. Plat. Prot. 316 D φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους κ.τ.λ.

62. 1. εἰδέναι μὲν? but cf. on 24. 1 above.

64. 1. The καί after δυνήθentes should probably go before κατὰ γῆν.

ib. 3. The second τὸ στράτευμα seems a mistaken repetition of the first.

BOOK VII.

26. 2. τῶν Λακ. perhaps with ἀρπαγὴν ποιῶνται. Cf. Eur. H.F. 591 ἐφ' ἀρπαγαῖσι τῶν πέλας and (?) Phoen. 1021.

39. 2. τῶν πωλουμένων not with ὅσα . . . ἐδώδιμα, as I first thought, but after τοὺς ἐπιμελομένους. Cf. [Arist.] 'Aθ. Πολ. 51 τοῖσι (i.e. τοῖς ἀγορανόμοις) ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων προστέακται τῶν ὀνίων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πάντων.

41. 2. αἱ before ὑπέρ, not before ἀπό? Hardly necessary, though usual.

69. 2. If αὐτοῖς is to be bracketed, which I doubt, it would go well with ὁ κίνδυνος or ἐγγύς above.

75. 3. οἱ ζῶντες καταλειπόμενοι . . . πολλὸν τῶν τεθνεώτων τοῖς ζῶσι λυπηρότεροι ἦσαν καὶ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ἀθλιώτεροι.

I do not see how to deal with the last four words (which cannot be right just after τῶν τεθν. λυπ.), unless, proceeding on the common confusion of καὶ and ὥς, we read ὥς τῶν ἀπολ. ἀθλ. in the next sentence, say after τραπόμενοι. It is a thing they might naturally say.

τοῖς ζῶσι is due to οἱ ζῶντες just before and stands, as has been suggested, for some other participle, e.g. τοῖς ὀρώσι or ἀπιούσα.

BOOK VIII.

44. 1. ἀπό before τῶν δυνατωτάτων perhaps only a duplicate of that before αὐτῶν. Cf. on 2. 76. 4 above. So probably the first ὑπό in 39. 1, and certainly the first ὥστε in 45. 3: perhaps the second οὖν in 57. 2.

45. 4. ὥς οἱ μὲν Χῖοι ἀναίσχυντοι εἰεν πλουσιώτατοι ὄντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἐπικουρίᾳ δ' ὅμως σφζόμενοι ἀξιοῦσι καὶ τοῖς σώμασι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασι ἄλλους ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίας κινδυνεύειν.

Besides the absence of μὲν from πλουσ. ὄντες and the very irregular antithesis of the verb ἀξιοῦσι to the participle ὄντες, it may be observed that ἐπικ. σφζóm. and ἀξιοῦσιν ἄλλους κινδ. say the same thing twice in one clause. ἐπικ. σφζóm. is tautological and superfluous as it stands. These various points suggest reading ἀναίσχυντοι εἰεν ἐπικουρίᾳ σφζόμενοι, πλουσιώτατοι δ' ὅμως

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δυνες (though the wealthiest; cf. 7. 75. 6) τῶν Ἐ. ἀξιοῦσι κ.τ.λ. The form is still slightly irregular, but much less so.

66. 4. καὶ προσολοφύρασθαί τινι ἀγανακτήσαντα, ὥστε ἀμύνασθαι ἐπιβουλεύσαντα, ἀδύνατον ἦν.

The two actions of bewailing yourself and revenging (or defending?) yourself go so little naturally together, that their association here by ὥστε arouses suspicion. Roughly it is the helpless man who bewails himself, the man of strength and resource who revenges or defends himself. Nor is anything explicitly said in the Greek about another man's assistance. I guess therefore that ὥστε ἀμύν. ἐπιβ. belongs to the sentence preceding, not to this.

In that sentence we are met with the difficulty of ἐξευρεῖν occurring twice. The second ἐξευρεῖν appears to be a case of a copyist substituting a word from the context for the right word, an error not uncommon. Tucker suggests αὐτὸ ἐξαιρεῖν, which makes good sense; but in such cases there is no need for the word closely to resemble the other which it has displaced. Probably it was some word, which led up naturally to ὥστε ἀμύν. ἐπιβ., e.g. προνοεῖν. ἐπιβουλεύσαντα hardly seems suitable to the subject of ἀμύνασθαι, while, if it is object, τὸν ἐπ. might be expected. Perhaps ἐπιβουλεύσαντας (object), referring to the persons implied in τὸ ξυνεστηκός. In 5 ἀπιστον and ἀπιστίαν may be, like ἐξευρεῖν, an erroneous repetition. But I incline to think them right, adopting Goodhart's ἄλλους for πολλούς.

68. 4. Theramenes was not πρῶτος in the sense of being absolutely first, and for the sense of a *leading man* there is no parallel. Should we read (of Phrynichus) φερεγγυάτατος ἐφάνη ἐν τοῖς ξυγκαταλύουσι τὸν δῆμον and then go on καὶ Θηραμένης . . . ἐν τοῖς πρῶτος ἦν? (ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι 89. 2). I have also thought of πρῶτός <τις>, but there is probably no example of that phrase. In Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 18 the MSS. vary between δυσπάλαιστος and δυσπάλαιστός τις.

99. 1. που should probably be πω (Hude, who omits τέως), but in any case τέως cannot mean *yet*. *Meanwhile* is unsuitable here, but a little below Φαρνάβαζός τε τέως, *Pharnabazus meanwhile*, would be quite appropriate.

101. 2-3. Is τῆς ἡπίρου right in both places, or is one a duplicate?

PART II. MISCELLANEOUS EMENDATIONS.

BOOK I.

3. 2. δοκεῖ δέ μοι κ.τ.λ.

As the words now run, δοκεῖ first stands independently, associated with an indicative (εἶχεν); then is taken into the construction, so that ἡ ἐπικλησις becomes a subject of it and an infinitive (εἶναι) is governed by it; finally and ungrammatically takes an accusative and infinitive (καθ' ἐκάστους, or αὐτούς understood, καλεῖσθαι Ἑλληνας). The third part at any rate should, I think, be corrected by reading Ἑλληνες. The mistake would be a very easy one, and probably most readers fail to notice that the accusative has no real construc-

tion. In the first part Reiske's *ἔχειν* for *εἶχεν* is probably right, the sentence being very faulty without it and the confusion not uncommon. For the form of sentence cf. 2. 17. 2.

9. 3. *ναυτικῷ τε* may stand for *ναυτικῷ τι* (cf. *εἰ μὴ τι καὶ ναυτικὸν εἶχεν* just below), but *τε* occurs often strangely in our text, and therefore that is not very probable.

10. 4. *οἱ μάχιμοι* for *καὶ μάχιμοι*?

11. 2. Perhaps it is *τὴν Τροίαν εἶλον*, not the *εἶλον* after *κρατοῦντες*, that should be omitted, as a natural adscript added to explain the meaning. *μάχη κρατοῦντες* will not refer to one battle, but to fighting in general, and the sense will be that they could easily have reduced Troy by fighting, if the enemy chose to meet them in the field, and still more easily and rapidly by blockade.

17. *οἱ δὲ* (for *γάρ*) *ἐν Σικελίᾳ*.

23. 6. Should not *γυγνομένους* be *γενομένους*? Cf. on 63. 2.

25. 1. The first *ποιεῖσθαι* is merely due to the second by anticipation. Cobet's *πορίζεσθαι* or some such word should be adopted.

ιδ. 4. Read *περιφρονούντες δὲ αὐτοὺς <ὥς> καὶ χρημάτων δυνάμει ὄντες* . . . *ὅμοιοι τοῖς Ἑ. πλουσιωτάτοις* . . . *ναυτικῷ δὲ καὶ πολὺ προὔχειν ἔστιν ὅτι* (for *ὅτε*) *ἐπαίρόμενοι κ.τ.λ.*

ὅμοιοι for *ὅμοια* Kratz. *ὥς* is often confused with *καί* in MSS. and would easily fall out before it. Cf. on 4. 10. 1. *ἔστιν ὅτε* seems rather wanting in sense; *ἔστιν ὅτι* connects much better with the special ground of confidence alleged. This contributed in some measure. 2. 94. 3 *ἔστι γάρ ὅτι καὶ αἱ νῆες αὐτοὺς* . . . *ἐφόβουν*: *Phaedo* 93 D.

Κορινθίῳ ἀνδρί a little above is certainly dative of instrument, like *Il.* 22. 176 *ἡέ μιν ἦδη Πηλεΐδῃ Ἀχιλῆι δαμάσσομεν*: *Herod.* 7. 191. 2 *καταείδοντες γόησι τῷ ἀνέμῳ*: *Ar. Ach.* 718 *ἐξελαύνειν* . . . *τὸν γέροντα τῷ γέροντι*: *Antiphon* 6. 41 *ταῦτα* . . . *μάρτυσιν ἀποδείξω*: *Eur. Or.* 582 *οὐκ ἂν με μισῶν ἀνεχόρεν* *Ἑρινύσιν*, etc. So the ablative in Latin.

The *γάρ* before *ἐν πανηγύρεσι* might be accounted for, if we read *ἐνόμιζον γάρ* for *νομίζοντες*.

35. 5. *εἰσὶν* for *ἦσαν* and *ἦπερ* for *ὅπερ* are obvious suggestions, but I do not find that they have been made. In *Phaedrus* 254 D *ἦσαν* is certainly wrong and *εἰσὶν* (Buttmann) probably right.

A few lines above, the construction of *ἦν* (*οὐ δίκαιον*) would appear more natural, if we placed only a comma before it.

36. 3. Read *τρία μὲν τὰ* (for *ὄντα*) *λόγου ἄξια*. In *Plut. Lucullus* 21 the reverse correction of *τῶν* to *ὄντων* (Coraes) is necessary. There *ον* was lost after *μόνον*, and here *ον* is a repetition of *εν* in *μὲν*.

37. 2. Read *ξύμμαχόν γε οὐδένα* . . . *οὐδὲ μάρτυρα* . . . *οὐδὲ παρακαλοῦντες*. The *γε* is explanatory of *κακουργία τι*.

38. 4. If the scholiast was right in *ἐπεστρατεύομεν*, *ἂν* must be added before or after it.

40. 6. For *εἰ γάρ* read *εἰ δέ*, as I have suggested *οἱ δέ* for *οἱ γάρ* in 69. 2.

63. 1. The comma (if any) should be put after *διακινδυνεύσῃ*, not after *χωρήσας*. If *ἢ . . . ἢ* went with *ὁποτέρωσέ διακ.*, they would be used ungrammatically for *πότερον . . . ἢ* or *εἴτε . . . εἴτε*. With *χωρήσας* by itself they can stand. Stahl is wrong in his analysis of *Μενο* 82 B.

ib. 2. The second *ἐγίνετο* should apparently be *ἐγένετο*. *διὰ τάχους* points to this. In 64. 1 most MSS. have *γυγνομένοις*, but *γενομένοις* is needed, and nothing is commoner than this confusion. Cf. on 23. 6; 2. 4. 2.

69. 4. *οὐκ ἀρχομένην τὴν αὐξῆσιν* (v.l. *δύναμιν*) *τῶν ἐχθρῶν, διπλασιουμένην δὲ καταλύοντες*. *διπλασιουμένων* would be more logically correct, but very probably *διπλασιουμένην* is what Thucydides wrote.

ib. 6. This section really belongs to Ch. 70, not 69. In a similar way the first section of Ch. 142 should have been assigned to 141, in which *χρήματα* are two or three times mentioned.

70. 5. One would expect *ἐπέρχονται*, not *ἐξ-*. The latter almost always expresses bodily movement outwards. Ullrich suggested *ἐξελθεῖν* for *ἐπελθεῖν* in the line before, and really the two verbs seem to have exchanged their prepositions.

84. 4. If we were to read *καὶ <ἡγούμεθα> οὐκ . . . δεῖν τὰς ἐλπίδας . . . , πολὺ τε . . . οὐ δεῖν νομίζειν*, we should make the sense coherent with what precedes.

89. 2. *οἱ . . . ξύμμαχοι <οἱ> ἤδη ἀφεστηκότες*?

91. 6. *καὶ <γὰρ> ἰδίᾳ*?

93. 2. Probably *ὡς ἕκαστοι τότε* (not *ποτέ*) *προσέφερον*. *ποτέ* is too vague for the work of a quite short time. In 101 perhaps *ποτέ* for *τότε*.

95. 7. *φοβούμενοι <μέν>*? *μέν* easily lost before *μή*.

115. 4. *ξυμμαχίαν <ποιησάμενοι>*?

122. 3. Omit *καὶ* before *πόλεις κ.τ.λ.*, which is in apposition to *ὁ* and puts the point again in other words. *καὶ* came from the line before.

124. 3. *τὴν <ἐγ>καθεστηκυῖαν*? Cf. 122. 3. *εγ* and *ην* resemble one another.

125. 2. *ἔλασσον δέ* is clearly wrong by itself. It does not, as in Herod. 7. 39. 3, give the right sense, but its very opposite. The proposed addition of *οὐ πολλῶ* is very plausible, but I would put it before *ἐλαττον δέ*, not after, as *οὐ διετρίβη* may have caused its loss (*οὐ* twice with a word after it). Cf. 10. 5 *πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας δέ*: 3. 22. 1 *ἀνὰ τὸ σκοτεῖνὸν μὲν*: Lys. 1. 42 *ὡς μετὰ πλείστων δέ*: Ar. Pol. 1. 12. 1259 a 40 *οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον*.

128. 1. Why the emphasis of *σφίσιν αὐτοῖς*? Simple *σφίσιν* is all we should expect. Perhaps *αὐτοῖ* (or *καὶ αὐτοὶ σφίσιν* or *σφίσι καὶ αὐτοὶ*). In 6. 63. 3 *σφίσιν αὐτοῖ* is now read for *σφίσιν αὐτοῖς*.

132. 5. In *ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖνος κ.τ.λ.* omit *ἢ* with Herwerden, *ἢ* and *καὶ* being constantly confused. Steup proposes *ἵνα . . . ἢ Ἀρτάβανος ἢ καὶ ἐκεῖνος . . . αἰτήσας μὴ ἐπιγνῶ*. This however could not mean 'that neither A. nor P. might perceive it,' but only 'that either A. or P. might not perceive it,' i.e. that one of them might fail to do so.

133. αὐτά τε ταῦτα must be wrong, for such emphasis is thrown away. αὐτοῦ? ταῦτά τε πάντα?

In this chapter τε in τῶν τε ἐφόρων is usually bracketed, and it is usual to put a full stop at the end after διακωλύειν. If we retained τε, put a comma after διακωλύειν, and then wrote ἀκούσαντες δὴ, we might really be restoring the sentence, though its framework would be loose. Cf. τότε δὴ at its beginning. In the first words of 135 δέ again looks as though it should be a resuming δὴ.

141. 1. διανοήθητε ἢ ὑπακούειν . . . ἢ . . . μὴ εἶξοντες.

The construction of a participle with διανοοῦμαι is unknown and very unlikely. It has been proposed to put a ὥς before μὴ εἶξ., or better before καί, and this would make the participle much more admissible. But perhaps what has been lost is an infinitive like φαίνεσθαι going with μὴ εἶξ. and parallel to ὑπακούειν.

ib. 4. πληροῦν (Herwerden) may well be right, πληροῦντες being due to the participles shortly following, ἀπόντες, δαπανῶντες, εἰργόμενοι. But something like πληροῦντες <ἐκπλεῖν> is also possible.

ib. 7. λανθάνει would seem more likely here than λανθάνειν.

142. 3. Though it is strange that Pericles should be made to speak as though Sparta could possibly set up in or near Attica a city to rival Athens, πόλιν ἀντίπαλον has to be accepted. The antithesis of φρουρίον almost establishes it, and where can it have come from otherwise? But neither ἀντεπιτετειχισμένων nor any variation of that word is then appropriate or reasonably possible. Should we restore ἀντιτεταγμένων, or ἀντιπαρεταγμένων? The context would suggest the corruption. For ἐπιτευχίζειν below we should naturally expect ἀντεπιτευχίζειν.

143. 2. Cf. Dem. 14. 32.

H. RICHARDS.

(To be continued.)

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THE IMPIETY OF SOCRATES.

IN *Varia Socratica* Professor A. E. Taylor devotes his first chapter to a proof that the impiety for which Socrates was condemned consisted in his connection with an Orphic-Pythagorean cult. This argument has more than historical interest, for it is the first step in an attempt to attribute to Socrates, and ultimately to Pythagorean sources, doctrines hitherto regarded as Platonic. Much of Dr. Taylor's new evidence seems to rest on passages which in their context contradict or greatly modify his inferences; other arguments have no better basis than the dubious principle that any fact shown to be related to Orphism in one connection is always so related; and, above all, the enquiry which set out to give precise legal grounds for the charge of impiety tails away lamentably into a mere discussion of doctrine. I propose, after examining the wording of the charge, to analyze the evidence for regarding Socrates' offence as the importation of a foreign cultus, then to enquire how far Dr. Taylor's discussion of doctrine is relevant to the legal charge, and, lastly, to ask whether the *Apology* of Plato and the *Memorabilia* really do preserve so suspicious a silence about the impiety as to justify a totally new theory to account for their reticence.

I.

The indictment in Xenophon runs: ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὗς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἔτερα δὲ καὶνὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρον· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νεοὺς διαφθείρων.¹ It is the clause connected with the new deities that Dr. Taylor attempts to interpret, and this offence, as he says, would of itself involve disrespect to the city gods.² He asserts that 'Socrates is charged explicitly with "importing" a foreign cultus (εἰσφέρον, εἰσηγούμενος).'³ This enables him at once to exclude the traditional interpretation that the 'divine sign' was meant, to infer that Plato and Xenophon concealed the legal charge because it was true, and to begin with a strong presumption that Socrates must have had illegal connections with a Pythagorean cultus. Can this assumption be justified? Words meaning 'to import from abroad' follow a very well-marked usage in Greek. The active voice is used of a stranger or traveller bringing in from abroad; the middle designates the importing by a resident like Socrates. The distinction holds not only of material objects but of pursuits, beliefs, laws, divine things.⁴ The passage of the *Bacchae*

¹ *Mem.* I. i. 1.

² *V.S.* 6.

³ The latter word is Favorinus' equivalent for εἰσφέρον.

⁴ See Herodotus and Thucydides *passim* for εἰσφέρειν; cf. *Pl. Laws* 759c, ἐκ Δελφῶν δὲ χρὴ νόμους περὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα κομμεσθαι. Contrast

Isocr. *Bus.* 28, Thuc. IV. 26, Dem. 935, 5, and note contrast in Hdt. VI. 118 and *Pl. Rep.* 370c. I use κομίζω and εἰσάγω for illustration, as Dr. Taylor does. Above all, cf. the use of εἰσάγεσθαι in Hdt. V. 67.

as interpreted by Dr. Taylor exemplifies this distinction: *ξένον δὲ εἰσφέρει νόσον | καὶνὴν* (353).¹ If *εἰσφέρει* means 'imports,' then it is active because a stranger 'imports' the new religion. But a study of the *Bacchae* shows clearly enough that the word is more probably used in the simple sense of 'introducing' or 'bringing in,' and that the *origin* of the Dionysiac worship is not the primary point of criticism. That is, I think, certified for this passage by Teiresias' scornful echo of the charge a few lines later—*Πενθεὺς ὅπως μὴ πένθος εἰσώσει δόμοις | τοῖς σοῖσι, Κάδμε*—and by other lines in the play.²

Professor Taylor rightly says that Socrates' deities were objected to because they were *unofficial*, not because they were *new*;³ nor, it may be added, primarily because they were *foreign*. Socrates was accused of introducing (*εἰσφέρειν*) privately minted deities into circulation beside the state currency (*νόμισμα*). Is not the metaphor, if any, drawn from coining rather than from commerce?⁴ In Attic we find *εἰσφέρειν* constantly used of innovation in a context which excludes any sense of borrowing or importing, and in combination with words which imply originality. When used in an unfavourable sense the word and its synonyms suggest arbitrary or dangerous innovation.⁵

The words *εἰσφέρειν*, *καινοτομεῖν*, and *ποιεῖν* (note 9) have already been found to possess a fairly well-defined common meaning in current use. Now in the *Euthyphro* *καινοτομεῖν* is used three times over to describe Socrates' offence, at cardinal points in the dialogue,⁶ and twice it is coupled with *αὐτοσχεδιάζειν*. What words could more strongly imply Socrates' originality in innovation? I leave aside for the present the pious Euthyphro's instant inference that Socrates was in trouble about his *δαιμόνιον*—most emphatically something that could be described as *καινότομον*. But Socrates professes to give Meletus' own reason for the charge: *φησὶ γὰρ ὡς ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν καὶ ὡς καινοῦς ποιοῦντα θεοῦς, τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα ἐγράψατο τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὥς φησιν* (3 b). The repetition of the *φῆσι* first and last seems to make Socrates stand scornfully aloof from any interference with Meletus' meaning. And even if the words *ποιητὴν* and *ποιοῦντα* are a humorous echo of Euthyphro's question, *τί καὶ ποιοῦντά σέ φησι διαφθεῖρειν*; the form, and not

¹ V.S. 6. 1.

² Cf. especially vv. 256, 465 (with Sandys' note) and 650.

³ V.S. 23.

⁴ Cf. Dem. In *Timocr.* 213: *εἰ τις δὲ τῆς πόλεως ἐστὶ νόμισμα, τοῦτο διαφθείρει καὶ παράσημον εἰσφέρει*. Ar. *Frogs* 890. Di. *Isot. τῶν τε σωθῶν*, *κόμμα καινόν*; Eur. καὶ μάλα. Di. *Is. δὲ προσεῖχον τοῖς ἐπιδόταις θεοῖς*. Cf. *Clouds* 247; cf. also Eur. *Bacch.* 328-9 for the nature of the offence.

⁵ Arist. *Met.* 985a 30, *Pol.* 1266a 15, *Pl. Laws* 797c (in the last two combined with *καινοτομεῖν*) 595c, Ar. *Frogs* 849, *Clouds* 547, also *Bacchae* passim (see note 6). For *εἰσενέσθαι* see Nauck *T.G.F.*, p. 771, where *τὸ θεῶν εἰσενέσθαι* is used of the man who invented gods to overawe man-

kind. The synonyms quoted by Dr. Taylor are *κομίζω* and *εἰσάγω*, cf. especially Arist. *Eth.* 1096a 13-17, where both words, along with *ποιεῖν*, are used to describe Plato's introduction of his ideal theory. All three words, as Prof. Burnet's notes and references (q.v.) show, suggest a certain arbitrariness. Dr. Taylor ignores *παῖον*, and seeks to attribute to Aristotle an 'insinuation' that 'Platonism is a mere modification of Italian Pythagoreanism'; this would be peculiarly offensive in the very phrase in which Aristotle apologizes for attacking his master.

⁶ 2b, 5a, 16a (the last sentence of the dialogue). The word means 'to open up a new vein.' For its metaphorical use see examples cited above and Ar. *Wasps* 876, *Ecol.* 583-586.

the sense, coincides with the sense of the word, discuss what charge against the state. To such a textual freedom is unnatural. with the charge, the p

The I Taylor and intimate of Pythagore. It will consider the (a) C Pythagore the *Phaed* to the H 'Whatev Delphi in awaker calling hi nor anyw foreign c Delos an for dwelli 'orthodo his ode, a that the s is very n mission t that retu In the P and he t the state philosoph to that I then, So identified The

¹ V.S. 22

² V.S. 21

the sense, of the answer is affected. Since the evidence of the *Euthyphro* coincides so well with the ordinary sense of *εἰσφέρειν*, it is superfluous to discuss whether Plato was here attempting to conceal the true nature of the charge against Socrates.

To sum up, Dr. Taylor's interpretation can only be supported by contextual frequency of use, and in the absence of that must be considered unnatural. The testimony of Plato supports a rendering which is in accord with the current use of *εἰσφέρειν*. So far therefore as the linguistic evidence goes, the presumption is against Dr. Taylor.

II.

The legal question is—did Socrates 'import' foreign deities? Professor Taylor answers that he did.¹ His real impiety was 'nothing other than an intimate connection, probably amounting to inter-communion, with foreign Pythagoreans.'

It will be convenient first to take the evidence about cultus, and then to consider the suspicion attaching to Socrates' friendships.

(a) Of direct testimony that Socrates was tried for a connection with Pythagoreans, there is, as Dr. Taylor admits, not a trace.² But he finds in the *Phaedo* some ground for conjecturing that Socrates was in private devoted to the Hyperborean Apollo of Delos, the special god of the Pythagoreans. 'Whatever,' he says, 'a Pythagorean might have thought of his weakness for Delphi in life, Socrates at least died in the faith. Hence his mission of awakener of the dull imposed on him at Delphi cannot be the ground for calling himself a fellow-servant with the swans of Delos.' As neither here nor anywhere is there more than a suspicion of Socrates' connection with a foreign cultus, and as Dr. Taylor finds in this conflict between Delphi and Delos an important psychological problem in Socrates' life,³ I may be excused for dwelling on this evidence. His grounds for considering that Socrates died 'orthodox' are that the dream announcing his death came from Delos; that his ode, according to the version in Diogenes, was to the Delian Apollo; and that the swans with which he compared himself are Delian too. Now all this is very natural, seeing that his death depended on the return of a solemn *state* mission to the god of Delos. If the vision came from Delos, it was to announce that return. As to the ode, there is even less doubt of its origin or purpose. In the *Phaedo* Socrates speaks of the old prompting of the god to write poetry, and he takes the opportunity of the delay in carrying out his sentence due to the state festival of Apollo to turn to this popular (*δημώδης*) *μουσική* from philosophy (the greatest *μουσική*). Thus, he says, he came to write a poem to that Delian whom the Athenians were then celebrating. In his last days, then, Socrates, so far from parting from Athenian orthodoxy, expressly identified himself with his fellow-citizens.

The swans are not solely Delian; they may even be Delphian in origin.⁴

¹ V.S. 22.

² V.S. 21. 2.

³ Cf. *Hon. Hymns* XXI., *Alcaeus* Fr. 3, *Eur. Ion* 160-9.

⁴ V.S. 21. 1.

At all events in the fifth century they were attributes of both gods. Thus Aristophanes can write *καὶ κύκνῳ Πυθίῳ καὶ Δηλίῳ* (*Birds* 870). But in the *Phaedo* the reference must be to the Delphian. For Socrates actually says that he and the swans were fellow-servants,¹ and had the gift of divination from their common master (85 b). Now Apollo Pythios of Delphi was the god of divination, and in especial the bestower of Socrates' peculiar power. In allowing himself to contrast the Delphian mission to the dull with the swan-song of Delos Prof. Taylor has surely fallen a victim to the wonted irony of Socrates. The point of the comparison with the swans is this: Swans end their life with a specially marvellous song; Socrates, too, was to consummate a lifetime of continuous service to the god by a swan-song; why?—because after their service their divination gave them foreknowledge. Thus the 'mission to the dull' has the swan-song as its fitting crown. In life, as in death, Socrates resembled those other servants of the Delphian, the swans of Parnassus.

Our result is this: The Delian was the Delian of Athens, not of Pythagoras; the god of the swans was the Delphian, or the point of the comparison is ruined. Finally, Dr. Taylor's argument depends on three distinctions to which he has no right. The Hyperborean god was connected both with Delos and with Delphi; both gods had a common worship at Athens; and the Pythagoreans, instead of condemning 'Socrates' weakness for Delphi,' probably shared it.²

It is not necessary to show that the passage in *Ar. Birds* 1553³ proves nothing very harmful about Socrates, for Mr. B. B. Rogers has already pointed out that *ψυχαγωγεῖν* was probably a catchword of Socrates to describe his art of drawing out the *living* soul—in this case Pisander's cowardly *ψυχή*. I might add references to *Xen. Mem.* III. 10. 6, *Plato Rep.* VII. 518 b-e, the initiation scene in the *Clouds*, and note that the necromantic machinery belongs to the *Odyssey* and is not peculiar to Orphism; also that Chaerephon the bat (a touch from the *Odyssey*) was at that date as alive as a *ῥιμθνής* can be. The jest consists in representing Socrates as a regular *ψυχαγωγός* because he dealt in *ψυχαί*.

(b) The suspicion attaching to Socrates' foreign friendships falls under the charge of impiety so far as they imply a relationship within a cult. Plato furnishes abundant proof that Socrates had many close friendships with

¹ The phrase *ἀδούλους . . . καὶ ἑαυτὸν αἰνέον* here corresponds to what Socrates says in the *Apology* of his service to the Delphian. As a result of the 'mission to the dull' *ἐν πεντή μυριάσι διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρίαν* (23c).

² The connection of Pythagoras with Delphi is vouched for as a very old tradition by Aristoxenus. The cities in which Pythagoreans most flourished, Croton and Metapontium, were founded from Delphi. Both cities had the symbol of the cult on their coins. If the Crotoniates took Pythagoras for the Hyperborean, then it

was in mistake for their own god, as is natural (cf. *Acts* XIV. 11-13). Compare *ὡς Πυθαγορεῶν θέομεν τῷ Δελφί, Μνῆσιμαχος, Ἀκωμαῶν*. There was a reason why the Pythagoreans should specially reverence Delphi. 'Das Pythagoreische Reinheitsritual lehnte sich an den Kult des delphischen Apollon an, an einen Gott der Harmonie, der Heilungen, und Helligungen . . .' (F. Dümmler, *Kl. Schr.* II. 178). This, of course, does not exclude the Delian from his position as a Pythagorean god, for that, too, is attested.

³ *V.S.* 22. 1.

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foreigners, and such openness, combined with an entire absence of any hint that his friends brought him to misfortune, hardly aids the thesis we are examining. Dr. Taylor attempts to establish the suspicion by showing that Xenophon tried to conceal the fact of Socrates' connection with foreigners.¹ Such a silence must be very marked before it can safely be considered significant.

In *Mem.* I. 2 Xenophon defends Socrates at considerable length against the charge of training Critias and Alcibiades to work harm to the state.² At the end of the defence he cites some really typical pupils, men who would appeal to all as beyond suspicion.³ Of seven names mentioned four are Athenian, while three belong to foreigners and Pythagoreans. The four Athenians are named first and the three foreigners next; so there is no very evident purpose of concealment. Yet Dr. Taylor can call this a 'curious' list, and says that Xenophon 'cannot help admitting that these men were friends of Socrates' but 'tries to cover up the fact that they were foreigners.'⁴ And Xenophon is trying to dispel prejudice by mentioning favourable examples of Socrates' teaching! If it was not known who these men were, what point was there in appealing to their good name? If they were known and suspect, how could Xenophon mention them? He would at once provoke the retort that Socrates not only produced people like Critias in Athens, but practised illegal rites with foreigners like Simmias and Cebes and Phaedondas—the two reasons for which he was condemned. As to the suppression of their nationality which Dr. Taylor alleges, if Socrates' intimacy with these men was too notorious for concealment, was not the reason for that notoriety just the fact of their nationality? It is as if a suitor attempted to convince a Victorian parent that his youth had not been misspent by saying that he was acquainted with Zola and de Maupassant, while concealing the fact that they were French.⁵ Further, if Dr. Taylor is right in conjecturing (as he does in another essay on p. 147 of *Varia Socratica*) that *all seven* intimates of Socrates here named by Xenophon were Orphic-Pythagoreans, then Xenophon picked out Orphics, and none but Orphics, to clear Socrates of the suspicion that he and they belonged to an "anti-democratic *ἐταιρία*" of Orphic-Pythagoreans who set the interests of the next world above those of the city-state; and he chose native and foreign names impartially, although the international character of Pythagoreanism, according to Dr. Taylor, was what caused Socrates to be accused of hostility to Athens.⁶

But the nationality of Simmias and Cebes is actually mentioned in *Mem.* III. 11. 17. Only because it is indispensable to the point, says Dr. Taylor,

¹ *V.S.* 20. 31.

² *V.S.* 20. 2.

³ καὶ τούτων οὐδὲν . . . οὐδ' ἐποίησε κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδ' αἰτίαν ἔσχεν, *Mem.* I. 2. 48. It is the orthodox Xenophon who thus uses these Pythagoreans as his final argument for Socrates' harmlessness as a teacher.

⁴ *V.S.* 31. 1.

⁵ It is hardly necessary to remark that Xenophon could no more have insinuated that the seven belonged to one city by the singular *πόλις*

than that they were all the sons of one father by the singular *οἶκος* (*Mem.* I. 2. 48). The construction is perfectly natural. Cf. *Xen. Ap.* § 17.

⁶ In the same vein Dr. Taylor remarks that no one would guess from *Mem.* IV. 2. 10 that Theodorus was a Pythagorean from Cyrene. As he is specially brought in by Socrates as *the* geometer, few Athenian readers would be puzzled. Compare the reference to Prodicus in *Mem.* II. 21. 1.

rather naively. But Xenophon is proclaiming that foreigners like these Thebans do come to Athens, attracted by Socrates, and in his *Apology* (which Dr. Taylor accepts as genuine) Socrates makes the same boast. Could he possibly have done so if that had been the accusation against him?

If Xenophon did all this, he gave concrete proofs of the very charge Dr. Taylor alleges to have been made, and that not incidentally, as a bungler might, but deliberately, and in the belief that he was clearing Socrates. If that is credible, anything is.

Dr. Taylor further infers that Socrates had an intimate connection with the Pythagorean societies of Central and Northern Greece.¹ He writes that 'the large sum of money which Simmias and Cebes brought from Thebes can hardly mean less than that the Theban Pythagoreans had made a "collection" on his account, no doubt with the original intention of bribing his accusers to let the prosecution drop.' The facts are quite different. In the dialogue named after him Crito offers Socrates his own money to bribe the necessary people. He expressly says that the sum needed will not be large. He adds that if Socrates feels a difficulty about taking the money from him,² then the strangers in Athens were ready. The words *ξένοι οἱτοὶ ἐνθάδε ἑτοιμοὶ* make it plain that Socrates' foreign pupils are meant. Simmias, he says, has actually brought the money in, Cebes is ready too, and many others as well. If he were trying to make it clear that there was no 'collection,' and that each individual was ready to put up his own money, could his language be more decisive?³ Cebes had before then ransomed Phaedo out of his own pocket. Thus every assertion of Dr. Taylor is disposed of by the text. The sum was not large; Simmias and Cebes had made no journey; there was no collection; but *ξένοι* were ready, like Crito, to be responsible individually for the moderate amount needed. With this vanishes the inference that the money was originally collected to bribe the incorruptible prosecutors. Crito made the offer all but a month after the trial. The people to be bribed were, he says, easily 'got at.' And Crito was an Athenian, not an ignorant foreigner. It may be remembered that Crito wished to send Socrates to the secular atmosphere of Thessaly, not to Thebes or Megara.

Dr. Taylor has another proof—'the curious assumption of *Phaedo* 98e that if he had escaped he would of course have made for Megara or Thebes.⁴ Why this selection of places? It may be said, because they were the nearest cities of refuge for anyone leaving Athens by land. But why should Socrates take it for granted that the escape would not in any case be made by sea? Now what Socrates does say is *περὶ Μέγαρα ἢ Βοιωτούς*, and for a ver good reason. He is criticizing Anaxagoras, and says in effect, 'if there were only physical causes, my tendons and bones would long ago have carried me over

¹ V.S. 20.

² 'As an Athenian he would be the prey of sycophants, no new trouble for him. *Mm.* III. 9. This gives a natural reason why foreign pupils should have to intervene.

³ The words are *εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκμήκε ἐν' αὐτῷ τοῦτο ἀργύριον ἱκανόν, Σιμμίας δ' ὁ Θηβαῖος, ἔτοιμος δὲ καὶ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ πάντων.* *Crito* 45b.

⁴ V.S. 39.

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the border'—and there were only two border states. Socrates speaks correctly of the territories instead of the towns because physical mechanism was in question, not spiritual affinities. To mention escape by sea was not merely otiose, but would have ruined an illustration where bodily motion was the point. It only remains to be added that in the *Crito* the nearness of Megara and Thebes is assigned as a reason why Socrates would naturally fly there (53*b*). Thus Plato gives the reason which Dr. Taylor expressly rejects, while his own interpretation wrecks Socrates' point.

It has been shown, I think, that Dr. Taylor's suspicions about the significance of Socrates' foreign relationships are invariably defeated by the context. And, after all, Simmias and Cebes were mere youths!

III.

The doctrine called Orphic is relevant to the charge of impiety only so far as it has a connection with cultus. But doubtless a jury would be influenced by the nature of a man's religious beliefs in considering a verdict—*εὐδιάβολα τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς*, as Euthyphro says.¹ Dr. Taylor attempts to show by the 'concurrent testimony' of Euripides, Aristophanes, and Plato that the Orphic doctrine of immortality was regarded as impious by fifth-century Athenians. As his cardinal proof is contained in Aristophanes, I shall examine that first.

The passage in *Frogs* 1078 is brought forward to prove that 'the Orphic doctrine of the future life was really, apart from any mere accessories, itself "impious" to Athenian ears.'² The *σῶμα-σῆμα* doctrine is said to be mentioned there by Aeschylus 'among the crowning proofs of the "impiety" of Euripides himself':

ποιῶν δὲ κακῶν οὐκ αἰτίος ἐστ' ;
οὐ προαγωγὸν κατέδειξ' οὔτος (the nurse of Phaedra)
καὶ τικτούσας ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς (Auge)
καὶ μὴννύμενας τοῖσιν ἀδελφοῖς (Canace in the *Aeolus*)
καὶ φασκούσας οὐ ζῆν τὸ ζῆν ;

Dr. Taylor adds that the climax is clearly intended from the arrangement of

¹ Prof. Taylor infers 'from the fact that the catalogue of members given by Iamblichus mentions only one Athenian' that the Pythagoreans, with their beliefs about the soul, were 'not popular' in Athens, and concludes that they were 'virtually unknown' in Attica because the same list attributes four members each to small states like Sicily and Phlius and a solitary member to Athens. Now Iamblichus omits Thebes and Megara from his catalogue entirely. It is as important a part of Dr. Taylor's case that Thebes was a centre of Pythagoreanism as that Athens was not, yet the omissions of Iamblichus, obviously inaccurate for Thebes, are made the ground for a set of inferences about the danger Socrates ran if he was a Pythagorean, and if he believed in immortality, and if he was tried for

that. It is strange that four scanty undated names should show that Pythagoreanism was known in Sicily, and one name prove it to be virtually unknown at Athens in 399 B.C. On such reasoning by ratio, if Iamblichus had only the wit to see that the Socratic circle probably formed a Pythagorean *δῆμος* (*Var. Socr.* p. 148), Athens could give Sicily and Phlius a long lead, with Thebes not even placed. But Iamblichus, who could include Parmenides and Melissus as Pythagoreans, did not set down even Simmias and Cebes as Theban members of the order. Let it be remembered further that, according to Dr. Taylor, this Pythagorizing *τραπία* had twenty-five years' life under Socrates (p. 147), and was 'universally known' from the beginning of that period (p. 133).

² V.S. 26.

the three first accusations—'pimping, sacrilege, incest, the belief in the "life of the world to come."'

Is it so certain that the impiety of Euripides is primarily in question? Is it conceivable that belief in the next world (expounded by the pious Xenophon, according to Dr. Taylor) seemed more impious to Athenians than incest? Before we accept that, the context must at least be examined, as Dr. Taylor has ignored it. Our lines come in the middle of a passage in which Aeschylus assails Euripides' political influence. In a sense the passage is the key to the whole contest, being an invective against the Euripidean *Πειθώ*. Aeschylus has accused Euripides of teaching young men to be talkative and disrespectful to authority; then comes Dr. Taylor's list of impieties with their result, which is a crop of young men who trick the Demos and (another climax) run badly. We should expect the list to contain illustrations of the charge, drawn from Euripides' dramas, and the results to bear some relation to the horrors which are said to produce them. On Dr. Taylor's interpretation the invective is dislocated, and the ecstatic exclamations of the chorus over the brilliant display of *σοφία* they expect are hardly justified by the heavy-handed specimen to which they have just listened. But we shall find, I think, that the list does illustrate Aeschylus' meaning by recalling to the audience some of Euripides' most notorious *σοφίσματα*. I hope to show that the belief in immortality was not the climax of a series of acts of impiety, but the last of a set of arguments taken from the philosophical schools, and used to justify those acts. On this view, Aeschylus' contention becomes relevant and pungent. It is that logic-chopping on the stage filled the ecclesia with quibblers and emptied the gymnasia. As this is the second edition of the *Frogs*, the audience were primed to catch every allusion (v. 1111), and would at once know that these women who sinned in Euripides' dramas had their sins justified by fine-spun reasons. The nurse in the *Hippolytus* justified adultery to Phaedra by convenience (v. 500); this was her piece of *σοφία* (v. 518). Auge, a priestess of Athena, bore a child in the temple, and defended her sacrilege to the goddess by a quibble about nature and convention; if the birds did so, why should not she? (Nauck *T.G.F.*² *Eur.* fr. 266). Canace's incest was excused by the famous sophistry about nothing being shameful unless you thought it so (Nauck *Eur.* fr. 19). And what of the woman who said that life was not life? We must try to reconstruct the context in Euripides. We should expect, by reason of symmetry, a supreme quibble, covering an infamy and uttered by a woman. This reference, like the others, must not be too obscure,¹ and it would not surprise us in a comic poet to find an anticlimax (cf. *Frogs* v. 151). But it is more. All that we know for certain about the famous paradox that life is

¹ Aristophanes did not place too great a strain on the knowledge of his audience. The nurse of Phaedra is the type and precursor of all those women who find reasons for their mistress's inclinations. Auge's defence was long famous, as we see from Clement of Alexandria. Antisthenes publicly protested in the theatre against the

sophistry that glossed over Canace's crime; the stories of Plato's reproof and Lais' jest are well known. No contemporary protests against the doctrine of immortality have come down to us, though sufficient evidence to show that Athens laughed at the paradoxical form in which Euripides put it.

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death and death life is that it was uttered in connection with an unjust sacrifice of life, and most probably covered a peculiarly atrocious act of treachery. The critical difficulty is that such lines occur in two lost plays of Euripides, the *Polyeidus* and the *Phrixus*. Polyeidus was condemned to death by Minos; Phrixus was all but sacrificed by the machinations of his step-mother Ino. Now Ino (the *Γοργώπις* of Hippias the Sophist) was a notorious Euripidean character. The extant fragments of the *Phrixus* represent her as pretending to be that rare thing, a loving step-mother (Nauck *T.G.F. Eur.* fr. 824, cf. 823). Her peculiar infamy was that she plotted, by means of a forged message from Delphi, to have Phrixus sacrificed on the pretext of saving the tribal harvest. The supreme scene of the play must have been that in which the tribesmen forced her reluctant husband, Athamas, to consent to the sacrifice. What irony if she brought her hypocrisy to the pitch of consoling Athamas for the loss with talk of life after death and a land where pain could not touch his son! On this supposition the line *φασκούσας οὐ ξῆν τὸ ξῆν* is in harmony with the three preceding references, and gives a fit climax. But if this suggestion is too hazardous, and we are to follow a scholiast (whose authority is not necessarily decisive¹) in attributing the lines to Phrixus himself, then Aristophanes surely implied that the belief was womanish folly. Phrixus palliated in his ignorance a monstrous crime by fantastic talk of the compensation he would receive. If Polyeidus was meant (and this is less likely) the point is the same. On any alternative a paradox palliated a crime. Nor is the immediate context in the *Frogs* our sole evidence that Aristophanes was striking at Euripides' mental dexterity. Other references show that the paradox about death being life was regarded as a supreme and exquisite jest. Its form, apart from the content, would ensure that. But there is actually in the *Frogs* a passage which echoes the lines I am attempting to interpret. When Euripides is finally discomfited (vv. 1469-78), his own *σοφίσματα* are turned against him by Dionysus, and the two parting shafts are the two final quibbles at which, as I contend, Aeschylus had struck in these four pregnant verses at the beginning of the dispute. The Palamedes of the stage (v. 1451) had failed to persuade.

We can now say, with some confidence, that four acts of impiety—adultery, sacrilege, incest, and treacherous murder—were justified by arguments from the schools. Convenience, nature, a subjective standard of action, and the paradox about life and death were used by Euripides' characters to palliate crimes. As the point of Aeschylus' words could only be seen by an audience which recollected both crime and excuse, he could

¹ In assigning the lines to Phrixus the scholiast corrects Aristophanes. If this is right, Dr. Taylor's contention disappears at once, for Aristophanes is simply laughing robustly at the weak sentimentality of Phrixus, who stakes his life for an illusory benefit to the tribe. The feminine *φασκούσας* would bear that meaning—there are no random hits in the *Frogs*. But I am not certain that Aristophanes did not mean a woman when he said a woman, and she could only be

Ino. The scholiast spoke from memory, for he quotes the passage that *Polyeidus* spoke, which differs in wording from the *Phrixus* lines. He may equally have confused Polyeidus and Phrixus, for their situation is almost identical. If Ino did say the words, their supreme hypocrisy would make a fitting climax. It is conceivable that the speaker and circumstances were forgotten because the sentiment did occur twice over in Euripides, and was suited for edification.

mention either the act or the sophism as best suited the comic stage. The Euripidean drama contained more than one murderess, but only one whose infamy was so glossed over; and the perennial jest about life being death not only marked clearly what crime was meant, but gave the needful relief as he passed to the effects of these sophisms:—

κατ' ἐκ τούτων ἡ πόλις ἡμῶν
ὑπογραμματέων ἀνεμεστῶθη
καὶ βωμολόχων δημοσιθήκων κ.τ.λ.

No wonder that the Chorus of Mystics (the impietiès unnoticed!) exclaimed with delight that the audience could take the subtlest allusions!

It might perhaps be urged that an argument which could be used to gloss over impiety was itself impious. But then it would be impious in respect of its use, not, as Dr. Taylor says, 'in itself.' Further, at most the belief in immortality was on a par with other arguments which, as represented on the stage, tended to corrupt youth. Doubtless the elastic term 'impiety' could be stretched to cover that; but Socrates was accused of corrupting youth and of impiety, and Dr. Taylor sets out to show that the belief in immortality was impious in itself because of its import for cultus. It is safer, I think, not to interpret this passage as aimed at the μελέτη θανάτου practised by the philosophers of the *Phaedo*, but, reading it in the light of the contest of Just and Unjust Arguments in the *Clouds* (cf. especially vv. 1002-23), to conclude that Aristophanes thought such speculations and paradoxes unwholesome as well as ludicrous, but hardly impious.

The passages in Euripides and Plato do not prove anything at all about the belief in immortality, though Dr. Taylor cites them for that purpose, nor do they touch all Orphics. The Platonic passages show that it was possible for Plato, like his master,¹ to think immortality a likely doctrine, while despising the gutter priests of the cult. That hardly helps Dr. Taylor in showing that the belief itself was illegal. Nor do the lines which he quotes from the *Hippolytus* of Euripides prove more. When Theseus finds that his ascetic son has apparently offered love to Phaedra, he bursts out into reproaches against his hypocrisy. The crucial lines are:

†ῆδ' οὖν αὖχει, καὶ δι' ἀψύχου βορᾶς
σίτοις ἂν καπήλυν', 'Ορφεία τ' ἀνάκτ' ἔχων
βάκχευε πολλῶν γραμμάτων τιμῶν καπνούς (vv. 952-4).

Dr. Taylor's comment is that Theseus, a typical Athenian, reveals in anger his true feeling about the ascetics, though normally he would hide it. If that is true, a prejudice is proved, but nothing more. But when we remember that in his passion Theseus disparages divination in the same contemptuous words that Hippolytus used to dismiss Aphrodite and her lore (vv. 1059, 163), and that afterwards he heartily repents of both his hasty judgments, the psycho-

¹ *Phaedo* 62b 5, with Prof. Burnet's note.

² *είτοις* must surely be a gloss on δι' ἀψύχου

βορᾶς, as the case shows. There is thus no guide to the word that has slipped out.

logical explanation which has been quoted hardly seems applicable. Another characteristic of an angry man is to confuse things that normally he holds separate. Could Theseus in his passion, convinced that his son had been disloyal, do anything else than think that all 'professing' religious people were alike? The emotional intensity of the scene is measured by his confounding of his hunter, meat-eating son, the chosen of Artemis, with the vegetarian, spell-weaving gutter-priests who lived by their piety. With some diffidence I would add that possibly the lines under discussion are in part the expression of another idea that possesses Theseus—that his son will be an outcast (cf. especially *ἀλώμενος*, v. 897, v. 1038, and *ἀλητεύων*, 1029, 1048). I cannot, at all events, believe that *καπήλενε* would not convey to an Athenian audience a vivid impression of those wandering priests (*ἀλήται*) who peddled pardons (*λύσεις*) and charms.¹

To sum up, the robust contempt of Aristophanes or the polite scorn of a modern young man like Glaucon are no evidence for the 'impiety' of the doctrine of immortality among Athenians. (Would Dr. Taylor claim that the doctrine was held to be impious in Thebes too because Simmias implies in the *Phaedo* (64b) that philosophers with their eyes on the next world were not too well regarded by Thebans?) Still less do the other passages prove that, because beggarly Orphics were despised, therefore any Orphic was legally 'impious.' It is, I think, fair to say that many, like Aristophanes, regarded discussion about the life to come as unwholesome or unmanly, but on our evidence we can go no farther. Also the *actions* of gutter-priests were regarded by some as a danger to morals; this is clear from Adeimantus' speech in the *Republic*. But it would not be hard to show that they batted on beliefs which belonged to a crude popular religion. Their true parallel are the diviners. Divination, which Theseus scorned in his anger, was a recognized practice. Yet no class of men was more despised than the *μάντιες*. The same language is held of them² as of the Orphic priests, for both classes were venal. And even the best of them, like Euthyphro, were laughed at. Yet it would be absurd to say that they were in danger of trial, much less of death, for impiety.

Dr. Taylor ends with another argument from the concealments and revelations of Xenophon.³ In the *Memorabilia* there is no mention of immortality, though the doctrine is implied; but in the *Cyropædia* there are arguments for life after death which bear a resemblance to those in the *Phaedo*. Dr. Taylor argues that Xenophon thus shows that he knew facts about Socrates which he was unwilling to reveal in the *Memorabilia*. Now if the doctrine of immortality was regarded as more impious than incest or sacrilege, is Xenophon likely to have mentioned it anywhere in his writings? But the words are actually placed in the mouth of his ideal hero! Knowing Xenophon's orthodoxy, we must believe that he thought this doctrine compatible with his other beliefs. Or would Dr. Taylor argue that he spoke freely in the

¹ The scholiast's metaphorical interpretation rests largely on the reading *εἶρος*.

² See the numerous references collected in Sandys' commentary to the *Bacchae* v. 255.

³ *V.S.* 32.

Cyropaedia because he was out of personal danger? Is not the more reasonable explanation that Xenophon omitted direct exposition of the immortality doctrine in the *Memorabilia* because he confined himself to proving to the ordinary man that Socrates was a benefactor to the State—and the ordinary man is no mystic?

Xenophon himself was no mystic. The arguments of the dying Cyrus are in reality popular arguments based on popular belief. Xenophon does not expound the *σῶμα-σῆμα* theory. Cyrus does not hope for immortality, but he is concerned with the continuation of life after death in so far as it affects the family. His sons are to be good, not because they will live after death, but because their father may, and so can harass them if they disobey him. His contention is for the *power* of the dead, though unseen, over the living. There are three clearly marked arguments: (1) An unseen thing can have visible effects—e.g. a living man's soul, avenging spirits, and the honours paid to the dead to keep them quiet prove this (*Cyr.* VIII. 7. 17). (2) As things have their most characteristic powers when they are separated out and so pure, when man's body dissolves, presumably the soul goes to its like, and is then most itself (§ 19). (3) Sleep and death are akin; and in sleep, the soul being most divine and free, sees visions. (§ 21.—This is an argument from divination.) I think that an examination of Xenophon's text will show that there are these three arguments for the continued power of the dead, and no more; and whatever the verbal resemblances to the *Phaedo*, the core and purpose of these contentions belongs rather to purely popular belief.¹ But such conflation proves nothing damaging against Socrates; rather the contrary. In the first place, as we have seen, Xenophon could never have even broached a theory so 'impious' as Dr. Taylor contends this was. Second, Dr. Taylor attempts to show the Orphic connections of the arguments by comparisons with the *Phaedo*, Pindar, and Aeschylus, and with the general mode of thinking which the Pythagoreans used. But so wide a range of comparison only proves an early and wide diffusion of the ideas so compared. It is unconvincing to say that the first argument rests on a Pythagorean pair of 'opposites,' when the opposition of body and soul belongs to beliefs far more primitive than Pythagoreanism. Protagoras is made by Plato to speak of the soul as sharing in the divine lot,² just like Cyrus, yet he was no Orphic. Anaxagoras³ seems to have argued from visions to a separate activity of the soul—and he was no Orphic. In these instances the language used closely resembles the Orphic vocabulary, though the ideas expressed differ widely from Orphism. We can therefore only judge the affinities of Xenophon's argument by its evident purpose, and that we have seen to be distinctly un-Orphic.⁴

¹ The Xenophonic arguments must be left for another time. Meanwhile, in support of my assertion that these beliefs are popular, let me refer to Rohde *Psyche* II. 264.

² *Plat. Prot.* 322a.

³ *Diels, Dox.* 437. 8; cf. *Zeller, Ph. d. Gr.* I. 1013. 4. Siebeck, *Gesch. der Psychologie* I. 1. 141.

⁴ It is really amazing that Dr. Taylor, in seeking to show that *δυσφύλος* (used by Xenophon in the second argument) is Orphic, should assert that the word is poetic and used only once by Aristotle. It is mainly a prose word, and Aristotle uses it ten times! It is a technical term, meaning of the same (1) tribe, (2) genus or species of

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Dr. Taylor's theory has a *prima facie* plausibility only if, as he alleges, a 'demonstrably false'¹ explanation of the charge of impiety has hitherto been accepted. The charge has been thought to involve the 'divine sign,' but Dr. Taylor declares that the reference to this in the *Apology* is a jest, which Xenophon took up.² We must now inquire whether Plato and Xenophon practised economy, and whether the sign gave reasonable ground for a charge of impiety.

First, as to the *Apology*. Dr. Taylor contends that Plato (or Socrates) avoided the charge because it could not be met.³ Now each must settle by his own feeling how far Socrates could, on the supreme day of his life, evade a direct charge against his belief and practice. If he did, then his vaunted *μεγαλγορία* was a pretence, and, though not fearing death, he feared to die for the Orphic practices attributed to him! It is curious, too, that after this piece of evasion, which profited him nothing, he should spend his last days in an 'orthodox' Pythagorean atmosphere without a qualm, though both he and his disciples knew that in public he had not justified his conduct because he could not or dared not. There is no question of what was or was not appropriate in court; it was a direct accusation which he eluded. These psychological problems could be multiplied, but there is no need; for at this stage of the discussion we may almost assume that Socrates was silent about Dr. Taylor's theory because it had not yet been thought of.

The *πρῶτον ψεύδος* of Dr. Taylor's view of the *Apology* lies, as it appears to me, in his assumption that Socrates is arguing a legal case.⁴ The formal structure is that of a forensic oration. Is its content to be judged by that standard? It is evident that Socrates is more serious in his effort to eradicate the lifelong prejudice of the jury than to combat the legal indictment which brought him into court. To answer his 'first accusers' seven pages are not too much; he disposes of Meletus in three. I see no reason to disbelieve him when he repeats at the beginning and end of the argument against his accusers that it is not Meletus or Anytus, but the *διαβολή* of the many that will condemn him.⁵ He displays the true nature of Meletus' indictment by saying that it rests on that popular *διαβολή*; and this relation, I think, determines the mode of his apology. If Anytus desired to have Socrates removed from Athens, it was consistent with his probity to put down a merely technical charge of impiety in order to fulfil his patriotic end.⁶ As we shall see later, the *δαιμόνιον* was capable of construction as impiety, and the charge was

animals, (3) sex, (4) material or element, and equivalent (according to Simplicius) to *δυσγενής*. A much easier way of showing that the word may have Orphic connections would be to quote the *Asiarchus*, where the *σέμειον* of *ψυχῆς* is said to be *αἰθήρ*. It is not improbable that Xenophon may have meant that the soul returned to its native element, the aether; the public monument to the fallen at Potidaea is proof that the Athenians had adopted the notion officially, so to

speak, before the last quarter of the fifth century. Such a fact shows the danger of arguments which assume that everything Orphic is therefore not Athenian. That the expression in Xenophon was a commonplace seems likely from Diels, *Dox.* 392a 15th 7.

¹ V.S. 4.

² V.S. 9.

³ *Ap.* 19a-b. 28a.

⁴ V.S. 14.

⁵ V.S. 8-9.

⁶ V.S. 15.

unsurpassed for rousing popular prejudice, as Euthyphro said. If Socrates knew this, he could content himself with construing the technical charges narrowly, or he could, as he did, answer for his whole life, which was the true issue. μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ περὶ Σωκράτους, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρεὶ φιλοσοφῆιν, as some forgotten apologist has it.¹

We shall find that the answers to the first and second accusers, taken together, are an effective apology to the jury in that they account for and illustrate the growth of the διαβολή against him.²

Socrates' aim was to expose to the jurors the growth of their own prejudices against him, without insisting too imprudently on the fact that the prejudices were theirs. This is done by objectifying their bias, so to speak, in the fictitious indictment of the 'first' accusers. He had, he says, long been classed with other philosophers who had been tried; he was now classed with other educators of youth, though he was very different from them. The origin of his unpopularity was simply his habit of testing the truth of the Delphic oracle about his wisdom. He had thus incurred the enmity of the three classes whose ignorance he had exposed in examining them. It was their anger with him and his young men that had resulted in the two charges now formulated against him. He has thus humorously led up to his present accusers, for the three classes—politicians, poets, and artisans—are represented by his three accusers, as he says!

A weakness in this plea is that he cannot adduce any concrete instance of the prejudice and ignorance which he has alleged. The little half-jesting reference to Aristophanes is in itself proof of that. Now that he has led up to Meletus, he will use him as a concrete example of the ignorance of his class, and show that he simply reflects current prejudice.³ He does not attempt to confute, but he shows Meletus' misunderstanding of both the charges. Was it in either case because he could not meet the issue? On Socratic principles, if Meletus did not understand his own indictment there was no need to trouble further with Meletus.

Why did Meletus fall so easily into Socrates' trap as to call him atheist, and attribute to him Anaxagoras' beliefs about the sun? Not simply because atheism was a worse crime than that in the indictment, as Dr. Taylor has it,⁴ but because his mind slipped readily into the conventional way of regarding the whole class to which Socrates belonged. So slight a hold upon him had the technical charge for which he was responsible that he could confuse Socrates with the other heretic philosophers, Diagoras and Anaxagoras. This at once illustrates and justifies Socrates' earlier attempt to dispel the διαβολή of the many.⁵ If he had calculated on using Meletus as a concrete example of the inveterate δόξα and ignorance against which he had striven all his life and through which he was now in danger, could he have done so more com-

¹ Ar. *Rhet.* II, 23, 18. I take the reading Σωκράτους. Whether this is the true text or not hardly matters, for in the *Antidosis* Isocrates is posing as Socrates did at the trial.

² V.S. 8, 17.

³ Ap. 24c, 26b, 27a.

⁴ V.S. 9.

⁵ Compare Ap. 18b with 26d-e.

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pletely? And, for Socrates, that disposed of Meletus. Dr. Taylor, therefore, is not justified in drawing a sharp line between the answers to the first and second accusers.

Still there is no word of the true nature of the charge of impiety. Was the δαιμόνιον implicated? Dr. Taylor denies this.¹ His argument is that Socrates could not give the δαιμόνιον as a reason for his abstention from public life if that was his impiety; also the language implies that there had been no previous mention of the divine sign in the trial, and that the dicasts would take no umbrage at it;² therefore the remark that Meletus aimed at the 'sign' in his indictment was only a joke.³ As we shall find that Xenophon gives the same explanation, and that it is almost incredible that he could have completely falsified the evidence, the *Apology* must give overwhelmingly strong proof against the traditional view before we can give it up.

After Socrates has flung Meletus aside, he embarks on his most serious and least forensic argument. Here, if anywhere, he is telling the precise truth apart from any personal fears or motives. The mission of the god is his one concern. He answers two suspicions by a reference to that mission. (1) Why did he practise a pursuit which brought him into trouble? (28b-31c). (2) Why had he not gone into public life like other men? (31c-32e). The answer to the first question is that the god forced him to do so, to the second that the divine sign prevented him. Neither reason could in its nature be very congenial or comprehensible to an ordinary juror; both were a fair defence because they accounted for Socrates' actions as piety to the god, a god, be it noted, who was an official deity of Athens. If in this elevated passage Socrates referred to his sign, it would have been out of place to give more than a reference to its legal importance, and it is just such a reference that he does make.⁴ But as a defence the sentence has its value. It reminds the jurors familiarly that the power incriminated has always been well known to them. This is surely what Socrates means by saying that they have heard him speaking of it many times, and in many places, as a possession from boyhood. When he adds not merely that it stops him from action, but that it never initiates, the repetition, so far from being otiose, has a point, if we remember that he is suspected of egging on young men through his δαιμόνιον against the democracy. In the examples of his political interventions which follow, it is not acts of Socrates, but refusals to act, which imperil his safety. Earlier he had appealed to the publicity of his life as evidence that he could not have corrupted youth. Now he assumes that a thing so familiar as the sign could not be harmful—a very passable defence, and one which exonerates him in Dr. Taylor's eyes!⁵ Further, it is implied throughout that the source of the sign is no unofficial deity, but the Delphian god. The allusion to Meletus means naturally, not

¹ V.S. 11. 13.

² V.S. 14.

³ The further contention that Socrates should have referred to the divine sign in his examination of Meletus ignores the dialectical purpose of that argument. As for Dr. Taylor's inference that because Meletus is said to have meant the

δαιμόνιον by his indictment (*Ap.* 31d), therefore he cannot have mentioned it in his speech, that seems to imply a perfectly Teutonic exhaustiveness in Socrates. (V.S. 11.)

⁴ *Ap.* 30d.

⁵ V.S. 14.

that Meletus made no charge about the sign, but that the young tragedian had turned farceur in making out so well-known an experience to be a criminal offence.¹ I may add that if Socrates was carefully avoiding the charge of impiety because he could not meet it, it would be folly to remind the jurors by such a reference that he had practised evasion.²

The *Euthyphro* supports the traditional interpretation of the *Apology*. It is very strange that Dr. Taylor should not have referred to the evidence which it contains. On hearing of the charge Euthyphro at once assumes that the divine sign has got Socrates into trouble, and says, with the knowledge of an expert in piety, that such accusations (of *κατωρομία περὶ τὰ θεία*) are good for prejudicing a jury. Socrates does not contradict the inference. Nor is it hard to see why a fifth-century Athenian should so regard the divine sign. It was, as an apologist said, *ἡ θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον*, which was private to Socrates. However well known, that could never become a 'trifling business,'³ for Socrates had private access to a (perhaps) private deity through it. That offended against cultus, for the power of private or privileged access was the reason why new deities were in disfavour. How could suspicion fail to fall on the sign in times of religious excitement? To call the sign 'trifling' is to misunderstand Athens. And indeed in another context Dr. Taylor admits that the sign, along with the foreign deity or deities, might well become an object of suspicion. That is, the sign might well become the reason for a charge of impiety in itself. Socrates' defence was thus an attempt to repel the charge of innovation by a plea of use and wont, the charge of privacy by a plea of general knowledge.

¹ *σπουδῇ χαριερίστει* (24c) is a similar turn.

² On Socrates' last speech to the jurors: The theory that Socrates concealed his Orphic views while on trial gains plausibility in Dr. Taylor's eyes, because 'no sooner is the issue decided than the Orphic ideas make their way to the front.' Then (1) in his last speech Socrates spoke of life after death without the faintest hint that he had just been condemned for believing in it. Here, at least, there is nothing to indicate that belief or cult had even been mentioned in the trial (see note 54); (2) we are to suppose that Socrates carefully concealed his belief in immortality so long as he was in danger of gaining it (cf. *Phaedo* 61c), but the moment there was nothing further to risk he had the indecency to flaunt this 'hope of a blessed immortality' in the face of his judges. Yet Socrates chose this manner of leaving his public life, and Plato perpetuated the intolerable picture, if Dr. Taylor's interpretation of the *Apology* is true. Is it not simpler to believe that Socrates naturally did not mention the life after death till it was fitting, and then said to his judges what all would understand—for that was fitting too? What does he say after all? Only that in the next world he would have fairer judges, meet better poets, see other victims like himself, and have better and less dangerous argu-

ments with warriors and statesmen—and how his hearers must envy him that, if it is true! No Greek would cavil at that. But the judges are Orphic! That is by no means certain, if Dr. Taylor means that they judged sins done in the body. If we may conjecture from Socrates' hope of meeting Sisyphus, he had not then in mind any scheme of rewards and punishments. And does not Dr. Taylor give another part of his case away in saying that, as a *true* Athenian, Socrates could not forget to add Triptolemus to the company of Orphic judges? As for *Orpheus* and *Musaeus* and *Hesiod* and *Homer* (italics Dr. Taylor's) neither names nor order is suspicious. Their mention can have no religious significance, for every juryman would recognize them as the four great early poets, to whom Socrates would escape out of the present dearth. When Dionysus goes to Hades on a similar errand, Aeschylus recounts to him the names of the same four poets, his predecessors, in the same order (*Frogs*, 1030-5). Hippias of Elis, no Orphic, keeps that order too. The reason is not far to seek. Many Greeks, like Xenophanes, thought that Hesiod, the more primitive poet, was older than Homer. And what a fine climax *ὁ θεῖος Ὀμηρος* made to the list!

³ *V.S.* 14.

Further, is it possible that Plato was unconscious in contrasting two and only two types in the *Euthyphro*? On the one hand there was the pious diviner who used the traditional methods, and on the other Socrates the private practitioner (ποιητής θεῶν, καινοτόμος, αὐτοσχεδιδίω), now in danger of his life. Both during his life and afterwards his sign was regarded as a kind of divination, though quite unique.¹

If Dr. Taylor holds that Socrates eluded the charge in the *Apology*, and made a joke about it which coincides with a bad guess of Euthyphro's, he has still to explain why Euthyphro thought that the divine sign was a good popular cry,² and how it could possibly be regarded as anything but a religious innovation.

Xenophon gives the same explanation. It would not be surprising if he softened the charge against Socrates. But the evasion with which Dr. Taylor charges him³ is the substitution of an 'inherently incredible' or 'palpably false' accusation for the real one. Xenophon says 'that, in his opinion, it was Socrates' notorious claim to possess a "divine sign" which gave rise to the belief that he had imported unauthorized δαιμόνια;' and Dr. Taylor urges that in arguing that the δαιμόνιον is only a kind of μαντική Xenophon is 'naïve enough to point out the incredibility of his own explanation. For if that is so, accusers and all Athenians would be convicted of impiety, and a prosecution on such grounds would not only have made the promoters ridiculous, but have laid them open to a counter-charge which they would not have found it easy to defend' (see note 60). Dr. Taylor hardly does justice to Xenophon's naïveté. If his contention is true, Xenophon gave an explanation of the charge which was ludicrous, and had nothing whatever to do with the trial. Yet he placed this in the forefront of a book meant for Athenians, who knew the still recent facts of the trial and were familiar with the controversy which had since raged over the issue. If this is true, naïve is no word for Xenophon.

We must attempt a credible explanation, one which will do more justice to Xenophon's sense. If he played the sophist, it was not by attempting to substitute an impossible and 'incredible' explanation for facts that were well known to everybody, but by showing that the impiety with which Socrates was charged fell under normal religious experience. Then, Dr. Taylor says, all Athens was guilty. This contention involves the absurdity that any attempt to justify a so-called offence on the ground that it is a particular case of allowable and normal usage thereby involves the usage in disrepute. Thus, a man accused of heresy may not plead that his belief is compatible with orthodoxy because that would turn all the orthodox into heretics.

Xenophon begins the *Memorabilia* with a refutation of the charge of impiety. To the negative part of the indictment he replies that Socrates did sacrifice to the city gods in public and in private, and was known to practise

¹ Pl. *Ap.* 40a, Xen. *Mem.* I. 1, *Ap.* § 12, Plut. *De Genio Socratis* 580c. In the latter passage the discussion about the divine sign

starts from an allusion to Socrates' trial for impiety.

² *Euthyphro* 2b.

³ V.S. 10.

divination. The last phrase is noteworthy, for its somewhat dubious turn suggests that here Socrates may have been suspect in the eyes of the orthodox.¹ At all events he immediately afterwards represents the sign, which he declares to have been inculcated, as a species of divination. That is, he tries to soften the charge by approximating it to recognized practices. He asserts (1) that Socrates did not neglect the normal means of access to the gods (see above); (2) that his special channel was not really irregular, but comparable to the usual public means, the birds and so on.

What then was Xenophon's evasion? He strove to minimize a difference which was legally essential. If divination is defined as a mode of receiving guidance from the gods through signs, it covers both the common practice and Socrates' sign. But, as Xenophon's language implicitly admits, the birds, etc., were sources of guidance, normal, public, and allowable. Socrates used a *private* channel, with perhaps a *private* god as its fountain-head.² That distinction was all important for cultus. The arguments that Xenophon proceeds to offer are intended to lessen the uniqueness of this *private* access to the divinity. He says that the gods gave guidance both through the birds and through the sign. This, if accepted, would nullify the suspicion that Socrates had a private deity or that he had no deity. It also makes both these phenomena branches of divination. Further, he argues, the guidance that Socrates received was used for the good of others (I. 1, § 4). This contradicts the *Phaedrus*, thereby revealing Xenophon's apologetic aim. These two arguments of Xenophon in effect prove that the two *differentiae* of the sign from ordinary divination are superficial—there is no private deity, and the information is not private, but used for public purposes. If that could be upheld—and authorities on divination like Xenophon and Euthyphro apparently thought so—Socrates might be acquitted of innovation. But the majority of jurors did not agree, and we have seen reason why they should not be convinced that the *δαιμόνιον* was harmless.

The account of Xenophon thus proves to be perfectly consistent and sane. Such an argument, though not flawless, might very well conciliate pious folk who were in doubt about Socrates' orthodoxy. It is in harmony with the indications in the *Euthyphro* and the *Apology*; and we are relieved from the necessity of believing that he began his book with an incredible explanation of facts which everybody knew.

To sum up, the *δαιμόνιον* was an object of attack for the following reasons: (1) It could be represented as a *private*, and indeed unique means of access to a private deity. (2) It thereby set aside the regular means of

¹ καὶ μαρτυρῇ χρόνος οὐκ ἀφάνης ἦν.

² For its uniqueness cf. especially Xen. *Mem.* IV. 3. 12, and Pl. *Rep.* 496c. In Eur. *Iph. Taur.* 1262-82, will be found a striking example of the strife of two deities, Apollo and Ge, for the control of divination. Apollo's grievance was that Ge had introduced a new form of divination—true dreams, which interfered with the profits

of his oracle. It mattered very little to him that both dreams and oracle could be classed under the rubric of divination. *Mutatis mutandis*, this seems to disprove Dr. Taylor's contention that if the divine sign was shown to be a kind of divination no divine interests were affected, and justifies Xenophon, who knew about divination, if any man did.

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access and the regular deities. (3) It might be represented as the initiator of measures against democracy. Hence, Socrates explains that it has restrained him from politics and kept him from harmful political acts (*Apol.* 31*d*), and further that it never initiated. (4) It afforded Anytus and his colleagues legal ground, therefore, for an action intended to drive Socrates from the city, and, finally, it gave a capital cry to excite a jury.

V.

Our conclusion is this. In rejecting the traditional view Dr. Taylor has had to interpret the *Apology* in a narrow legal sense, and to attribute to Xenophon an incredible piece of audacity or ignorance. He then construes the indictment as if the new deities must be foreign. Pythagoreans were foreign, and nothing is more manifest than Socrates' intimacy with these men; nothing more veiled than their connection with his trial. Therefore Professor Taylor is compelled to suppose a policy of silence, which proves Socrates' guilt. We have examined the passages which seemed to reveal what Plato and Xenophon tried to hide, if Dr. Taylor's hypothesis is right, and we found that his special interpretations were in open contradiction with the context. It was seen (1) that the evidence for Socrates' participation in a foreign cultus could not be so construed, and even proved that he considered himself to be joining in an Athenian celebration; (2) that Socrates' Pythagorean friends, so far from bringing him into suspicion, could be cited by the orthodox Xenophon as witnesses in his favour; (3) that the beliefs which Dr. Taylor declared to be 'impious' in Athens were at most unusual or considered unwholesome, and had no necessary connection with a charge concerning cultus. We are thus reduced to a significant silence for proof, but silence of a kind that is a grave argument against Dr. Taylor. His theory might be credible if Plato and Xenophon had written for an uncritical posterity, but they wrote to convince men who had known Socrates, seen him tried, read the controversy of the decade after, and had some grasp of the issues. If, in face of this, they practised such evasion or reserve as Dr. Taylor supposes, they had little confidence in Socrates and none in the perspicacity of Athenians.

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THE mystical part of Reitzenstein's interpretation¹ of the song in Theocritus's first idyll has not been generally accepted; it is somewhat surprising to find a new interpretation of the legend of Daphnis, and a new explanation of the genesis of pastoral poetry, introduced by the statement, referring to Reitzenstein: 'Nicht zu kühn war er, sondern noch nicht kühn genug.' Starting from Reitzenstein's contention that the pastoral was developed from a cult-song, Fries² elaborates the theory that Daphnis is a Greek Krishna; that the maiden of Theocritus's first idyll is the counterpart of the heroine of the *Song of Songs*; that astral mythology, Oriental in origin, supplies the clue to Theocritus's handling of the legend. On the basis of this and other material Fries constructs further theories affecting the development of other literary types than the pastoral, and leads us ultimately to a novel interpretation of the Phaeacian episode in the *Odyssey*. The author evidently expects opposition from students of classical literature; let me, therefore, hasten to say that no theory of Oriental influence as late as the Hellenistic period need, on a priori grounds, provoke opposition. If, however, the song of Thyrsis is convincingly interpreted in harmony with Greek and Indo-European ideas that conflict with astral mythology, Oriental scholars will hardly expect the classical philologist to assent to Fries's interpretation.

The story of Krishna, Radha, and the Gôpis, whether or not astral in origin, is ultimately the familiar theme of sacred and profane love. The exquisite expression of this theme in Theocritus (*Epigr.* XIII. Wilam.) shows, not only that the Greeks were familiar with the general notion, but that their expression of the idea was somewhat limited. If the contrast between the baser and the higher emotion ever found expression in Greek legend, Fries fails to note it; certainly legends like that of Hippolytus are not to be identified with such a subject. In brief, although the epigram of Theocritus may suggest how receptive the Greek might have been toward an Oriental expression of the idea, nobody who appreciates the conservatism of the people will readily admit that a legend which in its earlier form can hardly have been astral in origin would be made over, under Oriental influence, into the form implied in Fries's interpretation, or, perhaps we should better say, that without any essential change it would convey a new meaning such as Fries gives to it. I hope in

¹ *Epigramm und Skolion*, 193 sqq.

² *Studien zur Odyssee*, von Carl Fries. I. Das Zagmukfest auf Scheria. *Mitteilungen der vorder-asiatischen Gesellschaft*, XV. (1910), 2/4, pp. 261 sqq.

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any case to make it clear that the form of the legend current before Theocritus simply illustrates the notion, widespread among European peoples, that intimacy between a mortal and a fay is fatal to the mortal, and that Theocritus himself reveals, in the phrase which he uses to describe the fate of Daphnis, his consciousness of one of the common expressions of the theme in which the fay is a water-sprite.

I.

The first idyll is suggestive rather than explicit. The implications in the song have been variously interpreted both by ancient scholiasts and modern commentators. Is the story to be reconciled with an earlier form of the legend,¹ or is Theocritus giving us a novel Hellenistic version, or have we a mixture of the earlier legend with Hellenistic details? Is the maiden of verse 82 the only woman in the story, or must we supply one or more other heroines to explain the action? From the mystery one or two facts emerge: Daphnis is languishing and love-stricken; a maiden is seeking him, apparently the maiden whom he loves; he has in some way excited the wrath of Aphrodite, to whom his present plight is due. All these conditions may be most easily and immediately, but not inevitably, explained if Daphnis, like Hippolytus, has given allegiance to Artemis rather than to Aphrodite; if Aphrodite consequently has driven him against his will to love a maiden; if Daphnis, true to his oath, though love-stricken, has chosen to pine away without gratifying his passion.² Whatever the solution of the mystery, Daphnis succumbs to his suffering (verses 139-41):

τά γε μὰν λίνα πάντα λελοίπει
ἐκ Μοῖρᾶν, χά Δάφνις ἔβα ῥόον. ἔκλυσε δῖνα
τὸν Μοῖσαις φίλον ἄνδρα, τὸν οὐ Νύμφαισιν ἀπεχθῆ.

Upon the meaning of the words ἔβα ῥόον the ancient and modern commentators are in agreement; the scholia somewhat imprudently interpret ἔβα by διέβη and understand the stream to be Acheron; modern commentators agree that the stream is Acheron, and regard the phrase as an ordinary euphemism: 'Daphnis went to the stream,' i.e. he died. The evidence for this view seems cogent. The commentators quote, though only from Latin poetry, such analogous phrases as 'hic pressus Stygius uultum demisit in undas' (Prop. III. 18. 9); 'hunc quoque summa dies nigro submersit Auerno' (Ovid, *Amor.* III. 9. 27, cf. *Trist.* IV. 5. 22). Much more pertinent are two passages from

¹ The best discussion may be found in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie*, s.u. *Daphnis*. The article by Stoll in Roscher, *Lexik. der Myth.* s.u. *Daphnis* is an undigested mass of material. The theories of the scholiasts are sifted in *Class. Rev.* XVII. (1903) 107 sqq., but the view in one mass of scholia that Theocritus is modifying the orthodox Sicilian version is perhaps unduly discredited. A juvenile essay in *Harv. Stud. Class.*

Phil. X. (1899) 121 sqq. is an attempt simply to deduce the formula applied in the legend as it was current in Sicily before Theocritus. The only real interpretation of Theocritus's first idyll is the study by Schwartz, *Nachrichten der Götting. Gesell.* (1904), 285 sqq.

² So, essentially, but with mystical implications, Reitzenstein, *op. cit.* 213; cf. *Class. Rev.* XVII. (1903) 109, n. 1.

Theocritus's contemporaries: οὐδ' ἔτι νῦν περ ἀποικομένου 'Αχέροντος | δῖνας ἀποφάτους ψυχὴν ἐπιδέδρομε λήθη (Apoll. Rhod. I. 644); ἂ πρὸ γάμοιο | χλωρὸν ὑπὲρ ποταμοῦ χεῦμ' 'Αχέροντος ἔβα (Anyte, *Anth. Pal.* VII. 486. 3). There can be only one objection raised to such parallels—all of them specifically mention the Styx, or Avernus, or Acheron. In our passage such reference is left to the imagination of the reader: certainly the reader's imagination is not strained by the effort, and the suggestiveness of the phrase is quite in sympathy with the implicit style of the song.

When, however, we leave the commentators and turn to studies of the legend, we find an essential difference of opinion on this simple phrase. In 1853 K. F. Hermann (*Disputatio de Daphnide Theocriti*, 19-20) wrote of these verses: 'Hoc ipsum Daphnidis profluvium spectant quo nivis ad modum dissolutus decedendo quasi fontem effecerit inque undas abierit.' This interpretation, however, was part of an attempt to find symbolism in the story. Daphnis, in Hermann's view, is the *hibernus torpor* of the earth in general and the waters in particular; Daphnis, vanquished by Aphrodite, is the winter giving way before the spring. Such symbolical interpretation no longer claims our attention. But the same meaning without the symbolism is obtained by Schwartz in his stimulating study of this idyll. It should be borne in mind that Schwartz regards the Daphnis of this idyll as essentially a new creation, and quite apart from the heroic Daphnis of Sicilian legend. The maiden who is seeking Daphnis belongs properly in the story of Menalcas as told by Clearchus ap Athen. 619 C. She is transferred to the story of Daphnis along with the plot of Menalcas's adventures; Daphnis has once scorned love, and is now punished by finding his own love unrequited. In brief, the whole plot is a Hellenistic innovation, and constructed by transference of material from a different legend that had points of contact with the story of Daphnis. This theory of contamination cannot at present detain us, but with reference to the catastrophe Schwartz writes (*op. cit.*, 291): 'ἔβα ῥόον, zerschmolzen, zu Wasser geworden rinnt er in den Bach, dessen Strudel ihn fortspülen. In dieser wörtlichen Ausdeutung des ἔρωτι τήκεσθαι erreicht die weiche Sentimentalität des Θρήνος ihre höchste, dem Umschlagen gefährlich nahe Steigerung.' In other words, the verses are merely the poet's fanciful interpretation of ἐτάκετο in verse 66 and τάκεαι in verse 82 (cf. VII. 76, of Daphnis's languishing for Xenea, εἴτε χιών ὥς τις κατετάκετο). This interpretation is interesting as a record of an impression, but it carries no conviction until Schwartz explains to us, first, just how ἔβα ῥόον as a Greek phrase can immediately mean a dissolution into water; and, secondly, granting the possibility of the translation, just what evidence there is for such a bold revitalizing of the commonplace τήκεσθαι of the *sermo amatorius*. Hermann was at least conscientious enough to justify ῥόον as an accusative of the effect produced, or to attempt to justify it. He quoted τρέχειν τὸν ἥμιονον from Plutarch, apparently not foreseeing an inevitable reductio ad absurdum; for if τρέχειν τὸν ἥμιονον means 'run like a mule,' the conclusion must be that

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ἔβα ῥόον means 'walk like a stream,' not 'dissolve into a stream of water.' I should be glad to consider any evidence that can be adduced to prove that ῥόον in this phrase is possible Greek as an accusative of effect; but in view of the wide use, in the diction of poetry, of the accusative after verbs of motion as a mere expression of the end of motion (cf. Kühner-Gerth,³ I. p. 311) it seems inevitable that ἔβα ῥόον should mean, directly at least, 'he went to the stream'; *δρος βᾶσα* in Eur. *Hipp.* 223 and *τὸ κοῖλον Ἄργος βᾶς* in Soph. *O. C.* 378 have long since been quoted in connection with our verses. But, paradoxical as it may sound, it is still quite possible that, indirectly, ἔβα ῥόον may suggest, approximately, what Hermann and Schwartz seem to imply that it directly means. Whether, with such connotation, it can only be understood as an elaboration of *ἔρωτι τήκεσθαι*, the reader will easily judge in the course of the argument.

II.

The plot of the song in the first idyll is not, as we have seen, necessarily connected with any earlier version of the legend of Daphnis; but Theocritus was a Sicilian, and an earlier version of the legend which was certainly current in Sicily may fairly be considered in this connection. The considerable mass of material referring to Daphnis may be roughly classified as follows: (1) Theocritus, *Idylls* I. and VII. 73 sqq., the interpretation of which is disputed. (2) Various scholia on Theocritus containing interpretations of the passages pertaining to Daphnis. In this mass is discernible an early interpretation of the first idyll, which seems to me to be perpetuated in Nonnus, *Dionys.* XV. 307, Ovid, *Ars Amat.* I. 732, and possibly to be implied in Verg. *Buc. X.* 21-3 (cf. Theoc. I. 82-3). (3) Outlying material, in which Daphnis is merely a conventionalized figure — e.g. the plot ascribed to Sositheus, a Euboean legend attributed to Hermesianax, the references to Daphnis in Theoc. VIII. and XXVII., the pastoral romance of Daphnis and Chloe ascribed to Longus. (4) A consistent story of a heroic herdsman, specially current in Sicily, and found with unimportant variations in detail in Timaeus ap. Parthenium, *περὶ ἔρωτ.* παθ., XXIX., Diod. IV. 84, Aelian, *V. H.* X. 18, Ps.-Servius ad Verg. *Buc.* V. 20 and VIII. 68, Philargyrius ad Verg. *Buc.* V. 20, Ovid, *Metam.* IV. 276 (but here of an 'Idaeian' Daphnis). Although additions are made from other sources, the essential facts in these authorities seem to be derived ultimately from Timaeus,¹ a Sicilian historian of the fourth century B.C., and the folk-tale represented may have been a theme of the Sicilian poet, Stesichorus, as early as the seventh century B.C..

The folk-tale, which I call for convenience the 'Sicilian'² legend of Daphnis, stripped of unessential details, runs as follows: Daphnis, a mortal neatherd, loves a nymph; he promises her never to hold intercourse with mortal women; breaking his oath, he is punished by the nymph. This

¹ Cf. Reitzenstein, *Efig. und Skol.* 193 sqq.

² Knaack, in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Enc.* s.u.

Daphnis, finds evidence that the tale was originally a Euboean story.

narrative is one of a considerable number of Greek stories, ancient and modern, which depict a love-affair between a mortal and a nymph.¹ Infrequently the hero of such an affair is a herdsman like Daphnis;² usually the issue is disastrous to the mortal, and the malevolent power of the supernatural being is manifested in various ways.³ It is, however, difficult to find any exact parallel for the Sicilian legend with its essential details—the intercourse with the nymph, the compact, the breaking of the compact, and the punishment. The nearest approach to an analogue, as others have noted, is the tale of Rhoecus and the hamadryad (Scholia on Apoll. Rhod. II. 477) referred to Charon of Lampsacus. In the story as told by Charon we find a wood-nymph and a mortal lover, Rhoecus, a compact (*φυλάσασθαι μέντοι γε ἑτέρας ἡναικὸς ὁμίλιαν παρήγγειλεν*); but, instead of a violation of the oath, a mere fit of temper, in which the nymph punishes Rhoecus for speaking sharply to the bee, who serves as go-between (*εἰς ὁργὴν ἔτρεψε τὴν νύμφην ὥστε πηρωθῆναι αὐτόν*). The very feeble motivation of this punishment, which in Rhoecus's case, as in most of the versions of Daphnis's punishment in the Sicilian legend is blindness, is very suspicious. In the Scholia in K on Theoc. III. 13 the bee in the story of Rhoecus is said to announce to the mortal lover the time for the gratification of his love for the nymph; but the real clue⁴ to the rôle of the bee appears only in a fragment of Pindar quoted in the Latin translation by Longolius of Plutarch's *Ἀλτίαι φυσικαί*, 36. It is interesting to note that the quotation is made in connection with an interpretation of Theoc. I. 105-7, where Daphnis is answering the taunt of Aphrodite. The bee is described in Plutarch as a model of cleanness and the natural agent in punishment of adultery: 'Unde apud Theocritum iocose Venus ad Anchisen a pastore ablegatur uti apum aculeis propter adulterium commissum pungatur,

"te confer ad Adam,
confer ad Anchisen, ubi quercus atque cypirus
crescit apum strepitatque domus melliflua bombis,"

et Pindarus "paruula fauorum fabricatrix quae Rhoecum pupugisti aculeo domans illius perfidiam?"' It is probable, therefore, that Rhoecus, like Daphnis, suffered because of his faithlessness toward the nymph. In this case we have a much more precise analogy to the legend of Daphnis than appears from the story of Charon of Lampsacus. Common to both legends are the love for a nymph, a compact, a violation of the compact, and punishment; and the

¹ The material may be found in Rohde, *Der griech. Roman*,² p. 119 and n. 1. To Rohde's collection may be added Philammon (Conon, *Narrat.* VII.) and Astacides (Callimachus, *Epigr.* XXII. Wilam.)

² Cerambus in Nicander ap. Anton. Lib. XXII.; cf. Roscher, *Lexik. der Myth.* II. 1115. 54. Cf. Schmidt, *Das Volksleben der Neugriechen*, 110-11; Ross, *Insulreisen*, III. 45, 180.

³ Cf. Bloch in Roscher, *Lexik. der Myth.* III.

554, 32; Schmidt, *op. cit.* 111-112, 119-23, *Griech. Märchen*, 91; scholium on Soph. *Phil.* 194.

⁴ Wilamowitz, *Textgeschichte der griech. Bukoliker*, 233 sqq. I cannot see that this evidence necessitates our supposing a bee to have dropped out of the legend of Daphnis (Wilamowitz, *op. cit.* 234); but Wilamowitz, so far as I know, has not yet fulfilled his promise to elaborate his interesting suggestions.

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punishment in the legend of Daphnis, as told by Timaeus, is blindness, as in the case of Rhoeus.

The evidence for the Sicilian legend is all later than the middle of the fourth century B.C. It is difficult to disentangle elements that may indicate differences in other and possibly earlier versions of the story. The mortal woman who causes Daphnis's perfidy is a Sicilian princess, according to Timaeus's account. The fact that she is as yet nameless may suggest that this detail is an essential part of the folk-tale. Daphnis himself is represented in the various accounts to be son of a nymph or reared by nymphs, as exposed in a grove sacred to nymphs, as exposed in a bay-tree, whence his name. Whether such details are simply unimportant elaborations, relatively late, or whether they indicate an essential connection with the woods and wood-nymphs is not clear. Nor is the identity of the nymph clear; but it is important to note that in Timaeus, according to the report of Parthenius, her name is Echenais. This name recurs in Parthenius, *περὶ ἑρωτ. παθ.* XI. 3 as the name of a spring (*ἐνθα κρίνη 'Εχηνής*); and in Theoc. VIII. 43, in a story of the conventionalized Daphnis, his sweetheart is called Nais according to a generally accepted emendation of Meineke (MSS. *παῖς*), based upon the undisputed *Naiða* of VIII. 93. The verse of Ovid, 'Pallidus in lenta naiðe Daphnis erat' (*Ars Amat.* I. 732), may be only an echo from the eighth idyll; and in Hellenistic poetry 'Nais' is not always applied specifically to a water-sprite.¹ The use of Echenais, in Timaeus, as the nymph's name may serve as a more tangible starting-point in a search for traces of the nymph as a water-nymph.

A thorough study of the catastrophes² in Greek legends would probably throw no little light upon the development of variant versions and of legends in general. It is not infrequently the case that different reports of the same legend vary considerably in the account of the catastrophe. Not only is there variation, but apparently an accumulation in one account of catastrophes that will appear elsewhere as single isolated catastrophes. No appreciation of such facts in the tradition is possible until the whole subject is studied, not only within the field of Greek legend, but with the aid of corresponding studies of the legends of other nations. For our present purpose it is imperative that we should know, for example, whether blinding³ in early forms of Greek legends was a specific penalty meted out to perfidious heroes, or a generalized

¹ In the plot of Sosithus's drama (Schol. K ad Theoc. VIII. argumentum, VIII. 93, Ps.-Serv. ad Verg. *Bu.* VIII. 68, Reitzenstein, *Epig.* ad Schol. 258 sqq.) the heroine's name was Thaleia, which is not distinctive. The name Pimplea, given in Ps.-Servius l.c. in connection with the same plot, may be an echo from a form of the legend in which the heroine was a water-sprite (Roscher, *Lexik. der Myth.* s.u. Pimpeleis).

² One group of catastrophes was studied by J. G. L. Meilmann, *De caussis et auctoribus narrationum de mutatis formis*, Leipzig, 1786. The study

of a single legend from this standpoint resulted favourably in the case of the story of Byblis investigated by Rohde, *Der griech. Roman*,² 101, n. 1.

³ Examples of blinding are, in addition to Daphnis, Lycurgus (*Iliad*, Z 130), Thamyris (Conon, *Narrat.* VII.), Erymanthus (Ptol. *Heph. ap. Westermann, Myth. Gr.* p. 183), Rhoeus (cf. above), Stesichorus (Bergk, *PLG.*⁴ III. pp. 214-15), Tiresias (Apollod. III. 6. 7), Anchises (cf. Wilamowitz, *Textgesch. der griech. Bu.* 230 sqq.).

form of divine punishment; whether possibly it was at first specific and later generalized; whether the large number of cases is significant in which the hero or heroine whose love is scorned or unrequited, or who suffers remorse from other causes, commits suicide by leaping into the sea;¹ whether the transformation into a rock appears primarily in aetiological legends or whether it has any symbolical force as the conclusion of sentimental stories in which one who scorns love is thus transformed.² Finally, if such issues have specific force, the problem whether the forms of legends that reveal a harmony of incident and issue represent an early or a late development becomes a pressing question. Without a definite answer to all these problems I can only provisionally treat the variant versions of Daphnis's fate.

The testimony, in reports of the Sicilian legend, strongly attests the blinding of Daphnis (Timaeus, Diodorus, Aelian, Philargyrius, Ps.-Servius, in the places cited, with which cf. schol. in K ad Theoc. I. 85, VIII. 93). The number of witnesses is not important, particularly as Timaeus is very likely the ultimate source of the later evidence; nor does the amount of testimony for the blindness militate against the authenticity of any other catastrophe, even if it emerges in an authority of much later date than Timaeus or of relative insignificance. In three of the sources just mentioned the blinding is combined with another form of punishment. In Ps.-Serv. ad Verg. *Buc.* VIII. 68 Daphnis is blinded and turned to stone.³ In the schol. ad Theoc. VIII. 93 (K) Daphnis is blinded, then wanders about and falls from a precipice.⁴ Finally, in Ps.-Serv. ad Verg. *Buc.* V. 20, at the end of a story

¹ Ps.-Serv. ad Verg. *Buc.* VIII. 59: '... apud Leucaten soliti erant se praecipitare qui... amari ab his desiderabant quos amabant'; cf. ad Verg. *Aen.* III. 279. Illustrations are Sappho (Menander ap. Strabo. X. 452); a long list of perhaps dubious cases in Ptol. Heph. ap. Westermann, *Myth. Gr.* pp. 188-89; Calyce (Stesich. ap. Athen. 619 D); Anacreon (Bergk, *PLG.* frag. 19); Deucalion (Ovid, *Her.* XV. 166); Cephalus (Strabo X. 452); Menalcas (Hermesianax in argum. schol. ad Theoc. IX. K); Meletus (Suidas s.u.) = Timagoras (Paus. I. 30. 1); Byblis (Nicander ap. Anton. Lib. XXX.).

² Perfidious Battus (Anton. Lib. XXXIX. cf. Ovid, *Metam.* II. 676-77), like the faithless Daphnis, is so punished. The scorner of love, however, is similarly afflicted in the case of Arsinoe (Hermesianax ap. Anton. Lib. XXXIX.; cf. Anaxarete in Ovid, *Metam.* XIV. 698-764, and Rohde, *Der griech. Roman.* 284 sqq.) The punishment seems generalized in such stories as those of Cragealeus (Anton. Lib. IV.), Pandareus (*ibid.* XXXVI.) and the wolf (*ibid.* XXXVIII.). It is often a definite rock into which the victim is turned as in the story of Daphnis, told in Ps.-Serv. ad Verg. *Buc.* VIII. 68. So, too, in the story of Battus.

³ '... ab irata nympa amatrice luminibus orbatus est deinde (in) lapidem uersus: nam apud Cephaloeditanum oppidum saxum dicitur

esse quod formam hominis ostendat. ...' This metamorphosis appears without the blinding as the conclusion of Ovid's story of Daphnis ('uulgatos... pastoris amores | Daphnidis Idae quem nympa paelicis ira | contulit in saxum ...' *Metam.* IV. 276). It is possible that it is properly an independent catastrophe, apart from the blinding. The reference to an Idaean Daphnis in Ovid does not affect the question; for if there was a Cretan legend of Daphnis (and Reitzenstein, *Epig. und Skol.* 254-56, seems to me to strain the evidence) the *nympa*, *paelix*, and *ira* in Ovid repeat the important features of the Sicilian legend.

⁴ '... οὐδ' ἂν λοιπὸν φασὶ τυφλοῦσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ δλωμενον κατακρημνισθῆναι. This catastrophe, independent of the blinding, seems to me to be presupposed by the context of Silius Italicus XIV. 462-64. Silius is referring to the death in a naval battle of a descendant of the heroic Daphnis bearing the same name:

'hos inter Daphnis, deductum ab origine nomen antiqua, fuit infelix, cui linguere saltus et mutare casas infido marmore usum.'

There follows a celebration of the heroic Daphnis of pastoral legend. As the poet's purpose seems to be to parallel closely the fates of the younger naval hero and the heroic herdsman, *infidum*

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which closely follows Timaeus's account of the Sicilian legend, the commentator adds material apparently from some other source than Timaeus. In this added statement Daphnis is said, after his blinding, to have called Mercury to his aid; Mercury caught him up to heaven, and at the place where Daphnis disappeared caused a spring to gush forth, called 'Daphnis,' at which the Sicilians offer sacrifice yearly.¹

The very elusive traces of the nymph as a water-sprite in the Sicilian legend, combined with this novel form of the catastrophe in Ps.-Servius, in which a spring marks the place of Daphnis's disappearance and is named after him, certainly constitute a very weak basis for an interpretation of *ἔβα ῥόον* in the first idyll as meaning that Daphnis went to the stream in which his nymph, a water-sprite, resided, and disappeared forever in its waters. Before we hastily reject this possibility, a brief consideration of catastrophes that overtook other young men in Greek legends who are in many respects akin to Daphnis may add some strength to the argument.

Welcker, in a very different connection (*Kleine Schriften*, I. 35-37), long since noted that Daphnis is only one of several young men whose tragic fates form the 'subjects of 'Klagelieder' and who in time are represented to be themselves the first singers of the respective songs. These young heroes—Astacides, Linus, Ialemus, Hymenaeus, Manerus, Bormus—are by no means alike in origin, but a few of them, like Daphnis, are associated with nymphs. Of them Astacides is paired with Daphnis:

Ἀστακίδην τὸν Κρήτα τὸν αἰπόλον ἤρπασε νύμφη
ἐξ ὄρεος, καὶ νῦν ἱερὸς Ἀστακίδης.
οὐκέτι Δικταίῃσιν ὑπὸ δρυσίν, οὐκέτι Δάφνιν
ποιμένες, Ἀστακίδην δ' αἰὲν ἀεισόμεθα.

(Callim. *Epigr.* XXII. Wilam.)

Whatever mystery modern scholars may find in this epigram—whether Astacides be a Hellenistic poet in disguise or a hero of legend—the implication seems to be not only that both are celebrated in song, but that both are nympholept and *ἱεροί*. In this case Daphnis appears in a rôle which he has not assumed in the other evidence of the Sicilian legend, and in a rôle that is quite

marmor, though referring primarily to the treacherous sea in which the naval hero met his fate, would also cover the death of the herdsman as described in this scholium on Theocritus.

¹ . . . *adamatus a nymphea est; qui etiam iure iureiurando adstrictus est ne cum alia concumberet. hic dum boues persequitur ad regiam peruenit et ob pulchritudinem appetitus, cum regis filia consuetudinem miscuit. hoc cum nymphea rescisset luminibus eum orbavit, ille in auxilium patrem Mercurium inuocauit: qui eum in caelum eripuit et in eo loco fontem eliciuit qui Daphnis vocatur, apud quem quotannis Siculi sacrificant.* On the sources of the scholium, cf. Reitzenstein, *Epigr. und Skol.* 200. Schwartz (*op. cit.* 292 and

n. 1) does not attach any importance to the additions to the Sicilian legend in this comment of Ps.-Servius. He regards the spring as a mere combination by some late writer of 'das Melusinmotiv des Märchens' and 'der sentimentalische Schluss des theokritischen *θρήνοι*.' He continues: 'durch den "Cult" lasse sich niemand täuschen.' It is true that no trace survives in modern Sicily of a cult of Daphnis (Ciaceri, *Culti e Miti nella Storia dell' antica Sicilia*, 296). It should be noted that in the pastoral romance of a conventionalized Daphnis a spring called after his name recurs: *ἐσχάλαξε μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ πηγή, Δάφνιδος δὲ ὄμους ἐκαλεῖτο πηγή* (Longus, IV. 4. 1).

in harmony with the divine honours attributed to him in the commentary of Servius; but the nymph to whom Astacides owes his *ἀρπαγή* is not clearly a water-sprite. In the familiar stories of Borimur and Hylas, however, the same divine honours and a similar *ἀρπαγή* are the issue of acquaintance with a water-sprite. The fate of Borimur or Bormus was celebrated in a threnody and an *ἀνακλήσις*; . . . τοῦτον δὲ λέγουσιν υἱὸν γενέσθαι ἀνδρὸς ἐπιφανοῦς καὶ πλουσίου, τῷ δὲ κάλλει καὶ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀκμὴν ὥρα πολλὴ τῶν ἄλλων διενεγκεῖν ὃν ἐφεστῶτα ἔργοις ἰδίους καὶ βουλόμενον τοῖς θερίζουσι δοῦναι πιεῖν, βαδίζοντα ἐφ' ὕδωρ ἀφανισθῆναι. ζῆτεῖν οὖν αὐτὸν τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας μετὰ τινος μεμελωδημένου θρήνου καὶ ἀνακλήσεως,¹ ᾧ καὶ νῦν ἔτι πάντες χρώμενοι διατελοῦσιν (Nymphis ap. Athen. 619 F). Cf. Hesychius s. u. Βῶρμον: θρήνον ἐπὶ νυμφολήπτου Μαρνανδίνου. The stories of Hylas report not only divine honours, but the calling of various bodies of water near Cius after his name, and he is said to be worshipped at the spring into which he disappeared.² It is certainly clear that such an apotheosis as Ps.-Servius ascribes to Daphnis, the spring, and the worship at the spring are completely in accord with tales of nymph-lept heroes who have fallen under the malevolent influence of water-sprites. Of course it remains possible that the comment of Ps.-Servius is mere invention, suggested by such stories as that of Hylas. This possibility does not prove very attractive so soon as we begin to consider the plot of the Sicilian legend of Daphnis in the forms which it assumes outside of Greece.

III.

Whatever doubts may be entertained with regard to *ἔβα ῥόον*, there is no question that the Sicilian story, apart from the first idyll, is one of a vast number of tales current throughout Europe³ at various times that illustrate the fate of a mortal who refuses to ally himself to an elf, may, mermaid, fay. In *The English and Scottish Popular Ballads* (II. 371 sqq.) Prof. F. J. Child has interpreted the Clerk Colvill ballad by bringing together with his usual com-

¹ Kaibel rejects *καὶ ἀνακλήσεως* as a gloss.

² In general cf. Türk, *Breslauer Philolog. Abhandl.* VII. I quote only passages bearing on the details in question: "Τῆς δὲ θύουσι εἴρη νῦν παρὰ τὴν κρήνην αἱ ἐπιχώριοι καὶ αὐτὸν ἐξ ἐνόματος εἰς τρεῖς ὁ λερεὶς φωνεῖ καὶ εἰς τρεῖς ἀμείβεται πρὸς αὐτὸν τῆς (Nicander ap. Antonin. Lib. XXVI.). οὐρα μὲν κάλλιστος "Τῆς μακρῶν ἀρδμήναι (Theoc. XIII. 72). 'Postea cum esset cognitum quod perisset in fonte, ei statuta sunt sacra in quibus mos fuerat ut eius nomen clamaretur in montibus' (Serv. ad Verg. Buc. VI. 43) . . . 'Prusidem urbem et adluit Hylas flumen et perspergit Hylas lacus, in quo resedisse credunt delicias Herculi, Hylam puerum, Nymphis rapinam; in cuius memoriam usque adhuc sollemni cursatione lacum populus circumit et Hylam uoce clamant' (Solinus⁴ 42. 2) . . . 'amnes Hylas et Cios' (Pliny, N. H. V. 143). "Τῆς κρήνης Κίανος (Hesychius s. u. "Τῆς). According to a plausible emendation of Foerster (*JHB.* 135. 174) an epi-

gram of Ausonius represents Hylas as changed into a spring. It is addressed 'Nymphis quae Hylam merse runt,' and runs (98 Peiper): 'fuitis procaces Naides | amore saeue et irritio; | ephebus iste fons (MSS. flos) erit.' In the following passage of Valerius Flaccus (*Argon.* IV. 26), the MSS. read *amnes* for *arces*, and Langen is perhaps right in following the MSS. and referring to I. 692, but in either case the *fontis honores* are pertinent: 'hoc nemo heu fati mihi iam domus, improba quo me | nymphas rapit saeuae monitu Iunonis; in arces | nunc Iouis accessus et iam mihi lumina caeli | conciliat iungitque toros et fontis honores.'

³ A brief abstract in *Proc. Amer. Phil. Assoc.* XXXIII. (1903), p. cv, announced the facts that I here elaborate and put in their proper setting. Here, as there, I am indebted to Prof. G. L. Kittredge for calling my attention to the material collected by Prof. Child.

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pleteness the various applications of this formula in modern tales. In spite of his adequate knowledge of classical literature, he has not included the Sicilian tale of Daphnis, but I have no doubt that he would grant the pertinence of the story in this connection. Many of the versions in Prof. Child's collection suggest that the hero was already married when his acquaintance with the supernatural woman began; with such stories the analogy is not a close one. Of the other stories in which marriage with the mortal woman follows the association with the fay, I select two that closely parallel the essential features of the Sicilian legend—the intimacy with the nymph, the compact, the violation of the compact, and the punishment. As Prof. Child's work is not easily accessible to most of my readers, I summarize briefly these two German tales, or, rather, two versions of one tale.

The hero of the first version¹ is 'Peterman der Diemringer . . . von Stoufenberg . . . geboren' (50-52). One Whitsunday he rides to church. Finding a beautiful woman sitting on a rock by the roadside, he falls in love with her. In the conversation that follows it appears that she has been expecting him; for she has always helped him since his boyhood, though she has never before presented herself to him. To his offer of love she responds that he must never marry; if he breaks his promise he shall die in three days.² The vow is made; she promises to appear whenever he desires her; the knight rides on to church. Soon afterward his relatives and friends urge him to marry, but he refuses, and puts them off with various excuses. Later a new king is crowned. The knight, with a gay retinue, attends the coronation, and wins favour with all by his kindliness and generosity. Even the king summons him and invites him to marry a cousin, an orphan with a large dowry. The knight protests that he is not worthy of the honour. The bishops who are present inquire if he is already married. He tells them of his situation and the penalty of breaking his oath. They ask to see the woman, but he declares that she appears only to him. Whereupon the bishops pronounce it to be the devil's own work, and threaten him with the loss of his soul. Finally he agrees to the marriage; the preparations are made; he interviews his mistress, but she simply reaffirms the fate in store for him in case he marries. At the marriage feast, accordingly, a foot whiter than ivory³ appears through the ceiling; the knight exclaims that his friends have caused his ruin and their own; he has a bed prepared and dies.

Prof. Child remarks upon this story: 'A superscription to the old poem denominates Staufenberg's amphibious consort a mermaid, sea-fairy; but that

¹ For a fuller summary cf. Child *l.c.* Engelhardt, *Der Ritter von Staufenberg* 10-16 discusses the sources of the poem. It once existed in a MS. in the library of Strassburg, but was destroyed in the fire of 1870. Editions made prior to its destruction are the sources of the text. I refer to the text of E. Schroeder, *Zwei altdeutsche Rittermaeren* (Berlin, 1894). Schroeder (*op. cit.* p. II) dates the composition of the poem at about 1300.

² 'Aber nimst ein elich wip | so stirbt din vil stolzer lip | darnach am dritten tage' (395-97).

³ The Trilby foot may justify a quotation: 'Eins menschen fuoz ez sehen liez | blos in den sal unz an die knie. | uf erden so wart schoener nie | noch minnenlicher fuoz gesehen: | das muostent alle menschen jehen. | der fuoz über den sal erschein | wizer denne ie helfenbein' (1032-38).

description is not to be strictly interpreted, no more than mer-fay, or fata morgana, is in some other romantic tales. There is nothing of the water-sprite in her, nor is she spoken of by any such name in the poem itself.' But in a version of Staufenberg's adventure, as told at the beginning of the last century in the vicinity of Baden, the woman is quite clearly a water-sprite. This story is printed in *Sagen aus Baden und der Umgegend*, an anonymous publication, Karlsruhe, 1834, pp. 107-132. Peter von Staufenberg was returning from the hunt when he came upon a beautiful woman near a spring; the usual wooing and the compact follow.¹ The friendship continues for a year; a son is born. The knight goes off to war and wins great renown; a duke honours him highly and offers him the Princess Adelgunde in marriage. The knight is flattered and, having already tired of his mistress, wishes to wed the princess. He confesses to the duke his connection with the water-sprite; the duke tells him he is in the devil's power and the court-chaplain confirms his master's view. The knight accordingly is betrothed to the princess, and in spite of ominous portents preparations are made for the wedding. At the wedding-feast the foot of a beautiful woman appears through the wall. The knight is frightened, but reassures himself. Later in the evening he walks in the garden with his bride; she bends over a brook to pick a flower from the bank, and loses her myrtle wreath in the stream. The knight dashes into the brook, which hardly reaches to his knee; instead of the wreath, he grasps a cold hand and loses consciousness; his friends rush to his assistance, but he seems to be drawn down by an unseen power: 'Er sank mit einem dumpfen Gestöhn in die Fluth, die schäumend über ihm zusammenschlug, und selbst sein Leichnam konnte nicht gefunden werden' (p. 122).

In the Clerk Colvill ballad, too, the woman is a water-sprite. On this ballad Prof. Child remarks (*op. cit.* II. 372): 'Clerk Colvill is not, as his representative is or may be in other ballads, the guiltless and guileless victim of the love or envy of a water-sprite. His relations with the mermaid began before his marriage with the gay lady, and his death is the natural penalty of his desertion of the water-nymph; for no point is better established than the fatal consequences of such connections.'²

IV.

The spring called 'Daphnis,' therefore, seems to deserve more consideration than it has yet received. Such difference as there is between the normal

¹ 'Da gewährte er am Brunnen eine schneeweisse Frauengestalt in lichter, luftiger Kleidung' (p. 107). 'Ich bin eine Undine oder eine Mümmelein, oder eine Meerfey, wie uns die Menschen zu nennen belieben' (p. 109). 'Wenn ich Eurer Liebe vertrauen soll, so muss ich Euer Leben als Pfand haben. Eine fremde Liebe würde Euch den Tod bringen' (p. 110).

² I have not found any precise parallel to the legend of Daphnis in L. Gonzenbach, *Sicilianische Märchen aus dem Volksmund gesammelt*. Welcker

(*Kl. Schrift.* I. 192) quotes an Indian parallel from the *Hitopadesha* 'von einem Jungling, welcher eine Meernympe erblickt, von ihr in Gunst genommen und nach der Weise der Gandarven mit ihr vermählt wird. Keine andere auch nur im Bilde zu begehren macht sie ihm zum Gesetz. Doch einst da er ein reizendes Gemälde erblickt, enthält er sich nicht den schönen Busen mit dem Finger zu berühren und der Fuss im Gemälde stösst ihn weg und er sinkt in sein Nichts wieder zurück.'

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form of the Sicilian legend and the form which I assume (with a water-sprite as heroine and disappearance into her waters as the issue) is no more than the difference between the poem and the Baden-version of Ritter von Staufenberg's adventures. The *fons* and the *fontis honores*, as the story of Hylas shows, are only variant versions of an issue according to which the hero disappears into the *fons*. The water-sprite essential to this theme is suggested by the 'Echenais' of Timaeus's plot.¹

Such stories of nympholept heroes contain expressions which more immediately explain *ἔβα ρόον* than the current view of commentators that it is a unique case of an abbreviated form of *ἔβα ρόον* 'Αχέροντος. The phrases of Apollonius's account of Hylas are very concrete. Hylas sought the sacred waters of the spring (*δίξητο κρήνης ἱερὸν ὕδωρ*, Apoll. Rhod. I. 1208); he went to the spring *κρήνην μετεκίαθεν*, *ibid.* I. 1221; the nymph pulled him down into the midst of the whirling waters (*μέσση δ' ἐνικάββαλε δίνην*, *ibid.* I. 1239, cf. *ἔκλυσε δίνα* in our passage, and the fate of the hero of the Baden version of the German tale as quoted above). Borimus went after water and disappeared (*βαδίζοντα ἐφ' ὕδωρ ἀφανισθῆναι*, Nymphis ap. Athen. 619 F). Such phrases lead to the *ἔβα ρόον* of Theocritus.

To the vexed question of the interpretation of the first idyll my understanding of *ἔβα ρόον* cannot make any complete answer. The only contribution to that larger problem is that a water-sprite must be a participant in the action. To that extent probably a form of the Sicilian legend is still in the background of the Sicilian poet's mind; but the intervention of Aphrodite makes it clear that we have some essential modification of the Sicilian legend. In any case the water-sprite and the *ἔβα ρόον* make the poem a very weak foundation for a theory of astral mythology; nor is *ἔβα ρόον* any longer a mere 'wörtliche Ausdeutung des *ἔρωτι τήκεσθαι*'; on the contrary, it is fundamental in the folk-tale from which the poet draws his inspiration.²

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¹ That a water-sprite is equally appropriate in Timaeus's plot with the blinding as punishment is suggested by the story in Herod. II. 111, in which a king, angered at the overflow of the Nile, hurls his spear into the river and is punished by being blinded.

² The general notions that pervade this group of stories recur in tales that do not follow the essential features of the legend of Daphnis or of other nympholept heroes. So, for example, women who are 'von Haus aus mit dem Wasser verwandt' (Rohde, *Der griech. Roman*,³ p. 101) are metamorphosed into springs. Byblis, in various versions, is changed into a spring, or her tears form a spring; the spring is called

Byblis; Dryope (Anton. Lib. XXXII.), daughter of a river-god and a Danaid, is carried off by Dryads; a tree grows up where she stood, and near the tree a spring gushes forth; she herself becomes a nymph. But more pertinent than such stories is the *ὕδατος γάμος* of Parthenius, frag. 22, Martini, and Nonnus, *Dionys.* XXVI. 357. [ADDENDUM.—Wilamowitz, in his *Reden und Vorträge* (dritte vermehrte Auflage, Berlin, 1913, pp. 298 sqq.), adopts the conventional interpretation in his translation 'zur Styx sank er dahin' (p. 314). My colleague, Prof. Ernest Wilkins, suggests that modern survivals of the folk tale might be found in G. Pitre, *Fiabe Siciliane*.]

THE DREAM OF ENNIUS.

THE dream related by Ennius in the first book of his *Annales*, in which the ghost of Homer appeared to him, has been the subject of much discussion. There are various pieces of evidence about it from which inferences can be drawn; sometimes, I think, too much has been inferred, sometimes too little. My chief object in this paper is to consider what exactly was the view held or expounded by Ennius regarding the nature of the soul and the conditions under which a ghost appears. But I propose in the first place to review the evidence and to contemplate the dream as a poetic product, a thing which has its place in the history of poetry and its affinities with similar passages in other authors.

A dream as a prelude to a poem goes back to the vision of Hesiod in the *Theogony*. It is not indeed quite clear that that vision is a dream (unless it is implied in ἐννύχια, l. 10). But it would naturally be thought of as such. A dream is the natural and usual medium for the appearance of a god or a ghost (Pl. *Most.* 493, *mirum quin uigilanti diceret*, how could a dead man come and speak but in a dream?). And the reader of Hesiod could regard the vision of the Muses as a dream without in the least impairing its reality. The ancients distinguished clearly enough between a dream and what we see when awake (as in phrases like οὐκ ὄναι, ἀλλ' ὕπαι); but the poetic tradition and no doubt also the popular and general belief was that the god or ghost seen in a dream was actually there. A dream was not readily thought of as a thing entirely 'subjective,' a mere hallucination or a creation of the perturbed brain.¹

Several of the poets whom it is convenient to call 'Alexandrian' manifest a strong interest in Hesiod, and among other things the Hesiodic vision of the Muses is reproduced. This was done by Callimachus, at the beginning of his *Ἀλφειά*, and for Callimachus' dream we have the evidence of an Epigram in the *Anthology* (Anth. Pal. VII, 42):

¹ For this reason I have never been able to see that much would be gained, or any real difference be made, if the late Dr. Verrall had been able to establish his very ingenious theory that the *chorontes* in the *Heracles* are asleep during the apparition of Iris and Lyssa. The indications of their falling asleep which he found are

not really conclusive. But even if the Theban elders do sleep on the steps of the palace, would the spectators or even the most enlightened of them be at all likely to think of Iris and Lyssa, appearing on the *theologion*, as nothing at all but a dream of the *chorontes* or of the Coryphaeus? (*Four Plays of Euripides*, pp. 168-174).

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Ἄ μέγα Βαττιάδαο σοφοῦ περίπυστον ὄνειρα,
 ἦ ρ' ἔτεον κεράων οὐδ' ἐλέφαντος ἕης·
 τοῖα γὰρ ἄμμιν ἔφηνας, ἄτ' οὐ πάρος ἀνέρες ἴδμεν,
 ἀμφὶ τε ἀθανάτους ἀμφὶ τε ἡμυθέους,
 εὔτε μιν ἐκ Λιβύης ἀναείρας εἰς Ἑλικῶνα
 ἤγαγες ἐν μέσσαις Πιερίδεσσι φέρων·
 αἱ δέ οἱ εἰρομένη ἀμφ' ὠγυγίων ἡρώων
 Αἴτια καὶ μακάρων εἶρον ἀμειβόμεναι.

Callimachus, we may assume, is at Cyrene when he dreams this dream. It carries him 'from Libya' to Helicon, the traditional home of the Muses, where Hesiod had seen them. It is possible that Euphorion also introduced into one of his poems a Hesiodic dream. I know of no direct evidence for this; it is only an inference from the poetry of his Roman follower, Cornelius Gallus.

Ennius comes next in the order of time, but, leaving out Ennius for the present, I pass on to Virgil's *Sixth Eclogue*, in which the following lines form part of the description of the Song of Silenus (64-73):

Tum canit, errantem Permessi ad flumina Gallum
 Aonas in montes ut duxerit una sororum,
 utque uiro Phoebi chorus adsurrexerit omnis;
 ut Linus haec illi diuino carmine pastor
 floribus atque apio crines ornatus amaro
 dixerit: 'hos tibi dant calamos, en accipe, Musae,
 Ascraeo quos ante seni, quibus ille solebat
 cantando rigidas deducere montibus ornos.
 his tibi Grynei nemoris dicatur origo,
 ne quis sit lucus, quo se plus iactet Apollo.'

Skutsch has made it at least fairly probable that the whole of the Song of Silenus is full of allusions to poems of Gallus. In regard to these lines at all events there can be little or no doubt. Euphorion, Servius explains *ad loc.*, had sung of the origin of the Grynean grove and of the contest there between the rival seers, Calchas and Mopsus, which ended in the defeat and death of the former. This tale had been related by Hesiod or by a poet of Hesiod's school, probably in the *Μελαμποδία* (cf. Strabo XIV, p. 642). Euphorion perhaps began his poem with a dream, Gallus almost certainly did, and the vision must have been something like this: 'Methought I was wandering by the streams of Permessus' (that is, on the lower slopes of Helicon or on the plain where the Permessus makes its way to the Copaic lake) 'when one of the Muses'—Gallus would no doubt give her name—'led me up higher, to the river's source in the spring of Aganippe; there I saw the whole choir of the Muses, and Linus gave me a pipe that had been Hesiod's, bidding me sing of the Grynean grove.' It is not likely that Gallus would describe the whole

company of the Muses as rising to greet him; that, we must suppose, is a touch that Virgil has added to the picture by way of compliment to his friend.¹

We come next to Propertius, who begins one of his Elegies with a dream (III, 3):

Visus eram molli recubans Heliconis in umbra,
Bellerophontei qua fluit umor equi,
reges, Alba, tuos et regum facta tuorum,
tantum operis, neruis hiscere posse meis;
paruaque tam magnis admoram fontibus ora,
unde pater sitiens Ennius ante bibit;
et cecinit² Curios fratres, etc.

The poet is rebuked by Apollo for his ambition and directed to another region of Mount Helicon where the environment is more suitable for an erotic poet, the haunt of Venus' doves and of the rustic Muses (*sortitae rura Puellae*, l. 33, Horace's *gaudentes rure Camenae*).

Any discussion of Ennius' dream must deal with the passage where Lucretius alludes to it, and I now quote that in full (I, 112-126):

ignoratur enim quae sit natura animai,
nata sit an contra nascentibus insinuetur,
et simul intereat nobiscum morte dirempta
au tenebras Orci uisat uastasque lacunas
an pecudes alias diuinitus insinuet se,
Ennius ut noster cecinit, qui primus amoeno
detulit ex Helicone perenni fronde coronam,
per gentes Italas hominum quae clara clueret.
120 etsi praeterea tamen esse Acherusia templa
Ennius aeternis exponit uersibus edens,
quo neque permanent animae neque corpora nostra,
sed quaedam simulacra modis pallentia miris;

¹ It has usually been supposed that 'wandering by the streams of Permessus' signified elegiac poetry, erotic *slagi*. Elegi are *tenues, exigui*; they would readily be thought of as *humiles*, belonging to a lower region than the epos. Propertius, II, x, 25, 26:

nondum etiam Asdraeos norunt mea carmina
fontes,
sed modo Permessi flumine lauit Amor.

Skutsch, when he wrote *Aus Vergils Frühzeit*, accepted this as clearly proved; but later, in *Gallus und Vergil*, he came to doubt it, finding in Nicander the lines (*Theriaca* 12):

οὐδὲν περ
Ἀσκραῖος μυχῶντος μελισσέφροντος ἐκ' ὄχθας
'Ἑλίουδος κἀνδρὲς περ' ὄδας Περμησσοῖο,

where Hesiod (the higher vein of the Epic) is associated with the Permessus. But this doubt seems to be carried too far. It may be admitted that the streams of Permessus had not come to be a recognized symbol for elegiac poetry in Nicander's time. Perhaps Gallus may have had no very definite idea in his mind when he said, 'I was wandering on the banks of Permessus.' But it is highly probable that Propertius knew what Virgil meant by 'errantem Permessi ad flumina.' Gallus had written elegies, and Virgil (if not Gallus himself) took the 'banks of Permessus' to signify that.

² Mr. Butler in his commentary gives strong reasons for *cecinit* rather than *cecini*, and *cecinit* is accepted also by Prof. Phillimore.

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unde sibi exortam semper florentis Homeri
commemorat speciem lacrimas effundere salsas
atque omnem rerum naturam expandere dictis.

What was the scene of Ennius' dream, and where did he see Homer? 'On Mount Helicon' is the usual answer. But, to begin with a simple question, What was Homer doing there? He has no connexion with Helicon, or with Parnassus either. His presence there might even be challenged as a trespass; 'Go back to the banks of the Meles,' Hesiod would say. 'Lucretius and Propertius both attest it, and the coincidence of their evidence is conclusive.' But if neither of two pieces of evidence proves a thing, their coincidence proves nothing more: $0+0=0$. Propertius dreams that he is on Mount Helicon—that was what his forerunner Callimachus had done. He says that Ennius drank of the higher springs; but that is a metaphor or allegory, it is what every great epic poet does. Lucretius, again, might have written his complimentary phrase *qui primus amoeno | detulit ex Helicone*, etc., even if he had never seen the first book of the *Annales*. The passage from the beginning of the seventh book would have justified it (if it required justification from Ennius' writings):

scripsere alii rem
uersibus quos olim Fauni uatesque canebant,
cum neque Musarum scopulos

(where *rem* means the First Punic War, and *alii* is aimed at Naevius). Here Ennius claims to have climbed the heights of Helicon; but, again, this is metaphor or allegory, a quite different thing from a dream. Further, if a poet is to see the Muses, he must go to their home; goddesses could not condescend to pay a visit to him. But a ghost can come from the 'Acherusia templa' to any spot on earth with equal ease. Where then was Ennius when he saw Homer? Probably at home, perhaps in the house on the Aventine where Scipio Nasica found him 'not at home'; just as Callimachus was at Cyrene when his dream transported him to Helicon.

But we have not quite exhausted the evidence. There is the evidence of Persius and of the Scholiast on Persius, *Prol.* 1-3:

Nec fonte labra prolui caballino
nec in bicipiti somniasse Parnasso
memini, ut repente sic poeta prodirem.

Schol.: 'Tangit autem Ennium, qui dicit se uidisse somniando in Parnasso Homerum sibi dicentem, quod eius anima in suo esset corpore.' 'Tangit Ennium,' very probably, but I suggest that, while the scholiast did know the nature of Ennius' dream, he simply repeated 'in Parnasso' from his author Persius. And Persius, I think, had a different idea in his mind. Neither Callimachus nor Propertius dreamt his dream on Mount Helicon; he dreamt that he was on Mount Helicon (*somniansit se Helicone esse*, not *in Helicone*

somniauit). No, Persius was thinking of the practice of sleeping in a temple (e.g. that of Asclepius) in the hope of some helpful visitation from the god to whom it belonged. Vahlen so far agrees with my view that he tries to elicit from another passage of Persius the locality of Ennius' dream, Satire VI. *init.* (uu. 9-11):

'Lunai portum, est operae, cognoscite, ciues!
cor iubet hoc Enni, postquam destertuit esse
Maeonides, Quintus pauone ex Pythagoreo.

'Lunai portum,' Vahlen thinks, came immediately after the narration of the dream in the first book of the *Annales*. Ennius was at Luna. But Lucian Müller advances strong reasons for disbelieving that and for thinking that what is implied is only that the praise of Luna occurred somewhere later in the poem. See his edition of Ennius, pp. 139-140. It is a further possibility that it occurred in a different poem, a *satura* perhaps, and that Persius was thinking of the *Annales* as dominated by the Pythagorean dream.

The residuum with which we are left seems then to consist of two separate facts: (1) Ennius related a dream in which Homer appeared to him (*uisus Homerus adesse poeta*); (2) Ennius claimed to have climbed the Greek mount of song, unlike Naevius.

How then did the first book of the *Annales* begin? We know that Ennius addressed the Muses:

Musae, quae pedibus magnum pulsatis Olympum.

'Inspire me,' he would go on; 'grant that I sing of the great deeds of Rome and her sons in epic verse: let me approach and quaff the waters of your holy wells' ('Castaliis,' say, 'haurire ex fontibus undam'). 'Nor am I an unworthy suppliant. For lately in sleep the shade of Homer appeared to me.' (Here Vahlen would add 'with an aspect of extreme grief and despair,' inferring this from the apparition of Hector in *Aen.* II.):

ei mihi qualis erat, quantum mutatus ab illo

(l. 274), where Servius says, 'Ennii uersus.' But it does not follow that Ennius wrote this verse, or a part of it or something like it, in narrating his own dream. It may have occurred in a quite different part of the *Annales*, possibly not in a dream at all.) 'He shed salt tears' (Lucr. I, 125. *Aen.* II, 271, '*uisus adesse mihi largosque effundere fletus*'—that *may* be a reminiscence of Ennius). 'He, now an enlightened and disembodied spirit, commiserated the ignorance and the troubles of mankind'—perhaps in words like those of Empedocles (*Καθαρμοί*, l. 400):

ὦ πόποι, ὦ δειλὸν θνητῶν γένος, ὦ δυσάνελθον,
τοίῳν ἔκ τ' ἐρίδων ἔκ τε σπονδαχῶν ἐγένεσθε.

Ennius probably knew the verses of Empedocles very well, as a poetic source for the migration of souls. 'And then he unfolded to me the whole system

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of the universe. He explained how souls pass from body to body. When a hen lays an egg, it does not lay a soul: the soul is sent by the gods and enters into the chicken:

oua parere solet genus pinnis condecoratum,
non animam. post inde uenit diuinitus pullis
ipsa anima.

His own soul, he said, had once inhabited the body of a peacock—
memini me fieri pauon,¹

and now it had entered into me, Ennius, who was destined to be the Homer of Rome.' Empedocles, we may remember, had once been a bird:

ἤδη γάρ ποτ' ἐγὼ γενόμεν κούρος τε κόρη τε
θάμνος τ' οἰωνός τε καὶ εἰν ἄλλ' ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς.

(Καθαρμοί, 380-1.)

I come now to the question *cuius causa haec tota disputatio suscepta est*: What was Ennius' conception of the nature of the soul, and of the nature of a ghost? The *ἀπορία* is this: if Homer's soul had entered into Ennius, how could it also present itself to his vision as Homer?

The answer is contained in the passage of Lucretius; all we have to do is to take it seriously and read it carefully. It was *not* the soul of Homer that appeared to Ennius; it was a wraith, a spectre or *εἶδωλον* of him, coming from the *Acherusia templa*; to which *Acherusia templa* it is expressly said that *neither* our souls nor bodies go. At death, the earthly elements of the body remain on earth:

terraque corpus
quae dedit ipsa capit neque dispendi facit hilum,

and *two* things survive: the *anima* which goes into another living creature, and an *εἶδωλον* or phantom which goes to Hades or Orcus. It is a strange doctrine; but the sources of it, and the motives of it, can be recognized. The Homeric Hades supplied the notion of a realm of thin, intangible spectres, with no real life or mind in them:

ὦ πόποι, ἦ ῥά τις ἐστὶ καὶ εἰν Ἀΐδαο δόμοισιν
ψυχὴ καὶ εἶδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες οὐκ ἐνὶ πάμπαν. (Il. xxiii, 103-4.)

Tiresias alone is allowed any sense or intelligence:

τοὶ δὲ σκιαὶ δίσσουσιν. (Od. x, 495.)

Some such belief had to be retained, in order to account for the reappearance of the dead in dreams. The alternative was to accept the sceptical and materialistic explanation of the Atomists and Epicurus, which was a part of

¹ The peacock, L. Müller notes, was brought from the East to Samos in the sixth century—Samos, the birthplace of Pythagoras and, according to some, of Homer also. It was accounted

the most beautiful of birds and the emblem of the starry sky. So it was no unfitting incarnation for a poet's soul.

their atomistic theory of vision in general—namely, that persons and things throw off from them thin 'films,' consisting of inconceivably minute and subtle atoms, and that such 'films' may float about for long and impinge upon the senses or the mind of survivors (Lucretius, Book IV.). How such a 'film,' floating about mechanically, could usually select a relative or friend of the dead man was a difficulty for such a view, and I am not aware that Epicurus attempted to explain it.¹

What instances can be found of phantoms or *εἰδῶλα* separated from the real self or soul? There was one conspicuous instance of such a thing in Homer. In *Odyssey* XI, 601 sqq., Odysseus sees Heracles among the dead, but it is only an *εἰδῶλον* of him:

τὸν δὲ μέτ' εἰσενόησα βίην Ἑρακλῆϊν
εἰδῶλον· αὐτὸς δὲ μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι
τέρπεται ἐν θαλίῃ καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφυρον Ἥβην
παῖδα Διὸς μέγαλοιο καὶ Ἥρης χρυσοπέδιλον.

Ancient criticism attributed the last of these lines, or the last three of them, to Onomacritus. It is difficult to believe that the three lines belong to the original texture of the poem, but whether they did or not, it seems clear that they are due to the variety of stories about Heracles. In some places and in some legends he was translated to Olympus and became a god. The writer of the lines was trying to explain how the *ἥρως θεός* was both a *ἥρως* and a *θεός*.

Another famous *εἰδῶλον* was invented before the time of Onomacritus; the phantom of Helen, which Hera sent to Troy. It can hardly be doubted that this goes back to Stesichorus. His recantation, *οὐκ ἔβας ἐν νηυσὶν εὐσέλμοις*, can hardly have been a mere denial; it would be necessary to explain why Greeks and Trojans persisted in the war. Much in Attic drama was derived from Stesichorus, and among other things probably the *εἰδῶλον ἱρὸν Ἥρας* of the *Helena* (u. 1136). In two other passages of the play it is mentioned, 683, and still more explicitly in 33-34:

δίδωσι δ' οὐκ ἔμ', ἀλλ' ὁμοιώσας ἑμοὶ
εἰδῶλον ἔμπνουν οὐρανοῦ ξυμβείσ' ἄπο.

This last passage leads directly to my next example, the apparition of Anchises to Aeneas in *Aen.* v. 722 sq.:

uisa dehinc caelo facies delapsa parentis
Anchisae subito tales effundere uoces.

The phantom comes from heaven, it is an *εἰδῶλον* sent by the gods; it is not the *anima* of Anchises, for that is beneath the earth—the Virgilian Elysium is consistently placed under earth, whatever may have been the location of Elysium, whether near the orbit of the moon or higher, in Stoic or Platonist views from

¹ If he had known wireless telegraphy, he could perhaps have said that the selection was done by the recipient; innumerable 'films' were

constantly drifting up, and a mind consisting of cognate or similarly arranged atoms apprehended the 'films' with which it had affinity.

which some features of his picture are derived. But the phantom sent from heaven speaks exactly as if it were the real *anima*, 731 sqq.:

Ditis tamen ante
infernas accede domos et Auerna per alta
congressus pete, nate, meos.

So in Ennius the wraith of Homer spoke exactly as if it were the real *anima*: 'memini me fieri pauom.' But it was only the εἶδωλον, the surviving spectre or film of a particular incarnation of that *anima*.

In a later passage of the *Aeneid* (x. 636 sq.) Juno lures Turnus away from the field of battle by means of an εἶδωλον of Aeneas. This is an apparition of the living, which speaks and moves exactly as if it were the real person, like the Helena of Stesichorus. Another example is an εἶδωλον of a goddess, the apparition of Proserpina to Ceres, Claudian, *De Raptu Pros.* III, 81:

materno facies ingesta sopori.

'Facies' is the word which Virgil used for the apparition of Anchises. Tennyson, in his *Demeter*, has rightly interpreted it, in making what Ceres sees quite explicitly a mere 'likeness' or εἶδωλον detached from Proserpina herself.

These instances are few, and perhaps not very convincing. But it is antecedently unlikely that many instances could be found; instances, I mean, of the precise thing that I am looking for, an εἶδωλον or *simulacrum* distinct from the *anima*. It is the Pythagorean belief in the migration of souls that makes the supposition necessary. But usually, and in most of its forms, the Pythagorean theory contemplated the sojourn of a soul for some length of time in the realm of ghosts. It was not always and immediately sent to occupy a new body on earth. It might be detained for long to undergo a process of purification 'donec longa dies . . . concretam exemit labem.' And if the *anima* is in the world of ghosts, there is no need for duplication. The *anima* itself can come back, and present itself to the vision of the living, if it has an important message to deliver or claims redress for a grievous wrong:

patet ollis ianua leti
atque iterum remeare licet. (Val. Fl. *Argon.* iv. 386-7.)

It is not beyond hope that Herculeaneum or Egypt may yet restore to us Posidonius' treatise *περὶ μαντικῆς* or some similar writing of his, when new light would be thrown upon questions like these.

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DE TVNICA LINTEA.

(*Ad Iuu. III 147-151.*)

TVNICAM linteam pro lanea vulgo Romae saeculo tertio post Chr. n. gestatam esse iure optimo Friedlaenderus (S. R. III p. 68) contendit, sed idem Romanos fortasse iam antea eo uestimento usos esse addit, idque fretus loco Iuuenalis, quem supra indicaui. Mihi tamen uidentur uersus illi Aquinatis non posse afferri ad Friedlaenderi sententiam tuendam, quod ut demonstrem, eos infra describam et tractabo. Agit autem poeta de cliente paupere, qui propter cultum et uestitum uilem tritumque saepe diuitibus ludibrio est :

quid quod materiam praebet causasque iocorum
omnibus hic idem, si foeda et scissa lacerna,
si toga sordidula est et rupta calceus alter
pelle patet, uel si consuto uulnere crassum
atque recens linum ostendit non una cicatrix ?

Quaeritur, quid hoc loco sibi uelit illud *crassum atque recens linum*. Mayor de his uerbis tacet, sed Friedlaenderus ea intellegit de filo linteo, quo tunica linteae resarta sit, non recte, ut opinor. Nam de clientis uestimentis, lacerna et toga, iam sermo erat in prioribus uersibus, sed u. 149 poeta ad calceos transit, qui aequae triti uel sordidi erant atque uestis, neque ueri simile est eum calceis commemoratis rursus ad aliam partem uestitus atque eam, quae sub toga uel lacerna latens ab irrisoribus cerni non poterat, reuertisse. Accedit quod etiam scholiasta hunc uersum (151) non ad uestem, sed ad calceos referendum esse arbitrat, quemadmodum docet eius interpretamentum : 'a sutriballo sutus' (sc. calceus). Eas ob causas uerbis *crassum atque recens linum* non tenue aliquod filum significari existimo, quo tunica resarciri solebat, sed funem satis firmum,¹ quo sutor corium scissum consuere poterat. Ita si locum interpretamur, pulcherrima existit concinnitas in his uersibus, atque in altera parte tantummodo agitur de calceamento miseri illius clientis, non de eius uestitu et calceis ; cui interpretationi etiam fauet particula *uel* in u. 150. Sed forsitan quis roget, num ueteres re uera soliti sint calceorum *pellem ruptam* lino resarcire. Auctore Isidoro (*Orig. XII 1, 26*, Lindsay), quem sequitur Antonius Richius in lexico antiquitatum Romanarum s. u. *sutor*, pelles a sutoribus consuebantur saetis :

¹ Cf. Ouid. *Fast.* III 587 : 'dumque parant linum'; Isid. *Orig.* XIX 27, 1 : 'stuppa uero torto subducere carbasa lino'; *Met.* XIII 923 : 'cannabi est siue lini.'
'nunc in mole sedens moderabar harundine

'porcorum pilos saetas uocamus et saetas a sue dictas: a quibus sutores uocantur, quod ex saetis suant, id est consuunt, pelles.' Fallitur tamen bonus episcopus, si sutores pelles potuisse consuere credit saetis, sed fortasse ei ob oculos uersabatur usus quidam, qui etiam hodie ualet. Nempe sutores etiam nunc saeta utuntur, sed eam pice praefigunt ipsi filo, ut hoc per foramen, quod iam subula in pelle factum est, facilius traicere possint. Saeta igitur uice fungitur acus uel potius eius instrumenti, quod Angli 'tag' vocant, nos 'malie,' 'nestel.' Verum ad corium consuendum uel boum nerui adhibebantur (Hes. *op. et d.* 544), unde uocabulum *νευροράφος*, uel linum,¹ ut docet Galenus XIX 134: *ράφις τῇ κεντητηρίῳ, ᾧ διακεντοῦντες οἱ τεχνῖται τῶν τοιοῦτων ἐπιτηδείους ὁπὰς τῇ τοῦ λίνου διέρσει παρασκευάζουσι.*

Itaque non nobis licere puto ex uersibus 150-151 efficere iam aetate Iuuenalis tunicam linteam in usu fuisse, sed si quid uideo, iuxta clientem, cuius calcei rimas agunt, is h. l. depictus est, cuius pedes tecti sunt calceis 'crasso atque recenti lino' resartis.

J. VAN WAGENINGEN.

GRONINGAE SCRIBEBAM.

¹ Cf. H. Blümner, *Technologie und Terminologie der Gewerbe und Künste bei Gr. und R.* I³ p. 280; 296; II¹ p. 354.

ON THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION OF 459-4 B.C.

It appears to be a generally accepted opinion among modern historians that the expedition which the Athenians led up-Nile in 459 B.C. in support of the Egyptian insurrection against Persia was an exceptionally large one, numbering no less than 200 sail. Modern authors also seem to imply, though they may not say so explicitly, that the whole of this armada was involved in the catastrophe which overtook the rebels in 454 B.C.¹

The evidence for this traditional view is derived from the following texts:

Thucydides I. 104: 'Ἰνάρως δὲ . . . ἀπίστησεν Αἰγύπτου τὰ πλείω ἀπὸ βασιλέως Ἀρταξέρξου, καὶ . . . Ἀθηναίους ἐπηγάγετο. οἱ δὲ (ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐς Κύπρον στρατευόμενοι ναυσι διακοσίους αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων) ἦλθον ἀπολιπόντες τὴν Κύπρον.

Diodorus XI. 71. 4: οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι . . . ἐψηφίσαντο τριακοσίαις τριήρεσι βοηθεῖν τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις.

Ibid. XI. 74. 2: καταπλευσάντων δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Αἴγυπτον μετὰ διακοσίων νεῶν.

Isocrates, *De Pace* § 86: εἰς Αἴγυπτον μὲν γε διακόσiai πλεύσασαι τριήρεις αὐτοῖς τοῖς πληρώμασι διεφθάρησαν.

If these passages could be supposed to create a consilience of evidence, their joint testimony would be conclusive. But probably the statements of Isocrates and Diodorus are nothing more than inaccurate repetitions of Thucydides. [Diodorus' account of the Pentecontaetia is notoriously a mere réchauffé of Thucydides, supplemented by more or less unfortunate guesswork. Isocrates' allusions to events of the fifth century never betray any trace of independent research. His method is simply to take over the established tradition and to manipulate it according to the exigencies of his case: in the previously quoted passage, where he is arguing against Athenian imperialism, it would be his cue to exaggerate the extent of the disaster in Egypt.] It may be assumed, therefore, that in spite of the divergences

¹ Ed. Meyer alone goes so far as to mention expressly that the Greek fleet may have been reduced in numbers during the course of the campaign (*Geschichte des Altertums*, III, p. 606).

[After the completion of the present article the author has found his views confirmed in

Cavaignac's recently published *Histoire de l'Afrique*, vol. II. pp. 71, 72, where the total Greek force is estimated on the authority of Ctesias at 40 sail. But the point is not argued by Prof. Cavaignac at any length.]

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between Thucydides and our other two informants no independent authority can be assigned to the latter: our appeal must be to Thucydides alone.

What then does Thucydides tell us? Merely this, that the Greek armament was 200 strong *at the time when it lay off Cyprus previous to the expedition up-Nile*. He does not say that the *entire* Greek fleet proceeded from Cyprus to Egypt, or that the force dispatched to Egypt was maintained at its original strength after the first campaign in that country.

So far therefore as Thucydides' evidence goes, it need not be supposed that the Greeks ever kept a fleet of full 200 ships in Egypt. Some further considerations may show that the total of the Greek force was considerably smaller in numbers.

In the first place we have an independent version of the Expedition by Ctesias,¹ in which the contingent of the Athenians operating in Egypt is estimated at no more than 40 sail. In view of the normal preponderance of Athenian craft in the fleets of the Delian League, the total strength of the Expedition cannot on this reckoning have exceeded 60 ships or thereabouts.

Now it is usual to dismiss Ctesias' story as a tissue of fantastic falsehoods. Certain it is that his *Περσικά* are full of sad blunders, and that his account of the Egyptian Expedition is vitiated by the obviously exaggerated numbers which he assigns to the Persian forces then engaged. But extravagances like these should serve to bring into stronger relief the sobriety of Ctesias' estimates of the Greek fleet. To take a similar case, the figures which Herodotus gives for the army of Xerxes are as absurd as any of Ctesias' romancings, nevertheless his estimate of the Greek squadron at Artemisium or Salamis is usually accepted as approximately correct.

Another way of discrediting Ctesias' account is to suppose that his text is corrupt, and that the numeral M (40) is a mistake for Σ (200).² Unfortunately for this theory, the numeral of Ctesias' text is represented by a word and not by a letter symbol. A confusion between *τεσσαράκοντα* and *διακόσιοι* is out of the question.

In the absence of any cogent objection which can be brought against them Ctesias' figures must be allowed to carry their due weight.

From the same author we further learn that the Greek force at the time of its capitulation in 454 B.C. numbered 6,000 men.³ If this was the remnant of the complements of 200 triremes the slaughter among the Greeks previous to surrender must have been simply terrific. The crews of a fleet of 200 triremes would amount to 40,000 men. If only 6,000 of these survived at the end of the Expedition the casualties must have worked out at 85 per cent. But it is hardly possible to account for losses on so large a scale. In the first three years of the war the rebels had it all their own way, and during its

¹ *Persica*, bk. 14 § 63 (ed. Gilmore).

² K. W. Krüger, *Philologisch-historische Studien*, I. p. 163, followed by Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, III. p. 306, n. 2.

³ *Ibid.* § 65. Ctesias calls these 6,000 survivors Ἕλληνες, not Ἀθηναῖοι. Accordingly they represent the total surviving remnant of the Expedition.

later stages there was only one battle in the open field. A residue of 6,000 men is more in keeping with an initial total of 60 than of 200 triremes.¹

Another piece of evidence which points in the same direction is the famous 'Erechtheis inscription.'² This best of authorities informs us that the operations of the Greeks in 459 B.C. extended to Phoenicia no less than to Egypt and Cyprus. Now we can hardly suppose that the Greek fleet visited Phoenicia before putting in at Cyprus, for this island was obviously the proper base of operations for an attack upon the Phoenician coast. Still less is it probable that the invaders made their way from Cyprus to Egypt by skirting Phoenicia, for this course would have involved a détour along three sides of a rectangle against the seasonal winds and currents.³ It follows that the Athenians on arriving at Cyprus *divided their forces*, one section being told off to operate on the Phoenician coast, another perhaps remaining on guard at Cyprus. It may furthermore be assumed that the squadron which was dispatched into Phoenician waters was of considerable strength, because the duty of providing against an attack by a fleet issuing from Tyre or Sidon was of very great importance. On this reckoning therefore the squadron which sailed to Egypt must have fallen far short of 200 sail.

The importance of guarding against an attack by a Persian fleet issuing from a Levantine port is illustrated by the course of events in the fourth year of the Expedition. In 456 B.C. a new Persian armament recruited in Cilicia, Cyprus and Phoenicia (Diodorus XI. 75. 2), and numbering nominally 300 sail (Ctesias, *ad loc.*), appeared in Egyptian waters, and although nothing explicit is recorded as to its activities, there can be little doubt that its presence at the scene of war was a decisive factor in the catastrophe of the Expedition. So long as the Greek fleet maintained its control over the main branches of the Nile, there could be no question of the Persian land forces cutting off its retreat or placing it under efficient blockade. If the Greeks eventually submitted to being penned up in the island of Prosopitis, this can only mean that in the meantime their fleet had lost its command over the two principal arteries of the Nile, between which Prosopitis is situated. Whether the Greek vessels were worsted in a set battle or were driven to land without offering resistance cannot be ascertained: in any case it is clear that the intervention of the new Persian fleet in 456 B.C. must have contributed in no small degree to the final discomfiture of the invaders.

Lastly, it must be borne in mind that at the time of the Egyptian Expedition the Athenians were waging a highly critical war against their most powerful enemies in homeland Greece. In 459 B.C. they came to blows

¹ According to Thucydides (I. 110), only a small proportion of the Greek force got safe home. This does not contradict the view put forward above, for the Persians broke the terms of the capitulation (Thucydides, *ad loc.*; Ctesias, §§ 67-8) and slaughtered off part of the surviving 6,000.

² I.G. I. 433; Hicks and Hill, No. 26.

³ The summer winds blow from N. from Cyprus to Egypt, and from S.W. along the coast of Syria. The current travels E. along the shore of Africa, N. (as a rule) along the Syrian coast, and W. along the coast of Karamania.—*Mediterranean Pilot*, vol. II., pp. 7-8, 12.

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with Corinth; in 458 B.C. they were confronted with a coalition whose combined squadrons amounted to 150 or more triremes.¹ At this time the Athenian navy available for active service can hardly have numbered more than 300 galleys.² In view of this situation it is incredible that Pericles, who more than any Athenian statesman understood the need of maintaining at all costs the supremacy of Athens in the Aegean Sea, should have locked up nearly 200 Athenian vessels in a distant and speculative enterprise like the Egyptian Expedition and exposed his home fleet to the risk of being crushed by superior numbers.³

It is also difficult to understand why the enemies of Athens did not fall upon her with renewed vigour if the disaster of 454 B.C. had involved a fleet of no less than 200 ships. The loss of a similar number of vessels on the Sicilian Expedition of 415-3 B.C. was the signal for a determined and successful onset upon the 'tyrant city.' If no such attack was delivered after the failure of the Egyptian Expedition, this can only mean that the venture was on a more modest scale.

We may therefore conclude that the Egyptian Expedition was a less gigantic undertaking than has commonly been supposed, and that considerably less than 200 triremes were involved in the final disaster.

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¹ In 443 B.C. the Corinthians levied 133 ships on themselves and their colonists (Thuc. I. 46). There is no apparent reason why they should not have raised as many in 458 B.C. To this fleet must be added the navy of Aegina, which amounted to more than 30 triremes in 480 B.C. (Herodot. VIII. 46).

² In 431 B.C. Athens possessed 300 seaworthy galleys (Thuc. II. 13). A confused passage in

Andocides, *De Pace*, § 5, seems to convey that in the twenty or thirty years which followed the Persian invasion the Athenian navy was merely kept up to its previous strength of 200 sail.

³ The Athenians committed a mistake of this kind in sending out the two expeditions to Sicily in 415-3 B.C. But Feisander and Charicles should not be compared for statesmanlike prudence with Pericles.

SYNTAX AND ETYMOLOGY.

(i.) *utor*; *uescor*.

1. In the school study of syntax the results of etymology, however highly they may be valued in theory, are in effect neglected. I called attention to this, and specifically to the construction of *credo* with the dative, in an article in the *Classical Quarterly*, v. 193 (§§ 25 sqq.).

2. Syntax, as well as lexicography, would be the gainer if people really set themselves to define *utor* with reference to its derivation. I think the etymologists can hardly be wrong in saying that O. Lat. *oetor* comes from the root of *ei-re*, 'to go.' The morphological problems remain difficult enough. However glibly we may speak of *oe* (i.e. *oi*) as the deflected or *o*-grade of *ei-*, we do not know how to account for the use of the *o*-grade. Why has *oetor* the *to/te* present suffix? With our sixth sense, of divination, we may say that the present thus made is in this case frequentative (cf. Eng. *use* = 'frequentare')—as it is again in *viso*: *video*. What is the connection of the deflected vocalism with the *t*-formant? By pure divination again we may say that we have in *oetor* a denominative to *oi-ro-s*—without its Greek specialization of meaning—but why was a stem *oiro-* inflected as a primitive verb, *uti* and not **utari*?

3. Easier than these morphological questions, though in a way dependent upon them, is the problem of defining *oetor*. This verb with the vowel colour of **oiro-s* and provided, like **oiro-s*, with a *t*-determinant should mean something like 'viare, voyager.'

4. If this is its meaning, why is it a middle or reflexive? Why? Shall we ever know? But we can comfort our ignorance of why it is middle by recalling other middles like *ἐρχομαι* and *δεδύσσομαι* and *s'en aller*, albeit with the unconsoling reflection that all are middles with a difference. But for Latin *proficiscor* reveals one way in which the reflexive flexion may have arisen.

5. But we have come out with a definition of *oeti*, viz. quasi 'viare,' and the locution *aliquo uti* suggests to me our colloquial turn 'to run with somebody.' This, in the prevailing rubrication of the lexica (nor has even Skutsch altered the rubrication of the first Stowasser lexicon), is the last usage classified for *utor*. In my opinion it ought to be the first, and yet not more first than *scipione uti* 'to go with a stick,' which happens to be the first example in the lexicon of Lewis and Short. Cf. Skr. *āpvena yānti* 'equo eunt.'

6. When we etymologically define *uti* by 'to run *with*' we determine its primary syntax in the mere definition. Anything but an instrumental regimen becomes unthinkable, and it becomes necessary to apply our minds to the solution of the other cases where *uti* takes the accusative. For myself, I am satisfied with saying that *uti* with the accusative is due to imitation of some synonym like *adhibere* with the accusative, and that the innovation never gained a footing save in the gerundial constructions where it was so obviously a convenience.

7. Along with *utor* I may devote a line, absolutely without consideration of its etymology, to one of the deponents habitually grouped with it, *uescor*. By merely insisting, as our school grammars rarely seem to do, on its deponent or reflexive value, i.e. 'I feed myself with,' we account for the instrumental regimen. But that is to beg the question, for the regimen may be ablative and not instrumental and 'to feed one's self from' also explains the Latin construction. Nothing but an absolutely precise definition of *uescor* can solve which of the two possible cases—or three, for the original locative is not impossible, any more than in English (cf. e.g. Arnold's *Basis Latina*, p. 70, note to § 69)—is to be recognized. The isolation of indubitable cognates of *uescor* in the related languages might, however, settle the question which case is the real Latin regimen.

(ii.) *culauit*.

8. These remarks on *utor* may lead the way to an interpretation of the rare Latin word *culauit*, found in that form in two Latin passages only. One of these is Petronius 38. 2, eos <arietes> culauit in gregem, of a general sense that none could miss, 'he turned them in, bred them, let them in to his flock <of ewes>.' Now lexica of languages must often give only the general sense, and the second Latin instance of *culauit* is too obscure to aid in fixing the definition of *culauit* here. Lacking comparable instances, and lacking for this word any native or glossic interpretations, we must turn to comparative etymology, the third and least certain source of definition, to find our cues.

9. The Latin verb *colo* was pre-eminently in the Indo-European time a stock-breeder's verb, and meant to breed or keep cattle. That was its transitive sense, and the cognates given by Walde may be consulted with advantage. Intransitively used, this verb described the wanderings of the cattle themselves, as predominantly in Sanskrit (see also *पेलो* and its cognates). But in Sanskrit, in a ritual text, *anyena carati* is spoken of a woman 'quae uiro alieno utitur,' that is to say, that *cādrati* with the instrumental (= 'runs with another') is a verb of sexual import. We can hardly doubt that this use of *cādrati* is to be identified with the usage of *colit* (aliquam) in Latin, also used of irregular companioning (cf. exx. ap. *Thes. Ling. Lat.* iii. 1676, 16 sq.), but with the difference that the Latin accusative regimen is secondary, based on *amare* or the like.

10. The Sanskrit causative *cādrayati*, in the law-book of Manu (8. 362), is also used to describe the act of a man who puts his wife to the white-slave's

use. So, coming back to *arietes culauit*, I propose to define it by 'he let the rams run to (with) the ewes.'

11. This prepares us to look at the parallel instance, viz. to read with the manuscripts and not the editors, the Plautine line (from the *Sitellitergus*):

mulieres uxor culauit— < : > ego noui, scio axitiosa quam sit

The wife let her women gad—: I'm not surprised, I know how 'associatory' she is.'

The precise sense in which *culauit* is here used may escape us, but it may have meant something like 'procured,' as the following *axitiosa*, which we shall consider presently, may have implied something like 'procuress.'

12. Morphologically, *culauit* seems to me best explained by assuming that the root of *colit* was *k^welāy-*, a *seṭ* basis, to use Hirt's Paninian terminology, cf. the *ī*-vowel in Skr. *dcarīt* (Aor.), *carita-m* 'erratio.' It is also convenient to explain the *-a* of *-cola* as derived from *-ā(y)*. As to origin, we go far enough back if we make *culauit* a rustic (or technical) Latin derivative of *-cola* 'drover.' We may leave it an open question whether the *ā* of *culauit* (*ū* in the lexica is perfectly gratuitous) has intruded into the simplex from some lost compound, or is like the *u* of *rutūndus*: *rota*. If *culauit* is a denominative to *cola* the definition that results is 'bred' or 'herded,' and the latter makes a quite suitable rendering in the two known instances, already discussed.

(iii.) *axitiosus*.

13. Syntax has played no part in the development of *axitiosa*, but it is perhaps easiest of explanation in a context where a fairly clear example of it has already called for interpretation. All our knowledge of its meaning is derived from the following texts:

Paulus (Festus), pp. 2-3, de Ponor: *axitiosi factiosi dicebantur, cum plures una quid agerent facerentque. Axit autem dixisse antiquos pro egerit, manifestum est; unde axites* mulieres siue uire* dicebantur una agentes. Axamenta dicebantur carmina Salaria* . . . in uniuersos homines ꝑcomposita. Nam in deos singulos uersus ficti a nominibus eorum appellabantur, ut Ianuli, Iunonii, Mineruii.*

Thesaurus Glossarum Emend. (Goetz), s.vv.: *Axitionum* conspirationum, factionum, *Axitiosae* consolatrices.

Varro, *L.L.* 7, 66: in Astraba <Plauti>: *acsitiosae* annonam caram e uili concinnant uiris, ideo in Sitellitergo idem ait: (see § 11). Claudius scribit *axitiosas* demonstrari consupplicatrices, ab agendo axitiosas, ut ab una faciendo factiosas, sic ab una agendo *ac<si>tiosae* dictae.

14. From these examples and definitions the definition that arises to my mind for *axitiosa* is 'gadding,' but gadding with its note of 'companioning,' drove-gadding, as it were. Leaving *axamenta* 'στίχοι, carmina' aside for the moment, for that seems to me likely to have come from *axare* 'nominare' as *ornamentum* from *ornare*, the remainder of these words seem to have come from *acs-et-* wherein *acs-* is from *ag(e)s* 'drove, agmen' and *-et-*, whether from *-it-* or *et* (see Fay, *Class. Quart.* iii. 272), the well-known confix meaning 'going, iens.'

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15. For purposes of philological completeness it may be mentioned that in the gloss *axitas ἀποτελεσματικά*, we may account for the definition as 'female astrologers' by recalling that from Ovid's time on *axis*=caelum, and *axites* is then a sort of 'caelites.' Perhaps Scaliger's correction to *axites* is wrong, for the word cited above from Festus is really transmitted as *axtas*, i.e. *ax<i>las*, and if very ancient may be a noun in -a of the *aduenā*-type, with a primitive nominative plural in -ās. The definitions 'consolatrix' and 'consupplicatrix' need not be felt as inconsistent, for women's clubs and companies fulfil various social missions. But 'consolatrix' is the definition of *anxiosire*, to give the actual MS. reading, and the definition may attempt to solve or set up a connection with *anxius*. Note also the gloss *anxicia* 'meretrix,' which can hardly fail to be connected in sense, however strange the form, with *axitiosa* in the Plautus line given above (§ 11). The definition of Claudius in Varro, viz. 'consupplicatrices,' will refer to something like 'gadding' Bacchantes, and includes the note of *ax<a>menta*, glossed by στίχοι ἐπὶ θυσιῶν 'Ἡρακλέους, i.e. uersus in sacris Herculis (see also § 14). Thus *consupplicatrices* seems the most apposite definition for *axitiosae*, pace Goetz, *Archiv*, 2. 339. At any rate it presents the original sense of 'drove-gadding,' restricted to a shouting and praying religious band. Specific reference to the Bacchantes at Rome is not to be demonstrated, but in the first Plautine example (§ 13) *axitiosae* connotes extravagance, and may refer to a *bacchanal* of extravagant character, cf. the cook's allusion to such a *bacchanal* in *Aul.* 408. So also the words *mulieres uxor culauit* may mean something as innocent as 'The wife has herded together women'—to a Bacchanalian feast, to wit. With the Bacchantes in mind, the gloss *a[n]xitia* 'meretrix' is of easy explanation.

(iv.) *axitia* quasi 'paint-stick.'

16. For completeness, it may be remarked that there is another word *axitia* (*axicia*) that occurs in the following Plautine context, and is certainly the name of a toilet accessory (*Curc.* 578):

at ita me uolsellae, pecten, speculum, calamistrum meum
bene me amassint meaque axitia linteumque extersui.

I interpret *linteum extersui* as a paint-rag, for wiping off surplus paint. The closely connected *axitia* (cf. *-que -que*) was, I take it, nothing of the *scissors* kind (named from the *axis*, or pivot, forsooth), but a sort of spatula or trowel for mixing or applying the rouge. It belongs with *ascia* 'trowel,' and exhibits *cs* in the same order as the English cognate *axe*, not reversed as in *ascia*.

We explain *ascia* very simply from *ak/ak-* 'sharp' and *scia*: O.Ir. *scian* 'knife,' cf. *áxiw*, with a different reduction of the *-ksk-* group depending on the varying predominance of *prius* or *posterius* in the compound. In *axitia* (i.e. *ac-sicia*) the *posterius* will belong with *secat*. Thus also we explain Goth. *aqwizi* 'axe': O.Eng. *āx* (startform *acusi*, so Sievers, *Gr.* § 49³). The full startform was *a(k)-skw-es-i*, with *skw* to *secū* in *secū-ris* (?<*sekwōst-*) 'axe':

σκού-ρος 'chippings.' In Gothic the first *s* was lost by haplogy with the *s* (z) of the stem, probably after the first consonant shifting was fulfilled. Note the -es stem in Lat. *seces*(s)*pīta*. [For -*spīta*: Skr. *sphyā-s* see Fay, *A.J.Ph.* 34, 27 fn.]

(v.) *nubere*.

17. The unevenness of our lexica may be illustrated from the difference in the treatment of the lemmata *credo* and *nubo* in Lewis and Short. Think of the average pupil's inability to draw any syntactical instruction from the statement under the first, viz. 'Sanscr. *çrat*, *çrad*, trust, and *dhā*; v. 2 do,' whereas the entry under *nubo* ii. is 'In *partic.*, of a bride: *alicui*, to cover, veil herself for the bridegroom.' This entry clarifies the dative regimen even for a young student, and some, at least, of the school grammars likewise teach the construction of *nubere* by translation and fail to do the same for *credere*. We could get rid, in my opinion, of a great deal of syntactical schematism by grounding pupils in the correct definition of words. Even a construction like causal *cum* loses half its difficulty if students are taught to render *cum* in all but the concessive (= insufficiently causal) relation by 'as.'

18. While, as regards the definition of *nubere*, I hold to the penultimate rather than the ultimate theory of its derivation, I find it difficult to decide whether its *b* is from *dh* (after *ū*) or from *bh*. The assumption of a root *snū-dh-* (with *ū* from *eu*, *ou*, or *yu*), wherein *dh* is the same determinant that we have in the cognate *νῆ-θ-εῖ* 'spins' accounts for *nū-bē-s* 'cloud' as containing a root noun *dhē-*. The unextended root *snē-* 'twist, plait, weave, spin' has derivatives that justify by-forms *snēy-* (in Skr. *snāyati* 'uestire') and *snēw* (*snōw-*), cf. O. Norse *snūdr* 'a twist' (with u-diphthong): Scotch-English *snood* 'fillet of a maiden, removed at marriage' (from *snō-dh-*), Skr. *nī-dhā* (f.), from *(s)*nī-/dhē*, 'netz aus schnüren, fanggarn.' Cf. also Lat. *nuit* glossed by 'operuit, textit' (see Fay, *A.J.Ph.* 25, 372 sqq.; and on *νυθός*, 380). Of course the cognation *nūbēs*: Av. *snaoda-* 'cloud' makes strongly for original *dh*. On the other hand, a *bh*-determinant characterizes the group to which τὸ νέφος 'cloud' belongs and (s)*ne-bh-es-* (*s-* lost by incontiguous haplogy) 'cloud' may also be of the progeny of *snē-* (cf. Cauer's ἀννέφος in § 45). Furthermore, ptc. *nupta* pf. *nupsi* look to *bh* not *dh* (cf. *iussus*, *iussi*); and the synonym root in ἰψάινω had *bh*.

19. The recognition of *bh* rather than *dh* allows us to keep together in Latin *nubēs* 'cloud, thin texture' (cf. the late gloss *nouicula* for *nubicula*, 'rete ad capiendas aues' and *nebula linea* = the 'bride's veil,' Petronius, 55 fin.) and *nubere* 'to veil for,' and not to separate these from *obnubere* in the old formula *caput obnubito*, cf. Paulus (Festus), 207 I (de Ponor), *obnubit* 'caput operit; unde et nuptiae dictae a capitis opertione'; Placidus *obnuberat* 'co-operuerat, idcirco nuptiae ab obnubendo puellis capita dicuntur.'

20. Nor is the definition of *nubere* by 'to veil for' inconsistent with recognizing it as a cognate of O. Bulg. *snubiti* 'appetere, amare—to woo.' In Slavic and Romance lands alike there was a custom of bringing before a wooer

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several hooded and veiled women who must then be relieved of their veils (cf. § 18, on *snood*) by the wooer or his representative (so Hoffmann in *Rh. Mus.*, 56, 474). The custom was supposed by Usener (ibid. 30, 183 sq.) to be of great antiquity, but he seems not to have made the deduction that the Roman maiden's *flammeum* was the beautiful outgrowth, continued into our own times, of this ancient mummery. Then the *prōnūbae* may have developed out of the veiled women disveiled before the real bride was brought in. Of the bride, *nubere* will have meant 'to veil, put on the veil.' Is it really inconsistent to suppose that 'to veil,' if spoken of the bridegroom, referred to what he did with the veil, that is 'to remove the veil'? The denominative verbs of plain and visible definition tell us what is habitually done with (or to) the basal noun. In English *heads*=provides with a head, and *tops*=provides with a top, but each has also a privative usage=deprives of a head (or top). To *feather* an arrow is quite another guess thing from *feathering* a bird. It seems to me possible, then, that Latin *nubere* (of the woman) may mean 'to take (i.e. don) a veil,' and O. Bulg. *snubiti* (of the man) 'to take (i.e. doff) a veil.'

21. As to the difference between the pf. *nupsit* (ptc. *nupta*) and the pf. *obnubit*, no sound deduction of original difference between *nubo* and *obnubo* can be drawn. It were just as reasonable to argue a root difference between a first and second aorist of a Greek verb. Cf., with converse relation as between simplex and compound, *emit* and *dempsit*, *legit* and *dilexit*.

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SUMMARIES OF PERIODICALS.

LITERATURE AND GENERAL.

American Journal of Philology. Vol. 34. No. 1. 1913.

W. Peterson, *The Dialogue of Tacitus*. E. W. Fay, *Derivatives of the Root STHA in Composition, Second Part*. J. A. J. Drewitt, *the Genitives -ov and -oio in Homer*. K. F. Smith, *Note on Satyrus, Life of Euripides*, Oxyr. Pap. 9, 157-8. W. S. Fox, *Two Tabellae Defixionum in the Royal Ontario Museum*. A. P. Ball, *Julius or "Julius," a note on Verg. Aen. I. 286 sq.* Reviews: Sihler's *Annals of Caesar* (G. W. Botsford), Edmonds' *Greek Bucolic Poets* (W. P. Mustard), Curcio's *Q. Orazio Flacco Studiato in Italia dal Secolo XIII. al XVIII.* (W. P. Mustard). Brief Mention: White's *Verses of Greek Comedy*, Wilamowitz's *Reden und Vorträge*, Grünewald's *Die Satzparenthese bei den zehn Attischen Rednern*, the projected International Greek Thesaurus and Ehrlich's *Untersuchungen über die Natur der Griechischen Betonung*, the Editor.

Athenaeum. (Pavia: edited by Professor Carlo Pascal.)

Vol. I. Part I. 1913.

R. Sabbadini, *Two Ambrosian codices of Cicero*. The origin of *Codex Ambros. E. 14* (which contains *Epist. ad Att., ad Q. Fr., and ad Br.*, and is independent of the Medici codex 49. 18 and of a sister codex E. 15) is assigned to Milan rather than to Venice. Carlo Pascal, in *Varietà medievali et umanistiche*, quotes from *Ambros. codex (M 69)* 13 hexameter lines which resemble the *Carmen de Ponderibus*, ascribed by Hültsch (*Metrol. script.* II. p. 88) to a period not later than the sixth century. Noteworthy forms are: *calcus* for the ordinary *calculus*, *cerates* instead of the sing. *ceratium*. F. Calonghi, *A Latin Inscription found at Mergheb in Tripoli*. L. Castiglione, in *Some inferior MSS. of Seneca's de Ira*, discusses the origin of these two codices at Rome and Milan. C. Marchesi, in a *Grammatical note* discusses the constructions *fasciculus brachii crassitudine* and *fasciculus brachii crassitudinis*. Both occur in Pliny, though Columella prefers the genitive.

Vol. I. Part II.

Carlo Pascal, *The Moretum*. The *Moretum* is not mentioned in the ancient 'uitae' of Virgil, but in the ninth to the eleventh centuries is expressly attributed to him. Suggests that the fragment noticed or quoted by Macrobius (iii. 18, 11-12) of the poet Sueius, as well as that attributed to Virgil, both go back to a Greek original, but probably not to Parthenius (Cod. Ambros. T 21). Sums up against the probability of the existing poem being Virgil's. N. Terzaghi, in *The Heros of Menander and a passage in Horace*, discusses the title of Menander's play *Heros*, finds it confirmed by a fragment discovered in a Cairo papyrus, but disputes the relevance of evidence generally quoted from Horace (*Ars poet.* 114) or the schol. of Porphyryon on this line. G. d'Amico, *The Roman cult of Fortuna in the oldest times*. Quotes Varro (*De Lingua Latina* v. 74) to show that the Sabines had a similar cult, but with a different name. Traces are found in Umbria and elsewhere further South. The oldest conception was akin to that of *Tutela* and *Genius*. Under Etruscan influence first, and that of Magna Graecia later, the cult took more definite shape. By the end of the Punic Wars Fortuna appears as one of the chief divinities of Rome.

Berliner philologische Wochenschrift. 1913.

March 8. W. Ridgeway, *The Origin of Tragedy* (Nestle). The theory clears up many difficulties and deserves serious consideration. H. Weinstock, *De Erotico Lysiacō* (Raeder). A careful study of the language of L's speech in Plato's Phaedrus. W. Zillinger, *Cicero und die altrömischen Dichter*. Eine literarhistorische Untersuchung (Tolkiehn). U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Reden und Vorträge* (Schroeder). Third edition, including six new pieces; the most important of these is 'Geschichte der griechischen Religion, eine Skizze.' S. E. Stout, *The Governors of Moesia* (Vulić). 'An excellent book.'

March 15. G. Macdonald, *The Roman Wall in Scotland* (Anthes). Praised.

March 22. E. J. Goodspeed, *Index apologeticus* (Nestle). A useful concordance to the works of Justin Martyr and others. J. K. Schönberger, *Tulliana* (Sternkopf). On the text and language of *Sex. Rosc., Clu., Mur., Cael., Mil.* Maintains that A. C. Clark overrates *Σ. Vocabularium iurisprudentiae Romanae*, II. 1, III. 1, V. 1 (Brassloff). An interesting notice of the work by one of the contributors. E. Meyer, *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine* (Ebeling). Sums up results. F. Stolz and J. H. Schmalz, *Lateinische Grammatik*, fourth edition (Th. Stangl). A remarkable review by one who has special knowledge; high praise especially of Schmalz's work.

March 29. H. Schweizer-Sidler, *Tacitus, Germania* (E. Wolff). Seventh edition revised by E. Schwyzer. E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (Capelle). Has not made sufficient use of recent works on the subject.

April 5. F. Zorell, *Novi Testamenti Lexicon Graecum* (Nestle). A little fuller than Preuschen. F. Buecheler, *Petronii Saturae*, rec. F. B. (Tolkiehn). Fifth edition carefully revised by Heraeus. J. E. Harrison, *Themis* (Gruppe). Unfavourable.

April 12. O. Schroeder, *Über den gegenwärtigen Stand der griechischen Verswissenschaft* (Ebeling). This pamphlet (28 pp.) appeared in English in *Class. Phil.* 7, 137 sqq.

April 19. R. Laqueur, *Polybius* (Kallenberg). Seeks to show that P. recast his work in five successive editions. A. R. Crittenden, *The sentence structure of Virgil* (Jahn). Based on Wundt. Deserves study.

April 26. F. Richter, *Lateinische Sacralinschriften* (Samter). One of Lietzmann's *Kleine Texte*; 254 Inscriptions, all but three belonging to the Imperial period. E. Thomas, *Pétrone, l'envers de la société Romaine et études diverses* (Heraeus). Third edition of this valuable book, carefully revised and considerably enlarged. F. Stolle, *Das Lager und Heer der Römer* (Fröhlich). On the number of men in the legion, the length of the day's march, the development of the camp. The reviewer (who died in 1912) discusses several questions at length.

May 3. F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (Gruppe). Praises the book in some respects, but disagrees with many of its conclusions.

May 10. A. Lörcher, *Das Fremde und das Eigene in Ciceros Büchern De finibus bonorum et malorum und den Academicis* (Philippson). Ably written but misleading; underrates Cic. and overrates his sources. Reviewer examines the book in detail. C. Klotzsch, *Epirotische Geschichte bis zum Jahre 280 v. Chr.* (Swoboda). A comprehensive account. K. Schwarze, *Beiträge zur Geschichte altrömischer Agrarprobleme (bis 367 v. Chr.)* (Bardt). Valuable. C. Hude, *Lysiae orationes*, rec. C. H. (Thalheim).

May 24. W. M. Lindsay, *Isidori etymologiarum libri XX.*, rec. W. M. L. (Langenhörst). Rather unfavourable. A. E. Zimmern, *The Greek Commonwealth* (Swoboda). Valuable. F. Cumont, *Die orientalischen Religionen im römischen Heidentum* (Wissowa). German translation of lectures delivered at the Collège de France and at Oxford in 1905-06. High praise of C.'s work. H. Lamer, *Griechische Kultur im Bilde, Römische Kultur im Bilde* (Blümner). Useful for teaching, contain many pictures which are not in Schreiber, Baumeister, etc. Price, M. 1.25 each.

May 31. Fr. Ruehl, *Xenophontis scripta minora*. Fasc. II, ed. F. R. (Raeder).

Ruehl has revised Dindorf's text, collating once again the most important MSS. O. Leuze, *Zur Geschichte der römischen Censur* (Soltau). A thorough examination of the question, at what intervals new Censors were appointed, etc. A good collection of the evidence. In the summary of *Revue des études anciennes*, XV, 1, 2, the following words are quoted from C. Jullian, in reference to Sihler's *C. Julius Caesar*: 'M. Sihler cite un peu les Anglais, beaucoup les Allemands, jamais les Français. Il y a là un pur scandale.' The reason of this, says the writer of the summary, is that French publishers send scarcely any copies of their books abroad for review.

June 7. G. B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of his Age* (Lenschau). Sketches contents with approval. E. Preuschen, *Die Apostelgeschichte* erkl. von E. P. (Köhler). Forms part of Lietzmann's *Handbuch zum Neuen Testament*. Specially good on the language. M. Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters*. Part 1, from Justinian to the tenth century (Wilhelm). 'A standard work.' Forms part of Iwan Müller's *Handbuch*. E. A. Sonnenschein, *Latin Grammar* (Hermann). Generally favourable.

Classical Philology. Vol. 8. No. 2. 1913.

C. D. Buck, *The Interstate Use of the Greek Dialects*. J. A. Scott, *Paris and Hector in Tradition and in Homer*. B. L. Ullman, *Satura and Satire*. W. A. Oldfather, *Homeric*. W. D., Harry Langford Wilson, *In Memoriam*. Notes and discussions. J. W. White and P. Shorey, *The Rendering of Greek Verse*. W. S. Ferguson, *The Delian Gymnasiarchs*. R. J. Bonner, *The Minimum Vote in Ostracism*. W. S. Fox, *Note on Horace Odes* I. 27. 21-24. P. Shorey, *ἀντιρροπή οὐκ ἀντιβίει*; and *Emendation of Julian Oratio V* 179c. F. B. Tarbell, *Eumenés or Euménos*?

Classical Weekly (New York).

March 1. R. W. Livingstone, *The Greek Genius* (P. Shorey). 'His object, on the whole admirably accomplished. . . . But the implication that the possession of a few comprehensive formulas summing up the Greek genius is the chief abiding value of the study of Greek is a wide-spread delusion of popular culture.'

March 15. W. Headlam, *Agamemnon*, ed. by A. C. Pearson (E. D. Perry). 'Mr. Pearson has performed his difficult task with judgment and skill.'

April 12. W. Süss, *Aristophanes und die Nachwelt* (W. P. Mustard). 'Concerned mainly with German scholarship and literature.' 'It would have been easy to add many pages on the influence of A. in England.' H. Stuart Jones, *Companion to Roman History* (J. F. Ferguson). 'In general the book is an excellent reference-book for all the subjects it contains . . . several more subjects could be treated in a book of reasonable size.'

April 19. W. H. Fyfe, *Tacitus, The Histories*, tr. by W. H. F. (F. G. Moore). 'The great merits of the translation as a whole deserve warm praise and congratulation.'

April 26. A. W. Spratt, *Thucydides*, IV., ed. by A. W. S. (C. F. Smith). The explanatory notes admirable; 'at once brief and lucid.'

May 3. J. Sargeant, *Terence, with an English Translation* (G. Lodge). The price of this series is too high. The small bibliography 'is so peculiar that it is worth describing in detail.' 'The translation . . . gives a very good idea of the spirit of Terence. I do not mean by this that it is a translation; it is rather an imitation, but a good imitation. This being premised, we are prepared for a mass of inaccuracies, which would not be endurable in a strict translation.'

May 10. G. W. Elderkin, *Problems in Periclean Buildings* (D. M. Robinson). 'Suggestive and stimulating. It will have to be carefully considered by the specialists in Greek architecture.'

May 17. G. Dickins, *Catalogue of the Acropolis Museum*, Vol. I. (J. R. Wheeler).

'Anyone who will test this book by actual use in the Museum will find it most helpful.'

May 24. G. W. Botsford and L. S. Botsford, *A Source Book of Ancient History* (J. F. Ferguson). Intended as an auxiliary to Botsford's 'History of the Ancient World.' The material is translated.

Deutsche Literaturzeitung. 1913.

March 8. R. Foerster, *Libanii Opera*, rec. R. F. VII. (P. Maas). Completes the great Teubner edition of the declamations passing under the name of Libanius. Fr. Baumgarten and others, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur* (J. Ziehen). A joy to the adherents of classical education.

March 15. H. Dittmar, *Aischines von Sphettos* (H. Krauss). Studies in the history of the Socratic schools, especially as to opposing views of Aspasia, Alcibiades and others. T. Stangl, *Ciceronis Orationum Scholiastae* (E. Löfstedt). Quite excellent.

March 22. E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism* (E. Bonhöffer). Generally trustworthy. Fr. Stolle, *Des Lager und Heer der Römer* (R. Grosse). Discusses points connected with the Gallic wars. Fritz Norden, *Apuleius von Madaura und das römische Privatrecht* (O. Lenel). To be read with caution.

March 29. M. van Blankenstein, *Untersuchungen zu den langen Vocalen in der 8-Reihe* (A. Thumb). Shows the wide extension of the long-vowel grade. A. Roemer, *Aristarchs Athetesen in der Homerkritik* (C. Rothe). The first of the critical efforts of a life-time.

April 5. A. Boucher, *L'Anabase de Xenophon* (E. von Hoffmeister). Makes Xenophon's troops perform impossibilities.

April 12. W. A. Baehrens, *Beiträge zur lateinischen Syntax* (H. Lattmann). Nine essays, with the common purpose of maintaining the claims of manuscript readings against unjustifiable corrections.

May 3. H. Gomperz, *Sophistik und Rhetorik* (K. Münschner). Mistaken in supposing that the sophists were only concerned with rhetorical form. G. Jachmann, *Studia prosodiaca ad veteres poetas scaenicos Latinos pertinentia* (W. Hoffa). Explains by synizesis apparent instances of iambus-shortening in the penultimate rise.

May 10. Max Wundt, *Geschichte der griechischen Ethik*. II. *Der Hellenismus*. (A. Goedeckemeyer). Finds in the time of Augustus a conflict between an official Stoicism and Epicureanism in private life. J. Mussehl, *De Lucretiani libri primi condicione ac retractatione* (H. Lackenbacher). Demonstrates Lachmann's hypothesis that book i. was revised after the poem was completed.

May 17. E. Drerup, *Das fünfte Buch der Ilias* (C. Rothe). Helps us to understand the text and the poet.

May 24. H. Collitz and O. Hoffmann, *Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften*. IV., 4, 1. Nachträge, etc. (P. Kretschmer).

May 31. H. Collitz and O. Hoffmann, *Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften*. IV., 4, 1, etc. (P. Kretschmer). †G. M. Dreves, *Ein Jahrtausend lateinischer Hymnendichtung* (J. Werner). Gives material for a wide survey of medieval religious verse.

Hermes. Vol. 48. Part 2. 1913.

G. Pasquali, *Die schriftstellerische Form des Pausanias*. Discusses the extent to which Pausanias is indebted to Heliodorus, Polemon, and other *πρωτογενεῖς* for the literary form in which his work is cast. I. Hammer-Jensen, *Ptolemaios und Heron*, Hero must be later in date than Ptolemy since his work implies the existence of the theories and technique of Ptolemy. C. Blinkenberg, *Ῥόδον κτίσταις*, a discussion of the competing legends concerning the founders of Rhodes. R. Reitzenstein, *Philologische Kleinigkeiten*, (i.) Criticism of the *Ciris*, (ii.) *Das deutsche Heldenlied bei Tacitus*,

(iii.) *Adipalīs* bei Cicero. M. Lehnerdt, *Ein verschollenes Werk des älteren Plinius*, is inclined to believe in the tradition that Nicholas of Cusa saw in Germany a codex of Pliny, *On the German Wars*. U. Kahrstedt, *Nachlese auf griechischen Schlachtfeldern*, On the battles of Plataea and Sellasia.

Miscellen: L. Schmidt, *Das regnum Vannianum* in Plin. N. H. iv. 81. P. Maas, *das Epigramm auf Marcus Eis* *ἱαντόν*. L. Deubner, *Ein griechischer Hochzeitsspruch*, wishes to read *ἐκκόρει κορικωρώνην, κορικωρ.* being a reduplication like *χελιχελώνην*, and meaning a 'maiden,' while *ἐκκόρει* is used as in Ar. *Thesm.* 760. H. Mutschmann, on *Isocrat.* xiii. 12. H. Jacobsohn, *Ἀρράπιος, Antium*. S. Tafel, *Fragmente eines Glossars aus dem 9^{ten} Jahrhundert*. K. Praechter, on Cic. de Nat. Deorum 2. 33. 83. O. Kern, *Τίτιος*. B. Keil, *Pindarfragment*.

Journal of Philology. Vol. 32. No. 64. 1913.

J. Cook Wilson, *Difficulties in the Text of Aristotle*. The same, *Plato Timaeus* 37 c. The same, *Catullus* lxiii. 31. H. Jackson, *Eudemian Ethics*, *Θ* i. ii (H. xiii. xiv). I. Bywater, *Palaeographica*. E. G. Hardy, *The Policy of the Rullan Proposal* in 63 B.C. A. E. Housman, *Ciceroniana*. A. Platt, *Aeschylea*. The same, *Notes on Aristotle*. J. Cook Wilson, *Aristotle*, Met. 104^a 30 sqq. H. Jackson, *Aristotle* E. E. B viii. 1225^a 14. H. A. Δ viii. 533^b 15. Anon., 'Verify your Quotations.'

Nmemosyne. 41. 2.

J. C. Naber, *Observatiunculae de iure Romano* (cont.). A discussion of the forms used in the Ancient Law of the Roman, Greek, and Germanic peoples in disputes with regard to the ownership of property, especially the forms of the *διαδικασία* at Athens, (to be continued). P. H. Damsté, *Lectiones Valerianae*. Emendations of Val. Max. I.-II. (to be continued). A. Kurfess, *Varia* (cont.). Notes on Sall. in Cic. *insect.*, Fufi Caleni in Cic. *orat.* H. Wagenvoort, H. f., *De codice Senecae Angelico* (MS. lat. 1356). Besides the Ambrosianus inferior codices of Seneca repay study: evidence of codex Angelicus for *De Pronid.*, *De Breu. uitae.*, *Ad Polyb. de consol.* Collation of this codex and the Ambrosianus for the *De Consolatione*. P. H. Damsté, *Lucianae*. More critical notes to Lucian. J. W. Beck, *Ad Senecae Tragoedias* (cont.). Critical Notes on the *Phaedra*, in particular a discussion of a stanza-like arrangement of vv. 465-483. F. Groeneboom, *Adnotatiunculae ad Herodam*. Suggestions on the text with some useful parallels. L. v. Wageningen, *Ad Manilium*. J. J. Hartman, *Ad Plutarchi Moralia annotationes criticae* (cont.). Critical notes on pp. 267 to 341. *Quaest. Rom.*, *De fortuna Rom.*, *De Alex. magni fortuna aut uirtute* certainly by Plutarch. *Quaest. Gr.*, *Parallela* certainly not.

Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum, etc. XXXI. 3. 1913.

W. Aly, *Anytos, der Ankläger des Sokrates*. A life and characterization of A., who is made the son of the Anthemion of 'Aθ. Πολ. 7 and identified with the Anytos of Lysias xxii. 8. C. Hosius, *Plagiatoren und Plagiatbegriff im Altertum*. A survey of ancient authors' methods in borrowing from their predecessors, and their conception of originality, à propos of recent books by H. Peter and E. Stemplinger. P. Corssen, *Das Gefängnis der Antigone*. Antigone was confined neither in a natural cave nor in a tomb, but in an earth prison shut by a stone which could be removed from the outside. Evidence for such prisons is adduced (see especially *Iliad* V. 385 and Plutarch *Philopomen* 19, and compare the prison of guilty Vestals), and their relations to beehive tombs and treasures are discussed.

XXXI. 4. 1913.

L. Weniger, *Der Hochaltar des Zeus in Olympia*: its position, dimensions, shape (with tentative sketches), ritual, and history. G. Friedrich, *Q. Horatius Flaccus*. A study of H. as a 'poet' who lacks 'poetry' but has all that can supply its place.

Plinius, is a codex of *nachtfeldern*,
 P. Maas, *zeitsspruch*, *εὐώνη*, and
 mann, on
es Glossars
 O. Kern,

XXXI. 5. 1913.

R. Günther, *Richard Wagner und die Antike*. J. Ferber, *Der Lustbegriff in Platons Gesetzen*. A study of ἰδρονή in the *Laws*, with comparative reference to other dialogues, especially the *Philebus*. J. van Wageningen, *Tibulls sogenannte Träumereien*. The train of thought in Tibullus' poems is apt to be disturbed by 'flight of ideas' (*Ideenflucht*): a single word diverts him into digressions from his main theme, e.g. in I. iii. 34 *antiquo*, in I. x. 15 *Lares*, in I. vii. 22 and 36 *Nilus* and *una*. From this point of view van W. analyses several poems (especially II. xv.), and defends T. from the charge of loosely stringing together in a single poem the matter of divers Greek epigrams. F. Knoke, *Die Topographie von Syrakus*. Throughout Thucydides' story of the siege ὁ κύκλος means not a circular fort but 'the wall of circumvallation,' as it necessarily does in vii. 2. 5. In vi. 98. 2 ἵναπερ is to be taken with ἐρείχων τὸν κ. as well as with καθεύδονοι. W. Nestle, reviews of R. Hirzel's *Plutarch*, H. Steiger's *Euripides, seine Dichtung und seine Persönlichkeit*, and L. Hahn's *Das Kaisertum* (Hefte 4-6 of *Das Erbe der Alten*, edited by O. Crusius and others). H. Peter, review of A. Michaelis and E. Petersen's *Otto Jahn in seinen Briefen*.

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Philologus. LXXI. Heft 4. 1913.

W. Capelle, *Πεδάριος—μετάριος* (continued). The use and meaning of μετάριος down to Theophrastus are dealt with. W. Aly, *Ursprung und Entwicklung der ketischen Zeusreligion*. The writer 'rejects on principle' the conclusions of Miss Jane Harrison (in *Annual of the Brit. School*, xv., p. 308). F. H. Weissbach, *Zu Herodots persischer Steuerliste*. Criticizes severely the solution put forward by C. F. Lehmann-Haupt in Klio XII. 240 sqq. 1912. L. Jeep, *Priscianus*, III. An investigation of sources in Priscianus, Diomedes, etc. H. Georgii, *Zur Bestimmung der Zeit des Servius*. Argues from Macrobius, *Saturn.* I. i. 5, 6, 'nec mihi fraudi sit, si uni aut alteri ex his quos coetus coegit matura aetas posterior saeculo Praetextati fuit,' that Servius was born about 370, not 350-360, as commonly stated. In 'uni aut alteri' Macr. refers to Servius and Avienus. C. E. Gleye, *Die Moskauer Sammlung mittelgriechischen Sprichwörter*. Criticisms on the text and additions to the commentary of Krumbacher's edition of this collection (published 1900). O. Immisch, *De Eubio*. In Ovid *Trist.* II. 415 explains 'descripsit' as ἐκφραστικῶς ἔλεξε, and 'corrumpi semina matrum' by Soranus, p. 343 (ed. Rose). W. Nestle, *Zu Od.* ζ 185. Proposes κάλλιμον αὐτοῖς for τ' ἐκλυον αὐτοί. B. Warnecke, *Ad Naevium et Bacchylidem*. Compares 'ἐν χειρὶ μόνῳ' in B's 'Ἐρωτικά with 'cum pallio uno' in N. H. Stich. O. Crusius, *Extra oleas latus*. Explains the entry in a school report—diligentia—extra oleas nonnihil latus'—(made at Zweibrücken in 1764), by reference to Ar. *Frogs* 994/5. Crusius points out that the phrase occurs in Erasmus' *Adagia*.

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Revue de Philologie. Vol. 36. Nos. 3 and 4. 1912.

P. Lejay, *Origins of a Preposition absque*. The *que* is a conjunction. *absque* *ted* *esset* (Plaut. *Men.* 1021) and the like are properly explanatory parentheses, *que* being explicative as in old Latin. By Fronto's time this had been forgotten and *absque* was used in the sense of *sine*. The same, *Note on quod conditional*. Jordan's view that *quod* in e.g. 'quod tu speres' Ter. *Andr.* 395 has the sense of *si* is defended against C. E. Bennett's idea that it means 'although.' L. Méridier, *ζουθός*. The word need never refer to colour: in every case its reference may be either to sounds or movements. L. Havet, *Horace* od. 1. 27. 19 l. 'quanta laboras scis Charybdi.' The same, *Lucan* 6. 337-8. 'rapidi Leonis solstitiale caput' refers to the rising of the Dogstar and

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means 'the beginning of the Lion's consuming period which is near the solstice.' In Hor. *od.* 3. 29 the 'stella uestani Leonis' is a Leonis, not the constellation. M. Brilliant, *a Tomi inscription*. History and text, with comments, of a Greek inscription now in the courtyard of an hotel in the Rue du Hambourg at Paris (ap. Cagnat no. 604). H. Lebégue, *Seneca* epist. ad Lucilium. On three passages (*ep.* xii. 5, liii. 6, lx. 2) where b (= cod. Par. 8539) gives the truth. L. Delaruelle, *Observations on Cicero*. On the text of *Ac.* I 17; II 11; 69; 81. *Nat. D.* II 49 (124); III 50; 62. The same, *Virg. Aen.* VIII 101. I. 'ripaeque propinquant.'

Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. 68. 2.

F. Rühl, *Randglossen zu den Hellenika von Oxyrhynchos*. A discussion of historical points, making to show the superiority of the Papyrus over Xenophon. T. Lenschau, *Der Staatsstreich der Vierhundert*. An examination of the evidence on the lines of a reconciliation of Aristotle and Thucydides. The decrees of *Ath. Pol.* 30, 31, belong to the months after the fall of the Four Hundred and are wrongly placed in the unfinished text. K. Witte, *Wort- und Versrhythmus bei Homer*. Mainly to show the principles on which words of trochaic form are used as trochees and in certain positions in the verse. E. Petersen, *Lenäen oder Anthesterien*. Primarily to connect a group of 5th century Attic vases with the Anthesteria rather than with the Lenaea, as does Frickenhaus. Also discussion of forms of Dionysus-cult. R. Reitzenstein, *Horaz, Od.* i. 32. Aesthetic interpretation; establishes *poscimur* in v. 1. G. Friedrich, *Drei Epigramme des Martial*. Notes on iv. 8, the Emperor's day, vi. 3, esp. date of book, vii. 87, on text, esp. proper names. K. Barwick, *Umfang der Lücke in Tacitus Dialogus de oratoribus*: The codices show that the lacuna is one-twelfth of the whole book. A. Klotz, *Über die Bedeutung des Namens Hellespont bei den Geographen*. The idea that the name was extended to a part of the Aegean is the baseless fancy of a late grammarian. P. Corssen, *Der Mythos von der Geburt des Dionysus*. On Euripides' rationalizing in the *Bacchae*. The 'piece of aether' (v. 292) is cosmology: a connection with Protagoras. *Miszellen*.

Rivista di Filologia e d' Istruzione Classica. Vol. 41. No. 2. 1913.

D. Bassi, *The Cabinet of Herculeaneum Papyri in the National Museum of Naples*. A full account of the steps taken to preserve and make accessible this collection. M. L. de Gubernatis, *Roman Music and Poetry from its inception to Augustus*. Latin music was completely dominated by Hellenistic Greek music. After the conquest of Egypt orchestral music grew steadily in popularity. The lyrical compositions of Catullus and Horace were sung to a musical accompaniment. A. G. Amatucci, *On a passage in Donatus Life of Terence*. For 'Vallegius in actione ait' read 'Valgius' (so P. Daniel Aurelianus) 'in cantione ait.' E. Bignone, *The fortunes of Lucretius and Epicureanism in the Middle Ages*. The evidence adduced by Manitius (with the exception of perhaps one passage) and Philippe in the *Revue de l'histoire des religions* (1895-6) is insufficient to prove a direct knowledge of Lucretius in the Middle Ages, as all the quotations may have come from the grammarians. Dante may have obtained *Paradiso* XIV 114 sqq. from Lactantius *De ira Dei* 10. 3. J. E. Harry, *Emendation of Eur.* H. F. 495. Proposes ἄλυσ γὰρ ἰλθόν (or -ών) τι κενόν. L. Dalmaso, *Word-Formation in Palladius*. Includes lists of Substantives in (a) -culum, -crum, (b) -do, -tudo, (c) -men, -mentum, (d) -tas, (e) -tor, -sor (-torium, -sorium), (f) -tio, -sio, (g) -tura, -sura, (h) other formations, (i) diminutives. F. Stabile, *de Codice Cavensi inedito 'Vitae Alexandri Magni' Leonis archiepiscopi: accedunt animadversiones criticae in editionem Landgraf.* P. L. Ciceri, *A corrupt passage in the Octavius*. In Minuc. Oct. 23. 6 suggests the insertion of *Pyraemon* (vulg. *Vulcanus*) between *illic* and *Iouis*. D. Bassi, *Scheme for a treatise of Greek Papyrology for literary texts apropos of a recent publication*. Sketch of the methods and contents of such a manual with reference to Mitteis' and Wilcken's *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyrskunde* (1912).

Wiener Studien. XXXIII. 2.

Josef Dörfler, *Die Orphik in Platons Gorgias*. Traces of Orphic teaching in G. discussed under the headings 'Dualism,' 'Ethics,' and 'Eschatology.' The Gorgias is the earliest dialogue which shows an intimate knowledge of Orphic doctrine, and was composed after P.'s journey in Magna Graecia and Sicily. Hans Lackenbacher, *Die Behandlung des ΠΑΘΟΣ in der Schrift ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΟΥΣ*. The treatment of 'pathos' began in the lacuna in c. IX. L. Radermacher, *Lukians ΠΑΘΙΟΝ Η ΕΥΧΑΙ*. The work, written about 160, is aimed at the literary pretensions of Arrian. Alois Rzach, *Neue kritische Versuche zu den sibyllinischen Orakeln*. Gustavus Przychocki, *De Gregori Nazianzeni epistularum codicibus Laurentianis*. Examination of contents of MSS. O. Schissel v. Fleschenberg, *Die kunstlerische Absicht in Petrons Saturae*. 'Encolpis religiöse Anwendungen [werden sich] als charakterisierende Züge in dem realistischen Porträte des zwischen schlecht assimilierten Rationalismus u. krassem Aberglauben haltlos schwankenden . . . Durchschnittsmenschen der früheren Kaiserzeit darstellen.' Rich. Mollweide, *Die Entstehung der Cicero-Exzerpte des Hadaard u. ihre Bedeutung für die Textkritik*. In the early Middle Ages there were two Corpus Collections of Cicero, that of Leiden and that of Hadaard. Robert Novák, *Kritische Nachlese zu Ammianus Marcellinus*. R. Kauer, zu Donat II.

Wochenschrift für klassische Philologie. 1913.

Mar. 17. C. Rothe, *Der augenblickliche Stand der homerischen Frage* (F. Stürmer). E. Feyeraabend, *De verbis Plautinis personarum motum in scaena exprimentibus* (P. Wessner). 'A collection showing diligence and care.' Twenti Hauton Timorumenos, ed. by F. G. Ballentine (P. Wessner). 'Good.' E. Norden, *Aus Ciceros Werkstatt* (Nohl). 'An acute and thorough investigation.'

Mar. 24. C. Wengatz, *De Plauti senariorum iambicorum compositione artificiosiore* (P. Wessner). F. Haverfeld, *The Romanization of Roman Britain* (A. Schulten). 'Has collected all the most important results in this excellent little book.'

Mar. 31. Fraenkel, *Geschichte der griechischen Nomina agentis auf -της, -της, -της* (r.). I. (Helbing). 'An admirable work.' Th. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*. II. 3. Aufl. (W. Nestle). E. Fraenkel, *De media et nova comoedia quaestiones selectae* (E. Wüst). 'Full and interesting.' E. G. Hardy, *Roman Laws and Charters*, transl. with introd. and notes by E. G. H. (Grupe). 'Meritorious.'

Apr. 7. J. E. Harry, *Studies in Sophocles* (F. Adami). 'The conjectures will not find much approval.' O. Lautensach, *Die Aoriste bei den attischen Tragikern und Komikern* (Helbing). 'A model performance.'

Apr. 14. J. L. Strachan-Davidson, *Problems of the Roman Criminal Law* (Grupe). 'Would repay a German translation.' A. Stahl, *Der lateinische Akkusativ mit dem Infinitiv, genetisch dargestellt* (Draheim). 'Does not go much farther than Kühner and Schmalz.'

Apr. 21. H. Spiess, *Menschenart und Heldentum in Homers Ilias* (Leuchtenberger). 'To be recommended for school libraries.' C. Fensterbusch, *Die Bühne des Aristophanes* (P. Graeber). 'Against the Dörpfeld-Reisch theory.' R. B. Steele, *Case usage in Livy*. III. *The accusative* (H. Blase). R. G. Kent, *Note on 'malis ridentem alienis'*, *Hor. Sat. II, 3, 72* (Nohl).

Apr. 28. E. Belzner, *Homerische Probleme, II. Die Komposition der Odyssee* (F. Stürmer). Ch. Favre, *Specimen thesauri verborum, quae in titulis Ionicis leguntur, cum Herodoteo sermone comparati* (H. Kallenberg). G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*. 2 Aufl. (H. Steuding.) R. Pichon, *Les Sources de Lucain* (R. Helm). 'Concludes that Lucan possesses far more historical value than is usually allowed.'

May 5. G. Maspero, *Essais sur l'art Egyptien* (A. Wiedemann). 'Interesting not only to archaeologists but to all friends of antiquity.' B. J. Ullmann, *Horace and Tibullus* (G. Friedrich). B. Stech, *Senatores Romani qui fuerint inde a Vespasiano usque ad Traianum exitum* (Köhler).

May 12. E. Drerup, *Das fünfte Buch der Ilias. Grundlagen einer homerischen Poetik* (F. Stürmer). 'A model of thorough poetical comprehension.' H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. 3 Aufl. I. II. (W. Nestle). J. Middendorf, *Elegiae in Maecenatem commentario grammatico instructae adiuncta quaestione chronologica* (J. H. Schmalz). 'The standpoint to be approved, but much remains obscure.'

May 19. H. Steiger, *Euripides* (K. Busche). 'A rich fountain of learning about Euripides.' W. W. Jaeger, *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles* (A. Kraemer). 'A clear and lively-written book.' H. Holstein, *De monobiblii Propertii sermone et de tempore quo scripta sit* (A. Kraemer). 'A useful collection of material.' *Reform in Grammatical Nomenclature*. University Bulletin, N.S. XIII. 6. *Humanistic Papers*, Sec. Ser. II. (H. Blase). 'Can be warmly recommended.'

LANGUAGE.

Indogermanische Forschungen. XXXI. Band, 4 Heft. 1913.

Of the eleven items included in this continuation of the Delbrück *Festschrift*, nine are devoted to Teutonic and Letto-Slavonic. The late F. Solmsen writes on the following Greek words: ἐς οὐ, ζῆλον, ἰάκος, κρούς, ὁμιχέω, παῖς, πασποφόρος, σφαιροτήρ, τάλαντον. Then follows a list of Delbrück's philological works, including magazine articles and reviews 1862-1912. This is continued and completed in the next Heft, xxxi, 5.

Anzeiger. Reviews of J. H. Moulton's *Einleitung in die Sprache des Neuen Testaments*, a translation of the third edition of his *Prolegomena*; very favourable; the German translation is said by Radermacher to be really a fourth edition, as it contains so much new material incorporated by the author. There is also a review by Meltzer of Miss Nye's *Sentence connection, illustrated chiefly from Livy*, which is described as showing 'great care, good arrangement, and sound judgment.'

The obituary notices include two names of the greatest importance to all students of classical philology, R. Meister, the author of standard works on the Greek Dialects, and Ferdinand de Saussure, who laid the foundation of the *Ablaut* theory in his *Mémoire sur le système primitif des voyelles dans les langues indo-européennes*, 1879.

Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung. XLV. 3. 1913.

W. Schulze, *Ἀττικὸν κῆρυξ*. Plato's reference, *Kratylos* 414 c, is to the Attic form, not to *κῆρυξ*. Ernst Fraenkel, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Adjektiva auf -τικός*. F. Bechtel, *Paverga*: Homeric ἀγχιστίος, ἀδενκίς, ἀμφιγυγίης, ἀμφιλόκη νῆς, ὠκίς als Femininum, νυκτάλωψ; Lit. *gimti*, Got. *ḡiman*. Karl Fr. W. Schmidt, *Homerisch ἰθών*. The word is connected with Gr. ἰθρῖς, Skt. *vadhri*, *avadhri*, cf. O. Baktr. *vādāy*, Gr. ὠθίω. Hence correct Hesych. ἰθῆεν ἔτρεχεν. ἰθῆει (leg. ἰθῆι ὠθῆι). W. Schulze, *Latin mundus*, etc. *mundus* < *mū-dnos*: Sl. *myti*, Skt. *mūtram*. Gr. δῆλος: for the connection with Lat. *dolare* cf. Hieron. *Ep̄p̄*. 8, 1. L. Sadée, *Zur Erklärung der attischen Schiffsnamen*. The arrangement of the names of ships in the lists CIA. II. 789-812. W. Schulze, *Dor. Φωαμί*. The simplification of σσ also in Cretan *Φωάμην*. Ernst Sittig, *Καρποκράτης*. Discussion of the form as bearing on the rough breathing of Ἀρποκράτης and the transcription of Phoenician gutturals. G. N. Hatzidakis, *Der Ausfall der Vokale im ionischen Dialekt*. R. Trautmann, *Ahd. Manzon*: Gr. μάζος, Lat. *mamma*. W. Schulze, *καχορμύση*. Id., *Der Fuchs*. The names ἀλωφός, Osl. *lebedz*, Gr. ἀλφός: Lat. *uolpes*, etc.

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